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A new social security benefit called Earnings Top-up (ETU) was
introduced as a three year pilot in October 1996 . ETU is an income-
related, in-work benefit available to people who work 16 or more hours
per week and do not have dependent children . The aim of ETU is to
improve the incentives for people to take up work or stay in work of 16
hours or more.
Two versions of the benefit are being piloted - Scheme A and Scheme B
- which differ in their level of benefit entitlement . Each scheme was
introduced in four areas which were matched in terms of labour market
characteristics : major urban areas, large towns, rural and seaside areas.
Four more matched areas were selected for study as control areas . Research
is being carried out in all twelve areas, which represent about one tenth
of the British labour market.
Research has shown that Family Credit - which is an in-work benefit for
people with dependent children - has been successful in helping low-
paid families get and keep paid work, especially lone parents (Marsh and
McKay, 1993 ; Marsh, Ford and Finlayson, 1997). The ETU pilot intends
to evaluate whether in-work wage supplementation of this kind would
be effective for all low-paid workers, not just those with dependent
children. In particular, interest centres on the effects of ETU upon its
potential customers among low-paid workers, on the unemployed whom
it may help find work, on employers, and on the labour market.
The research that will assist this evaluation is being carried out by The
Policy Studies Institute (PSI), The Institute for Employment Research
(IER) at the University of Warwick and The Centre for Research in
Social Policy (CRSP) at the University of Loughborough . This joint
research effort can be summarised in a number of inter-related strands:
Field surveys of low-paid workers-in-work.
Field surveys of the longer-term unemployed.
Surveys of employers.
Analysis of official administrative statistics.
Studies of local labour market conditions.
In-depth interviews with key participants.
This report is a baseline study which provides data for comparison when
the research is continued in the same way during the succeeding three
years of the ETU pilot evaluation. It presents the results of the first
surveys of low-paid workers and unemployed people ; of the surveys of
employers ; and of the preliminary labour market analyses, all carried out
in the summer months prior to the introduction of ETU in October
1996 .
The workers, in -x ork sure e i~ The sample was selected using National Insurance records from the tax
year 1994/95 to identify low earning employed and self-employed workers
in the twelve ETU evaluation areas (eight pilot and four control areas).
2,400 interviews were achieved in summer 1996, representing a response
rate of 79 per cent . Three out of ten of the `employed ' sample had left
work by time of their interview.
The majority of the low-paid workers-in-work sample were women (56
per cent) . Women had persisted longer in their low-earning jobs since
1995: 27 per cent of the men but only 11 per cent of the women in the
sample had been lost to unemployment meanwhile . Among the single-
earner couples, women outnumbered men as the breadwinners by two
to one. Women were more likely to have partners : nearly half were
married or in couples compared with four in ten men.
4;v The sample was comprised of working-age people, excluding families
with dependent children . This resulted in a bi-modal age distribution,
with very few aged between 35 and 44 years, while 44 per cent of the
workers-in-work were aged 45-plus.
l rluaatio,i Educational levels were low . More than half the workers-in-work had
no educational qualifications and just ten per cent had qualifications at A-
level or above. Women had less education than men : 57 per cent had no
qualifications compared with 48 per cent of men . Overall, younger
respondents were more likely to hold qualifications, with particularly
striking differences between younger and older women.
Among the older workers, few had any qualifications at all . But even
among the young, educational levels were still low by comparison with
higher earners : half the under 25s had no more than a few GCSE or CSE
equivalents and fewer than one in seven had an A-level or better . There
was however a cadre of single, well-educated under 25s for whom their
current low earnings was probably a temporary phenomenon.
A narrow majority of these low-paid workers had no housing costs, or
paid only nominal amounts . As many as three-quarters of the under 25s
lived this way, paying small contributions, and most of the rest lived rent
free . This is important for the workings of ETU since entitlements to the
benefit will not count against Housing Benefit in work.
Tenure seemed much more closely related to life-course stage than to
employment status . The large numbers of younger workers among single
people (four out of ten were under 25), their very low wages and their
lack of housing costs, all suggest a solid customer base for ETU among
the young. Had the sample base been more contemporary, young workers
might have been an even larger presence among such likely customers.
However, the time-lag between sampling and interview left out those
who, by 1996, had become 18 and 19 ; the youngest respondents were
20.
2
Though low paid, not all the workers had the kind ofjobs that are usually
thought of as low paid . Six out of ten certainly had jobs that lay
recognisably at the bottom of the income distribution, dividing evenly
into four groups : personal services, sales, plant operatives and ` other
unskilled' jobs - the women concentrating in service and sales sectors,
the men in operative and other unskilled jobs . The remaining four out
often, however, divided evenly into three categories : craft workers, clerical
jobs and even twelve per cent who were ` professional and managerial '
workers - though many of the latter were likely to be self-employed and
said to be earning little or nothing.
2 .7 Job soticto~ctior2 Broadly, low-paid workers seemed reconciled to the sort of work they
did even without the possible advantage of ETU . Most actually liked
their jobs and only a quarter said they were actively looking out for a
new one . These jobseekers, however, said they would continue in the
same line of work and sought wages only a little higher than their present
wage - typically they sought less than £120 a week.
This suggests that the initial deadweight inflow to the benefit is likely to
be composed of a stable population of low-paid workers who have little
expectation of a better-paid job . Like Family Credit jobs, ETU jobs may
lack a career structure (Bryson et al, 1997) - 70 per cent of the sample
saw their jobs, one way or another, as `dead-ends ' . Added to that, seven
out of ten said that, if they were seeking a new job, they would certainly
be glad of some kind of `wage top-up' if one were made available, sooner
than hold out for higher wages . This was particularly true of those still in
work and may have interesting outcomes for eventual take-up of ETU.
Earnings were low of course, as the sampling design intended, averaging
just £100 a week for a 34 hour week, rarely supplemented by any other
income: an average of just £3 .00 an hour . Even taking out the relatively
few part-time workers, average earnings rose only little . The best-paid
group were women supporting husbands and even they managed only
£3 .40 an hour.
The sample of (claimant) unemployed individuals was drawn from the
Departmental Central Index (DCI) at the Department of Social Security.
The sample was taken from the medium-term unemployed, with 26-65
weeks of unemployment at the point of sampling . This duration-band
constituted about 20-25 per cent of all claimant unemployed in each of
the twelve ETU pilot localities . 1,991 interviews were achieved,
representing an 81 per cent response rate among eligible sample members.
By the time of the interview, just 64 per cent of the ` unemployed' sample
remained unemployed and seeking work . The remainder either had jobs
(16 per cent) or were too unwell to seek work (13 per cent) ; only a
handful were in education or training .
3
S . 4
(icmlr The unemployed and workers-in-work samples differed substantially in
their composition by gender. Fewer than one in three of the unemployed
sample but nearly three in five of the workers-in-work sample were
women.
Because those with dependent children were excluded from the survey,
it was expected that there would be an abnormally low proportion from
the prime-age groups, when children are being born and raised, and that
the sample would be concentrated among younger and older individuals.
As expected, only 30 per cent were aged 25-44, but the sample was not
markedly skewed towards younger people, with just under one-third of
the unemployed sample being under 25. The shift was towards older age
bands : 37 per cent of the sample was aged 45 or over . This age distribution
may partly account for higher rates of ill health (see below).
Even compared with the lowest-paid workers, the unemployed had a
poor accumulation of `human capital ' . They were (even) more likely to
lack any qualifications (56 per cent) and, among the under 25s, to recall
having persistently truanted from school (46 per cent) . They had typically
spent only one-third of the past five years in employment and the same
proportion unemployed, indicating a very weak competitive position in
the jobs market . Both ETU samples suggest a fairly severe level of
educational disadvantage among low-paid workers and the unemployed.
3 . Health or ill health can also be considered an aspect of human capital
since it may limit paid work in various ways, or be a source of
discrimination. Persistent illness was common, reported now or in the
recent past by a third of unemployed men and four out of ten unemployed
women compared with a quarter and a fifth among employed men and
women.
3 . G I-I, The great majority of unemployed men were single : only three out of
ten of them had partners compared with four out of ten employed men.
Among women, even fewer of the unemployed (22 per cent) but more
of the employed (48 per cent) had partners . More importantly, the majority
of these partners were themselves unemployed . Whereas 61 per cent of
the unemployed sample had no other employed person in their household,
the proportion was only 42 per cent for the employed sample.
A very high proportion of single unemployed people lived with their
parents - more than two-thirds of them did so. So many still lived at
home, especially the men, and so many of the rest were older, that the
housing tenure profile of low-income people without children is very
different from those with children . Four out of ten of the unemployed
Human capital is a term used by economists to describe the skills, capacity and
abilities possessed by an individual which permit her or him to earn income .
and a quarter of the workers-in-work were social tenants, far fewer than
low-income families with children.
There was a relatively low level of job search activity among the
unemployed sample ; 18 per cent were in a job or waiting to take up a job
by the time of interview; 57 per cent were still claiming benefit and
actively seeking a job ; but 26 per cent had not recently been actively
seeking paid employment (includes seven per cent who were `unemployed'
but not claiming) . The inactive proportion was 22 per cent in the case of
men but 36 per cent for women . Even after excluding those on disability
benefits, there were quite high proportions not seeking work (13 per
cent of men and 23 per cent of women).
Of the economically active, there were quite high proportions making
only a few job applications or none at all . There were strong indications
that the social networks of the unemployed sample contained fewer
employed people . If, as might reasonably be assumed, employed friends
are more useful for providing information about job vacancies, then the
unemployed sample was evidently at a disadvantage since so many of the
people they knew were themselves out of work.
eisi,.er h,°1.iavi
	
For the sample of unemployed people, the analysis tested several
dnd ()lUtCome multivariate models . The main purpose of the analysis was to test the
capacity of the sample, and the survey measures used, for assessing the
issues of interest to the ETU evaluation . Several `time models ' were
estimated to examine the current determinants of economic activity ; the
rate of entry into employment ; job-search intensities ; and wage
expectations.
or 11111t k The extent of economic activity was low compared with other studies of
unemployed people
. The model indicated that economic activity was
depressed by high rates of ill-health among the unemployed sample.
Women were also less active job-seekers, especially those with access to
some non-waged income other than partner ' s earnings . Men's activity
was increased by a recent history of temporary work and raised further
among those reporting frequent social exchanges.
t tltploynt(!lt A minority of the unemployed sample (14 per cent) had found paid
employment by the time of their interview (two per cent more were self-
employed) . Among those free from sickness, the strongest influence on
early work-entry was recent employment experience, suggesting again
that employers rely on work histories in judging suitability for
employment . In contrast, `human capital' factors were weak . Women
who were economically active tended to obtain work more easily than
did men, especially if they had a non-working partner . The latter runs
counter to research with less geographically-restricted samples. There
was some evidence that those in ETU pilot areas (Scheme A and B) were
moving into work faster than in the control areas, though other evidence
dampened speculation that this might be some kind of ` anticipation effect'.
It seemed more likely to suggest that ETU Scheme B areas had somewhat
more attractive or efficient labour markets for low-wage workers.
5.3 Job search intensity The estimated model simultaneously contrasted those making `moderate '
numbers of job applications (one to five a week) with those making
none, and those making `high ' numbers (more than five) with those
making none . Moderate rates were associated with younger unemployed
people and those who had less access to non-wage income or lower
wage expectations (see also below) . Higher rates of job applications
were, in turn, influenced by better education, experience both of training
schemes and more continuous employment, and by age.
5,4 GI pectations Wage expectations were carefully measured. Amounts sought in new
employment averaged £122 a week overall, higher in fact than the average
take-home pay earned by the parallel sample of low-paid workers-in-
work. Controlling for other factors, wage expectations were lowest in
ETU Scheme B areas and highest in Scheme A areas (£116 vs £127).
For the practical efficiency of the new benefit, this difference is the wrong
way round : A-area jobseekers will more often pitch their wage expectation
beyond the scope of the eligibility rules compared with B-area jobseekers
who will bring lower expectations to more generous entitlement levels.
But the difference is not large and it remains to be seen quite what they
do get if and when they start work in 1997 . Other influences on wage
expectations were as expected, with higher values associated with better
education, people with driving licences, and people in the middle years -
who of course are relatively few among a sample of people without
children. Debt was also important : an overhang of debt forced people to
look for higher wages in work than they may be able to find . Previous
studies of Family Credit have also shown debt to be a disincentive to
work.
6 Financial incentives among The analysis estimated who among the continuing unemployed would
out-of work households be better off in work at their preferred wages, who would then be entitled
to apply for ETU and who would not, and what difference ETU would
make to the `better-off estimates for potential applicants currently out-
of-work. In all of these estimates, continued (though reduced) entitlement
to other benefits, typically Housing Benefit, and receipt of other non-
wage income was taken into account alongside their minimum wage
expectations.
6 .1 Wages and final incomes in Even without ETU most unemployed people (87 per cent) would be
work have been better off in work (all other entitlements considered) at their
preferred wages, while 13 per cent would have made a loss from work.
They would be an average of £44 a week better off. The unemployed
were prepared to work full-time hours, on average, for the equivalent of
less than half average hourly earnings for their area . They sought a final
income gain of around £40 per week if they did not have partners, and
about £60 if they did.
Under Scheme A, half those currently out of work would have qualified
for ETU in work at their expected wages, while under Scheme B, the
proportion was nearer two-thirds . The addition of ETU to preferred
earnings would have left almost everyone considerably better off in work
than out of work . This offered a wide margin for further reductions in
wage expectations: people 's preferred total incomes in work could be
maintained at an average wage of £80 a week; only £20 a week would
still see the average jobseeker in profit if ETU was added to their in-work
income. The apparent ease with which margins in work were maintained
in this way was due to the relative absence of housing costs (see also next
page) . This is not to say that, in every case, housing costs would remain
absent if they had got a job.
Finally for the unemployed, an analysis was carried out of their expected
()III(' in work incomes in work, disaggregating their expected wages (less any recurring
in-work expenses), their continued benefit entitlements, and any other
income they expected to receive . Respondents estimated their future
prospects in work and how they might respond, in their own view, to
the introduction of some form of wage supplementation.
.Sonrcec o income ivhoti in Prior to ETU, four additional sources of income appeared in people ' s
work calculations of their total incomes in work: partner's earnings, Housing
Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, and pensions . Expected in-work expenses
were high with a median value of £19 a week. Only a quarter of renters
expected any Housing Benefit in work . On average, 87 per cent of their
total expected income in work was sought from wages alone.
7 2 11 5hae di Jrrerrce r.r wind Gains from work were expected to be £67 a week, though downwardly
~asras Jrorrr work rrrake 2 adjusted to £49 a week after in-work expenses such as travel . Most
people judged accurately the extent to which their expected total incomes
in work would leave them better off compared with their current out-of-
work incomes.
This combination of low wage expectations (compared at least to average
earnings, for example) that still leaves those who attain them relatively
much better off than their out-of-work incomes and commonly in scope
of ETU, creates an interesting tension : will they lower their expectations
still further when the benefit is actually available? We can only point out
now that these wage expectations were designed to reflect a `rock bottom '
position . These levels also reflect some of the latest offers they are likely
to encounter from employers . The 1997 levels will show us what they
chose in the event.
Tl?e availability of F"fC7 Two thirds ofjobseekers said they would accept a ` top-up ' to their wages
if one were available while the remainder hoped to be free of subsidy-
6, 2
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level wages . Among the potential jobseekers who gave a minimum
acceptance wage, just under two thirds (63 per cent) said they would
accept a wage lower than their earlier income, plus the new top-up,
leaving 37 per cent holding out for their minimum wage.
The sample of employers was drawn from the British Telecom
`Connections in Business' database . The study consisted of a telephone
survey of 2,400 employers, 200 in each of the twelve ETU pilot areas,
representing a 78 per cent response rate from those approached . The
survey covered all industrial sectors but care was taken to obtain a sufficient
number of interviews in those industries within which lower levels of
pay are known to predominate . The survey was also structured to provide
an adequate representation of large as well as small establishments . The
re-weighting of the data allowed an analysis of the workforce
(employment) as well as the employing unit (establishment) to be
undertaken.
8.2 (2/ar,eteiistea gat the The majority of establishments were in the private sector . Public sector
employers tended to be much larger on average . Most employers serviced
customers locally and only three in ten were part of a national operation.
Half formed part of a larger organisation and a tenth of those interviewed
were themselves the Head Office branch.
job types The survey concentrated on the employment of three typically low-paid
job groups: semi/unskilled ; skilled/craft ; and clerical/sales . Half the
employees in these key categories were women . There was considerable
evidence of horizontal occupational segregation by gender, which is the
disproportionate representation of women in certain occupations . For
example, women formed the majority in clerical/sales jobs while the
majority of skilled/craft employees were men . Most employees worked
familiar 37-38 hour weeks on average . But about one in ten worked less
than the ETU threshold of 16 hours per week: these were predominantly
clerical/sales or semi/unskilled workers ; those in establishments with less
than five employees ; and those in hotels/catering, education or `other
service ' industries.
Employers were asked to name the important influences on their wage-
setting policies . The greatest influence mentioned, and one of considerable
importance for ETU, was simply the pay individuals were willing to
work for - three in five establishments mentioned this . Half were also
influenced by the pay offers of other local employers . Overall, about a
quarter of employers had to follow Head Office direction in wage-setting,
which will tend to blunt any local wage-effect of ETU in their cases.
The average wage offers quoted were much higher than those earned by
workers in the employed sample (chapter two) or sought by the
unemployed (chapter three), probably because the sample was not restricted
to low-paying industries . Wage offers ranged, on average, from L4 .20
an hour for the semi/unskilled to £5 .07 for clerical/sales employees and
£6.74 for skilled/craft workers . But there were quite wide variations
within job groups : half the semi/unskilled employees, three out of ten
clerical/sales workers and 14 per cent of the skilled/craft workers were
paid less than £4 .00 an hour.
rr ttar ,el Establishments generally had greater autonomy in their recruitment policies
than in wage-setting, though still 43 per cent of local branches had to
follow procedures laid down by their Head Office . About a quarter of
employers reported difficulties in recruitment over the past twelve months,
rising to four out of ten among larger employers . Skilled/craft workers
were the hardest to recruit but semi/unskilled workers only a little less
so.
Low-paying industries are traditionally associated with high job turnover.
There was considerable turnover of unskilled employment, with the
majority of firms both recruiting and losing at least some of these staff in
the past year . An important factor associated with the turnover rates in all
three job types was the proportion of employees paid less than L4 per
hour: as the proportion of low-paid employees rose, so did the rate ofjob
termination.
8,6 , ;otial S'w ity henef is There was a high level of awareness of in-work benefits among the
employers surveyed : about three-quarters of employers knew about them
in principle and, when prompted, almost all employers had heard about
Family Credit, for example . On the other hand, only about a third of
employers had any actual experience of dealing with in-work benefits or
advising their employees about them.
Employers' own attitudes towards social security benefits were particularly
interesting . Half had no doubt that benefits for unemployed people created
difficulties for recruitment . In contrast, of those who had some experience
of in-work benefits, over a third thought that they had made it easier to
recruit to low-paid grades . But over two out of five thought that in-
work benefits made employees unwilling to work overtime and made
some want to decrease their hours of work . A quarter of employers with
experience of in-work benefits thought that such benefits had helped to
keep their wages down. Significantly, nearly half of those with no previous
experience of in-work benefits thought they could have this effect . Such
views were more common among smaller establishments who were more
likely to have local autonomy over wage-setting.
Co1Iip3ris
	
During the initial phase of the ETU pilot scheme, most of the recipients
~f, mot areas would have had their jobs some while . In fact this is likely to continue to
be the case, as it is with Family Credit, many of whose customers come
within range of benefit through a temporary trough in earnings . First
indications from DSS statistics indicated that fewer than a fifth of
applications were from people newly arriving in work from a spell on
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benefit . It is important therefore to compare the workers-in-work sample
for differences that may influence the take-up of benefit in Scheme A and
Scheme B areas or that might distort some of the differences in behaviour
seen in the pilot areas compared with the control areas.
In terms of the size of the key ETU related categories (working 16+
hours, over or under 25, singles and couples) the three areas did not differ
at all . Nor were there any differences in key background variables such
as housing tenure and educational qualifications, present wages or
expected/acceptance wages . The only really significant differences to
emerge seemed fairly idiosyncratic and not part of any systematic pattern.
For example, control areas together had more people claiming disability
benefits and more people working in health-related occupations too.
The local labour market analysis shows that South Wales (the largest C
area) had outstandingly large numbers of people of working age reporting
long-term sickness and very low activity rates altogether among men of
working age . The Scheme B areas had more people in catering and
more trade union members.
This relative similarity between the Scheme A, Scheme B and control
areas, however, conceals wide differences between the twelve individual
areas . Some differences are to be expected : they were designed into the
study in choosing contrasting urban and rural areas, for example . But
others remain and some of them are very puzzling.
The local labour market analysis described Southend as an atypical seaside
town, `more like the London subdominants ' , with many commuting to
London or to the large Ford factory at Dagenham . Unemployed in
Perth also lagged well behind the average and, together with North Wales,
had net gains in employment levels contrasting with net losses in the
major urban areas like Newcastle . The urban areas and towns still suffer
the greater unemployment overall . Newcastle has much lower
unemployment levels than the other urban areas but this initial surge of
claims from places like Sunderland and Newcastle was not coming
primarily from the unemployed . The greatest relative loss of employment
occurred in the area responding least to the benefit : Southend . Here
though, we noted that it was non-employment, especially among older
workers, rather than jobseeking unemployment that was the problem.
Among those in work, like other ` Home Counties' places including the
southern control area of Southampton, earnings were higher than
elsewhere . The lowest earnings were in the rural areas, but not of course,
the highest take up.
Both the field survey data and the IER analyses pointed to the same
conclusion: there were no simple or obvious patterns across the four area
types, the three ETU groups (A, B or C) or the twelve geographical
locations, except the rather obvious differences between major urban
areas and large towns on the one hand, and seaside areas and rural areas
on the other, that were designed into the pilot in the first place.
I0
fusions The baseline surveys were conducted before the introduction of ETU
among possible customers of ETU and employers
. The tentative
conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that:
housing costs would not create a barrier to the work incentives created
by ETU, that is to say, awards of ETU would not simply replace
otherwise continuing in-work entitlement to Housing Benefit;
the introduction of ETU could increase the scope for people to lower
their wage expectations, often by significant amounts;
dead-weight costs would be seen after the introduction of ETU as
medium-term unemployed people and low-paid workers were already
in a position of being better off in work without an additional top-up;
evidence from the employers survey did not oppose the idea that the
availability of ETU would influence recruitment and wage-setting.
I I
THE ETl PILOT EVAL ,TIOb
1 .1 Overview This chapter provides a brief overview of the ETU pilot evaluation . First,
it provides a description of the ETU pilot itself and the main features of
the new benefit . This is followed by a description of the programme of
evaluative research and its aims and objectives . The chapter closes by
outlining the structure of the remainder of the report.
1 .2 ETU pilot Since 1971, many working parents of dependent children have been able
to receive additional income from social security benefits on top of their
wages from work. Family Income Supplement, until 1988, and then
Family Credit have provided such payments under increasingly liberalised
qualifying rules . Now 800,000 parents working 16 hours or more each
week receive an average of more than £50 a week from in-work social
security payments . Additional allowance is made for some childcare costs
and in favour of maintenance payments, and some entitlement to passported
benefits, such as free prescriptions, is retained in work . Research has
shown that Family Credit is effective in providing families, especially
lone parents, with incentives to work and in helping people with
dependent children enter or remain in the labour market (Marsh and
McKay, 1994 ; Finlayson and Marsh, 1997).
The pilot of ETU first examines whether in-work social security assistance
of this kind would be effective for people without children, and secondly
whether it would be effective for all low-paid workers, irrespective of
whether they have dependent children or not . Extending in-work benefits
on a national basis to all those on low earnings has significant public
expenditure consequences and, as yet, uncertain results . The Department
of Social Security decided to evaluate the effectiveness ofETU by piloting
the benefit from October 1996.
The programme of evaluative research was designed to compare eight
pilot areas with four more areas chosen as control areas of corresponding
type . Each of these twelve areas is based on a distinct ` travel-to-work '
area, or several such areas joined together . The `pilot' areas had been
selected where ETU was likely to have the most impact : areas with high
levels of unemployment; a high number of job vacancies ; and a high
proportion of vacancies which are low paid.
Two different rates of benefit (Scheme A and Scheme B) were tested for
each of three distinct groups of people, to assess which benefit is the
more successful in meeting its objectives, and the most cost effective.
The groups were:
• couples;
• single people aged 25 and over;
• single people aged 18 to 25 .
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Within each area group - A, B and C - four areas reflect different labour
market types . These area types are:
• major urban area;
• large town;
• seaside area;
• rural area.
The pilot areas are listed in Table 1 .2 by their area group and area type.
1 .3 Earnings Top-up There are two main objectives of ETU:
• to test the effectiveness of providing an incentive for unemployed
singles and couples without dependent children to take work of 16
hours or more a week, without worsening incentives for others;
• to test the effectiveness of providing an incentive for those on low
incomes to stay in work by raising their incomes relative to out-of-
work support, without reducing their hours of work.
(Department of Social Security, 1995)
ETU is an in-work benefit for people on a low income who have no
dependent children. ETU is available to those aged between 18 and 64
(inclusive) but not full-time students . It is available to employees and the
self-employed who work at least 16 hours a week . It is payable for jobs
of at least a five-week duration . ETU is normally paid at a fixed rate for
a period of 26 weeks . ETU is not available to those with savings of more
than £8,000 . A credit (worth 10 .55 in 1997/98) is payable in addition
to ETU for those working 30 hours or more a week.
ETU is only available in the pilot areas : four areas receive Scheme B at a
higher rate and four other areas receive Scheme A at a lower rate . There
are different rates for couples and single people (Table 1) . The maximum
amount of benefit payable is reduced by 70 pence for each pound of
income over the threshold.
Table 1 .1 ETU credits and thresholds - 1997/1998
Single 18-24 Single 24 & over Couple
Scheme A
Credit £23 .35 £28 .75 £47 .65
Threshold £49 .45 {59.70 £77 .15
Scheme B
Credit £23 .35 {28 .77 £57 .50
Threshold £77 .15 £77 .15 £77 .15
Credit:The maximum amount of ETU payable
Threshold : People earning below this threshold are entitled to the credit shown
1 .4 Design of the ETU pilot The ETU pilot evaluation consists of a comprehensive programme of
evaluation research, comprising a number of inter-related strands:
• Field surveys of low-paid workers.
• Field surveys of the longer term unemployed.
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•
Surveys of employers.
• Analysis of official administrative statistics.
•
Studies of local labour market conditions.
• In-depth interviews with key participants.
Each of these strands is described in more detail in Appendix A.
The basis of the research design rests on direct observation of the labour
market in all twelve test and control areas at several points in time over
the three year period of the pilot . Relevant changes in the behaviour of
workers and their employers, or even by self-employed people, occurring
in the eight pilot areas but not perhaps in the four control areas, may be
attributable to the effects of the introduction of ETU.
At this stage, no inferences can be made about the progress or
implementation of ETU . This is because the first period of research
covered the months prior to the introduction of the benefit in October
1996, and was intended to be a pre-ETU baseline . This period is the sole
subject of this report, except for some preliminary figures indicating the
initial take-up of the benefit itself.
The pre-ETU baseline surveys established the characteristics of three key
actors:
• potential customers of ETU already in low-paid work who would
become eligible to apply as soon as the benefit became available,
provided of course that they still had their jobs (Workers-in-Work
Survey);
• potential customers of ETU who were unemployed in the medium
term prior to the introduction of the benefit and who might be tempted
into work, perhaps on wages lower than they might otherwise have
contemplated accepting, provided they had not already accepted one
(Unemployed Survey);
• employers in the pilot areas, to establish their characteristics and current
employment practices which, in the eight pilot areas, might change
following the introduction of ETU (Employers Survey).
The pre-introduction phase also included analysis of the socio-economic
and local labour market profiles of the twelve study areas, using mostly
data from the 1991 Census of Population, unemployment statistics and
the Census of Employment/Annual Employment Survey . The pilot work
and sampling procedures developed and used in the baseline surveys are
described in Appendix B .
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Table 1 .2 ETU pilot area groups and types - geographical
areas
Scheme A
Lower rate
Scheme B
Higher rate
Control areas
ETU not available
Major urban
area
Large town
Seaside area
Rural area
Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Barnsley, Castleford and
Pontefract, Wakefield
and Dewsbury
Southend
Sunderland
Doncaster
Bournemouth
Middlesborough, Hartlepool
and Stockton
Rotherham and Worksop
Southampton and the Isle of
Wight
South Wales:
Hay on Wye, Brecon,
Llanwrtyd WeIIs,Tredegar,
EbbwVale, Pontypool,
Monmouth, Abergavenny
and Crickhowell, Cwmbran,
Llanelli, Burry Port,
Llandeilo and Llandovery.
North Wales: Bangor
	
Perth and Crieff,
and Caernarfon, Conwy
	
Dumbarton, Stirling
and Colwyn, Denbigh,
Dolgellau and Barmouth,
Holyhead, Porthmadog and
Ffestiniog, PwIlheli, Shotton,
Flint and Rhyl, Wrexham .
1 .5 Objectives of the ETU ETU was introduced as a three year pilot scheme in October 1996, with
pilot evaluation the following aims:
• to assess the effects of ETU support in raising net income, taking
account of the impact of changes in the number of hours worked, the
effects of other in-work benefits, labour recruitment behaviour, the
impact on the distribution of wages and hours, and any effects on
employers ' wage setting behaviour;
o to assess the impact of such help in encouraging low income workers
to get and retain work and, in particular, on outflows from
unemployment;
o to assess the aggregate effects on employment and unemployment;
• to identify the likely effects and impact of extending ETU as a benefit
nationally;
o to assess the relative effectiveness of the two ETU models (Scheme A
and Scheme B).
(Department of Social Security, 1996)
1 .5 .1 The main questions for In particular, the main questions for the evaluative research included the
research effects of ETU both on work incentives and on wage rates, and grossed-up
estimates of the likely effects of the new benefit on employment and
unemployment if it were to be introduced nationally.
1 .5 .2 Incentives among workers How effective is ETU, in each test version, in raising net incomes from
and the unemployed work among the low-paid compared to their incomes out-of-work, and
by what amounts?
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1 .5.3 Will ETU depress wage
rates?
How effective is the benefit in improving the labour supply at very low
wages? Does it encourage more of the unemployed into work? Does it
allow more to stay in work longer at lower wages? (It is particularly
important to accept that in-work benefits are every bit as effective if they
keep people in work even if they recruit relatively few from
unemployment.)
Exactly what role does ETU play in the transition from unemployment
to work?
Will ETU encourage people working long hours on low wage rates to
work fewer hours in order to qualify for the benefit?
What is the take-up rate : what proportion of eligible workers will receive
the benefit? Take-up itself (the total, not the rate) may be considered a
good guide to the performance of the new benefit
. In carefully-chosen
local labour markets, these numbers may be grossed up to national levels,
allowing a discount for the higher levels of local opportunity for low-paid
work that informed the original selection of areas for the pilot, estimates
of temporary inward migration or forestalled outward migration, and
which version of the benefit is chosen. However, the demographic and
labour-market match between the pilot areas (Scheme A and Scheme B)
and between the pilot areas and the control areas will not be sufficiently
reliable to provide a secure test of efficiency based on take-up totals alone.
Probably the best test of efficiency between the two variants of the benefit
will be estimates of the penetration, or the take-up rate - that is, what
proportion of eligible workers claim their entitlement?
The pilot will test whether employers respond consciously to the
introduction of ETU by reducing existing wage rates . But if, over the
period of the pilot, ETU encouraged more people to come forward for
the lowest-paid jobs, and this surge of cheaper labour placed a restriction
on increases in wages rates at the bottom of the labour market, then there
is a sense in which ETU would subsidise employers rather than workers.
This is true even though a net saving may still result from the introduction
of ETU if the benefit helps more people to remain in work who would
otherwise be claiming Jobseeker's Allowance or Income Support.
However, if money flows into wage supplementation at a gathering pace
in this way, the implications for public expenditure are considerable.
This is especially so if large numbers of workers earning a little more than
the maximum thresholds allowed under ETU come into eligibility during
the following years.
Comparisons between wages received by ETU recipients towards the
end of the pilot period with those of otherwise eligible workers in control
areas will be one measure of this effect. Comparisons with Labour Force
Surveys, the Family Resources Survey and the New Earnings Survey
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will also provide yardstick measures, as will the wages offered in
notifications of vacancies to Job Centres in the pilot areas compared with
the control areas . It is essential that the research gains a clear grasp of the
potential `wage effect' of ETU . Probably the best measure will be the
use of administrative statistics, especially the trend in wages reported in
Family Credit claims in the Scheme A and Scheme B areas compared to
those reported in the control areas and elsewhere.
1 .5 .4 Will ETU reduce The research has to be sensitive to both natural fluctuations in
unemployment? unemployment levels that may occur and to possible displacement effects.
Lone parents have been substantially assisted into work by Family Credit
but remain vulnerable in the labour market . They typically prefer short
hours work and they are vulnerable to childcare difficulties . So for that
matter are the large number of married women with dependent children
who also work short hours . A sudden increase in child-free, young
workers able to accept wages even lower than those now accepted by
many lone parents might simply ` substitute ' work from parents to those
with no children, with consequently higher amounts of Income Support
and Jobseeker's Allowance being paid to families out of work.
1 .6 Structure of the Report The remainder of this report provides results from the ETU baseline
surveys conducted in 1996 before the introduction of the benefit . Chapter
Two presents a descriptive profile of the low-paid workers-in-work in
the twelve pilot areas . Chapter Three describes the unemployed sample,
together with some comparisons with the parallel sample of employed
people in Chapter Two, and, at some points, with earlier surveys of
unemployment . The labour market behaviour of the sample is considered
in some detail, as is any likely financial gain from working and claiming
ETU . Chapter Four reports findings from the baseline survey of
employers, giving a descriptive account of employers ' employment
practices and awareness of social security benefits in the pre-ETU period.
A comparison between the twelve pilot areas chosen for the evaluation
and initial take-up of ETU in the pilot areas is presented in Chapter Five.
The future expectations of both workers-in-work and unemployed samples
covering employment and benefits is considered in Chapter Six, together
with a first look at who might claim ETU . Finally, we draw some tentative
conclusions in Chapter Seven.
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2 DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF WORKERS-IN-WORK
2
.1 Introduction One of the objectives of ETU is `to improve the incentives for those on
low incomes to stay in work, by raising their incomes relative to out-of-
work support, without reducing their hours of work ' (DSS, 1995) . ETU
will be every bit as effective as an incentive to work if it helps low-paid
people stay in work as it would if it helps out-of-work people enter
work. Thus both of these are stated objectives of ETU . To evaluate the
effectiveness of ETU in helping people remain in work, samples of low-
paid workers-in-work were interviewed before the introduction of ETU
in the eight pilot areas and in the four control areas . By following these
respondents over time, we will observe the impact of the availability of
ETU on job stability and progression, on respondent's incomes, on the
hours they work and on the mix of benefits relative to wages in those
incomes.
Information on existing workers was vital if we were to learn more about
the wider costs and benefits arising from the introduction of the benefit.
ETU paid to existing low-paid workers could be interpreted as a
` deadweight cost ' : why did they need an incentive to do the job they
were already doing? However, if these workers were able to remain in
work longer, or progress to higher earnings more quickly because of the
security of a higher income with ETU, or if ETU made them less likely
to claim Income Support or Jobseeker 's Allowance in the future, then
such deadweight cost would be minimised or even turned to advantage.
Careful comparison with control area respondents will be required.
2
.2 The analyses This chapter on the low income workers-in-work - the `employed ' sample
- concentrates on a description of these workers ' circumstances before
the introduction of ETU
. This descriptive analyses concerns mainly
their economic status, marital status, age and sex . Respondents are divided
into key low-earner `customer' groups using these categories . These
groups are then compared on a number of important dimensions - in
educational achievement, housing tenure, income, their use of social
security benefits, occupational group, industry, job tenure, satisfaction
with current employment, and their wage expectations.
Data from this workers-in-work sample appear again in two subsequent
chapters
. Chapter Three describes the `unemployed' sample with some
important comparisons with the workers-in-work sample . A regional
comparison of low income earners forms the basis of Chapter Five.
Workers in different ETU area groups - where the benefit will be paid at
different rates - with those in control areas are compared, to see if any
key differences exist between these area groups, even before the
introduction of ETU . Key factors which might account for differential
rates of ETU applications in each area are assessed .
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2.3 The sample The sample was selected using National Insurance records from the tax
year 1994/95 to identify low earning employed and self-employed workers
in the eight ETU pilot areas and four control areas (see Appendix B).
This scan identified 14,700 likely low-paid workers . Early work had
shown that the only practical way to confirm their low-paid status, and
their potential eligibility for ETU, was to knock on their doors and ask
them. A doorstep sift eliminated respondents who had dependent children,
or who had moved on to higher incomes since 1995 or whose partners
earned high incomes . In this way, a sample of 2,434 workers-in-work
who were likely to be eligible for ETU, or with earnings on the margins
of eligibility, was identified 2 .
The doorstep sift required respondents to be out of work or to have gross
earnings of less than £140 per week, or of less than £200 if they shared
their home with a spouse or partner . Respondents with partners were
excluded (regardless of their own employment status and earnings) if
their partner earned £200 or more each week. These figures represent
arbitrary boundaries for an earnings-population `within range ' of ETU
that, at best, helps single people with gross incomes up to about £100 a
week, and couples up to £150.
Respondents were sampled in each pilot area from postcode sectors
covering roughly one-third (or 16) postcode sectors in each study area
population, with probability of selection proportionate to the size of the
population of interest . However, doorstep sifts revealed that the proportion
of respondents who either met or failed the selection requirements were
unevenly distributed across study areas . These differences produced
uneven final response numbers from each area (see Figure B, Appendix
B) . Those earning less than the lower earnings limit for National Insurance
purposes (equivalent to £62 per week in 1997/98) were necessarily
excluded in this sample frame, although some respondents were earning
less than this amount by the time we interviewed them.
Using individual records to identify eligible households which may contain
couples where both partners had low earnings will have given couple
households a disproportionately higher chance of inclusion . It is likely
that more couples, and particularly dual-earner couples, appeared in our
sample as a result, though the co-occurrence oflow-earnings and eligibility
for ETU will be rare.
Thus, both the small increase of couples and the relative under-
representation of some areas will be corrected by weighting in the final
analyses . The calculation of such weights in this study is complex and
involves some careful re-investigation of the NIRS file . In the present
z In the following analysis, table bases are less than the total interviewed of 2,434 due
to missing data on some variables.
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analyses, such weighting has not been attempted . This is unlikely to
make large differences to marginal values.
An important complication to the sampling strategy arises naturally from
practical survey procedures: the gap between identifying low-paid workers
from their 1994/95 earnings record and interviewing them in 1996
allowed many to remove themselves far from ETU eligibility . Some
though were simply unemployed and these were kept in the workers-in-
work sample out of interest. The opposite problem occurs with the
unemployed sample, some of whom had returned to work by the time of
interview. These too were retained . Just over a quarter of the respondents
in the ` employed' sample whose characteristics are reported here were
out of work at time of interview. Most of these (14 per cent of the
sample) were claimant unemployed. Four per cent were unemployed
but not claiming, three per cent were sick and three per cent were retired.
Fewer than one in a hundred were studying full-time, on government
training or `looking after the home ' . But all these exceptions add up : 71
per cent of the workers-in-work sample had jobs.
There is a difficulty in examining the joint employment status of couples
caused by the sampling approach . Individuals were sampled and questions
were directed to the respondent, regardless of their employment status or
sex. Partner ' s employment and earnings details were recorded by proxy.
A couple might contain a (currently) out-of-work respondent with a
low-earning partner . It would be the partner's wage which would attract
an Earnings Top up, if any, but questions about reservation wages and
attitudes towards employment and top ups would be directed to the
respondent. This is reasonable given our interest in why the respondent
was out of work, but the answers would differ somewhat if we had asked
them of the working partner in the same couple . In practice, however,
the worker tended to be the respondent . In 80 per cent of couples where
the man worked full-time and the woman did not, the man was the
respondent. And in 93 per cent where only the woman worked full-
time, the woman was the respondent . In most cases then, survey questions
were directed to the appropriate person in the couple.
2.4 Who were the low income The majority of those selected for the employed sample and of those
earners in ETU Evaluation remaining in low-paid work at interview were women . Table 2 .1 gives
Areas? a breakdown of the economic status of the employed sample - including
2.4 . 1 Employment status those not in work. The table shows clearly that women were much
more likely to have continued in work (81 per cent), while men made
up the bulk of the newly unemployed, whether claiming benefits or not.
Since the sample was drawn, a third of the men had lost their jobs, and
one in five had moved onto out-of-work benefits . These proportions
were halved among the women.
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Table 2 .1 Employment status by sex
Current economic status Men Women ALL
Column percentages
Full-time employed (I6+ hours each week) 3 48 70 60
Part-time employed 3 7 5
Self employed, 16+ hours each week I 0 3 6
Self-employed, part-time 4 I 2
Government training 0 0
Claimant unemployed 21 8 14
Unemployed, not claiming 6 3 4
Full-time education I
Temporary sickness (less than 6 months) 2 1 2
Permanently sick/disabled I 2 2
Looking after the home - I
Retired 2 3 3
Other 0 0 0
Base 1052 1311 2363
A fifth of the men who were working were self-employed, compared to
one in twenty of the women, and taking employees and self-employed
together, it was interesting to note similarly small proportions of men and
women working part-time (seven to eight per cent) . More part-time
working might have been expected among the women because more
were partnered, and as we shall see, most of their partners had full-time
jobs. Part-time work is unlikely to provide sufficient income on its own.
It is more usual to find part-time work where it tops up household earnings
than where it comprises sole household earnings.
Just over half the men were single, that is, living alone or not ` as a couple'
with anyone, compared to just over a third of the women
. Twice as
many women (17 per cent) were separated, divorced or widowed than
men (8 per cent) . Nearly half the women were in continuing partnerships
(42 per cent were married, six per cent in cohabiting relationships), as
were four in ten men (one third of whom were married) . The relationship
between marital status and employment is shown in Table 2 .2. Among
men, the divorced, widowed and separated were the least likely to be in
paid work. A similar proportion (46 per cent) were unemployed as were
in paid work. Partnered and single men were equally likely to be in
employment, although partnered men were much more likely to be in
self-employment (26 per cent versus six per cent of single men).
Altogether, more than a third of working men with partners were engaged
in self-employment, much higher than the equivalent national average of
20 per cent (13 per cent for all men) (Campbell and Daly, 1992) . One in
twenty men with partners was sick or disabled.
3 In this report, `full-time' work in the context of in-work benefits covers work of 16
hours or more each week.
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Table 2.2 Employment status by sex and marital status
Current economic status Men Women
Has
Partner
Div Sep
Widow Single
Has
Partner
Div Sep
Widow Single
Column percentages
Full-time employed (16+ hours each week) 46 35 52 69 64 73
Part-time employed 3 - 3 9 7 4
Self employed, 16+ hours/week 18 II 5 4 3 2
Self-employed, part-time 9 4 I I I 0
Government training 0
Claimant unemployed 8 34 28 4 II 12
Unemployed, not claiming 6 12 5 2 2 3
Full-time education 0 - 2 0 I 3
Temporary sickness, <6 months 3 2 I 2 I 0
Permanently sick/disabled 3 - I 2 4
Looking after the home 3 - -
Retired 4 2 0 4 6 1
Other 0 - 0 0 I
Base 406 83 563 625 219 467
Women 's employment status varied much less by marital status, with
very similar proportions of partnered and single women in employment
(around three in four) and few in self-employment (around one in twenty)
- although single women were rarely in self-employment. Those with
partners were more likely to be doing part-time work (ten per cent),
although again this was a smaller proportion than among men with partners
(twelve per cent) . Those without partners were more likely to be claimant
unemployed, while the handful of women ` looking after the home ' all
had partners.
Of course, as far as the effect ofEarnings Top-up is concerned, differences
between male and female employment patterns in couples are less relevant
than the combined employment position of the benefit-receiving unit -
that is, the couple . As far as eligibility for ETU is concerned, what
matters is not whether those with partners are in work, but whether there
is a worker in their benefit unit - which could be either themselves or
their partner.
Employment participation among the couples was quite high, and was
distributed fairly evenly between male and female partners . Taking the
employment status of both partners together, only 13 per cent of couples
contained no worker . Half (48 per cent) were dual-earner couples, and
in four out of five such couples both partners were working full-time . A
third of couples contained one full-time and one non-worker, and in
these households, twice as many of the breadwinners were women as
were men . This was quite an unexpected finding, and must relate to two
facets of the sampling procedure used . Sampling was based on
participation in low paid work - which more women do than men -
which meant more of the workers in these couples were women than is
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the case for all couples . Also the income distribution is truncated, which
is likely to mean that among all single earner couples, this sample includes
more of the lowest earning of them - those where the breadwinner is a
woman.
Among the dual earners, a small number of couples (eight per cent)
combined a full-time with a part-time worker (five per cent where the
man was the principal breadwinner, and three per cent where it was the
woman).
Most of the 18 per cent of couples without a full-time worker had no
worker at all . A fraction (five per cent) contained one partner in part-
time work while the other was out of work . In just four couples were
both partners in part-time work.
2.4.2 Age Age was a particularly important variable because the amounts of ETU
available differ for those under 25 . The sample comprised a working-age
sample which excluded families with children, resulting in a bimodal
age distribution for all respondents, with very few aged between 35 and
44 years . This age difference was also reflected in marital status, with the
majority of respondents in couples aged 45 years or older, and the majority
not living with partners aged under 35 years . The age distribution of the
two groups by single years of age is given in Figure 2 .1 . The median age
of those without partners (25 years) was half that of respondents in couples
(50 years) . Thus, there are two different populations : young singles and
older couples.
Figure 2.1 Age distribution of workers-in-work sample, 1996
Age distribution of workers in work
sample 1996
coupe,
2
.5 ETU `customer' groups The sample of workers was heterogeneous, divided in ways unfamiliar in
the general population . This had some potentially important implications
for how they would respond to ETU in terms of gender and age . It will
be useful to reference the other characteristics of survey respondents against
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a summary of these differences . Sample members were divided into
ETU ` customer' groups by their key distinguishing features in terms of
age, sex, marital status and employment (Table 2 .3).
Table 2 .3 Summary of sample sex, age, marital and
employment differences
Percentage of sample (%) Base
Working 16+ hours
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hours 7 165
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 8 189
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hours 9 213
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 12 283
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 7 174
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 13 314
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 5 120
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 9 219
Not working 16+ hours
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 5 125
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 7 165
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 3 67
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 5 123
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 8 196
As far as eligibility for ETU is concerned the key employment distinction
for customer groups is between those working 16 or more hours each
week ( `full-time ') and those working fewer hours, or none at all . In
practice, few worked part-time hours and such workers were grouped
with the out-of-work.
The interaction between the bi-modal age distribution and marital status
is also important . The very high concentration of single people in their
early twenties needs to be recognised : individuals embarking on their
working careers, whereas the majority of couples were nearing the end
of them. The high concentration of couples were in their late forties and
fifties (Figure 2 .1) . The age distinction drawn for the customer groups
partly reflects these different distributions and is also pragmatic . The
design of ETU creates an age division among single people between
those aged under 25 years, and those who are older who receive a higher
rate of ETU. The rules do not discriminate between couples of different
ages, but in practice there were few couples where the respondent was
younger than 45 years . Those younger tended to be dual earners . A
distinction is drawn in Table 2 .3 between younger and older dual earner
couples.
Men and women experience the labour market differently : they approach
it with different priorities at different stages of their lives . The market
itself can discriminate between them in making jobs available in different
industries, of different hours and for different rates of pay (Humphries
and Rubery, 1995) . A distinction is also drawn based on the gender of
the principal breadwinner, where appropriate .
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2.5.1 Non-dependent children In total, 12 per cent of workers-in-work were parents with co-resident
non-dependent children (ie . aged over 18, or over 16 if not in full-time
education) . Parents of dependent children were excluded from the sample,
but even having older children, some of whom may be potential ETU
recipients themselves, may influence parents ' labour market behaviour.
The gender and age division above neatly identifies respondents most
likely to live with their non-dependent children as older non-partnered
women and older couples. Sixteen per cent of women aged 25 and over,
living without partners, had co-resident children . The proportion was
the same for both workers and non-workers . It is plausible that many of
these women were once lone parents of dependent children . Some may
have been previous Family Credit claimants, who left eligibility as their
children grew-up . One in ten of the younger dual earner couples, and
28 per cent of the older dual earners had non-dependent children still at
home with them . The gender distinction was important for single
breadwinner couples : where the woman was the breadwinner, 27 per
cent lived with their children compared to just 12 per cent where it was
the man. Even 18 per cent of couples with no earner had non-dependent
children present.
The following sections report key differences between the different groups
in Table 2 .3 in terms of characteristics likely to influence their response
to ETU: education, housing tenure, occupational group, industry type,
benefit receipt, earnings, net income and wage expectations.
2.5.2 Education and home A key determinant of success in the labour market is human capital and
background the low-paid workers-in-work sample had a correspondingly low level
of educational attainment . More than half the workers-in-work had no
educational qualifications and just 10 per cent had qualifications at `A'
level or higher, including just four per cent with degrees . These figures
compared unfavourably with the working population as a whole among
whom only 31 per cent have no qualifications but 34 per cent have at
least `A' levels and 11 per cent have degrees (Office for National Statistics,
1998, page 89) . There were considerable differences within the sample
however, and even within groups . For example, Table 2 .4 shows that
83 per cent of young single women had qualifications at CSE level or
above, which is little short of the national figures for women aged 20-29
(ONS 1998) . Although a relatively high proportion of respondents in
couples out of work had degrees (nine per cent), these were one third of
those reporting any qualifications . With the exception of young dual
earners, more than seven in ten of the respondents from couples reported
no qualifications at all.
Overall, younger respondents were more likely to hold qualifications,
with particularly striking differences between younger and older women.
Younger women were actually more likely to hold degrees than younger
men, while older women had fewer degrees than older men.
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Table L4 Highest educational qualifications obtained
Base Degree `A' level '0' level CSE None
Row percentages
ALL 2,314 4 6 23 14 52
By employment status of respondent
All respondents working 16+ hrs each week 1,528 2 5 24 15 53
Respondents not working 16+ hrs each week 786 8 7 21 13 52
By ETU `customer' group
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hrs 165 2 13 33 36 16
Single male, 25 or over; working 16+ hrs 188 6 5 24 19 46
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hrs 220 4 II 38 30 17
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ hrs 286 1 4 23 12 60
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 110 5 14 30 29 23
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 147 II 4 27 II 47
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 63 12 19 31 22 15
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 115 7 4 II 9 70
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 174 2 8 33 18 39
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 320 I 2 13 2 83
Man works 16+ hrs, woman not in work 117 4 3 13 7 73
Woman works 16+ hrs, man not in work 219 2 2 13 7 75
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 180 9 3 14 3 71
The relatively high proportion of single respondents who fell among
those no longer in paid work with degrees suggests that these men and
women were students or recent ex-students doing part-time work when
selected for the sample . They appeared in the sample largely because
they were unemployed, not because they had a low earning potential.
Young cohorts of workers should be expected to be better qualified
because qualification levels have increased in recent years . Achieving
higher levels of qualifications now may mean little more for their job
prospects than did the correspondingly lower rates of achievement for
the older cohorts in the sample . Nevertheless, a high proportion of the
young respondents in and out of work had at least one qualification,
compared to the older workers . It seems likely that for the more qualified
younger workers, their current low earnings were a more temporary
phenomenon than they would be for older respondents.
2.5.3 Housing tenure Another key determinant of employment prospects is housing tenure
(Marsh, 1994) . Surveys of the effect of Family Credit on low-paid families
with children found that social security claimants of all kinds tended to
concentrate in Local Authority and Housing Association accommodation.
They contrasted with non-claimants (even eligible non-claimants) who
were equally concentrated among low-cost owner-occupation even
though they too were low-paid . The first group - tenants on benefits -
showed persistently high liability to experience hardship compared with
the non-claimant home-owners . Would this division hold true among
low-paid people with no dependent children?
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The tenure picture was blurred somewhat by the high proportion of
respondents (38 per cent) who lived with their parents . Although the
parental tenure is recorded, it seems less relevant than the fact that a third
of those who lived with their parents said they made no contribution to
housing costs, and the remaining two-thirds paid typically nominal
amounts (two thirds paying £20 per week or less ; just four per cent
paying more than £40).
While £20 is not a large sum, it represented 23 per cent of the average
income of those paying rent to their parents . Thirty eight per cent were
paying more than a quarter of their net income to their parents, and one
in ten claimed to be paying their parents more than half their income.
But it was the non-workers who were most liable to giving up their
income . Among those actually in work, a quarter paid more than 25 per
cent of their income to their parents, and just two per cent paid more
than half. On average, those living in their parents ' home who paid,
parted with 36 per cent of their income in order to do so . Respondents
in work parted with 27 per cent of their income on average.
Three quarters of young men and women (under 25) were living with
their parents and paying some rent to them in this way . Another fifth
lived with their parents rent free . Those without jobs were as likely to
share their parent 's home, but were less likely to pay them.
Even six in ten of the older single men (aged 25 years and over) who
worked, lived with their parents . The older women without partners
had more varied housing tenures. A quarter paid rent to their co-resident
parents, while one in nine lived with them rent free . Twenty eight per
cent lived in their own rented accommodation, compared to 12 per cent
of single older men . And 13 per cent of older women owned their homes
outright, compared to six per cent of the men.
A third of younger dual earners rented and half were buying their homes
- the group most likely to occupy their own accommodation, and be
paying for it. Only five per cent owned their homes outright . Older
couples were much more likely to own their own homes - including 43
per cent of those with no earner, a third of those where the woman was
the breadwinner and a quarter where the man was the breadwinner (a
quarter of whom also rented) . Twenty two per cent of couples with no
earner had mortgage payments to meet.
So tenure was less clearly linked to employment status among this sample
than among families with children . Tenure seemed much more closely
related to life-cycles . It was rare for the young and unpartnered to have
left the parental home, and where they had, the destination was typically
rental accommodation and often then on an informal and shared nature -
cheap too . Home buying and outright ownership were largely the preserve
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of couples in this sample . The benefit fault-line4 was less visible, with a
surprisingly high proportion (35 per cent) of outright owners who had
slipped out of work, compared to a quarter of renters.
The findings for housing tenure are of the greatest significance for the
likely effects of ETU . Prior to introduction, there was a view (Redmond
and Sutherland, 1996) that eligible workers would retain large entitlements
to Housing Benefit which would merely be replaced by new entitlement
to ETU. Even these descriptive data for housing tenure show that this is
not so.
2.6 Occupational group and Only 12 per cent of the workers-in-work sample were in professional or
orientation to work managerial occupations. These tended to be the older workers, still
employed at the time of the survey (Table 2 .5), but at least a quarter of
out of work couples reported this occupational category for their last job.
The largest group were personal service and clerical workers (17 per cent
each) who were mainly women and plant operatives (14 per cent), where
older male workers predominated.
The occupational categories of those without partners differed little
between those continuing in employment and those out of work. Around
a quarter of women were personal service workers . While clerical jobs
were more common among younger women, and among those who
supported their non-working partner, older women were more likely to
work in sales.
There was surprisingly little difference between respondents' reported
occupations in younger and older dual earner couples . Among those
with continuing jobs, craft sector occupations were largely concentrated
among young single men, perhaps through apprenticeships, and in couples
where only the man worked.
Supervisory jobs were distributed fairly evenly across all groups at around
a fifth (22 per cent) rising a little to 29 per cent among younger dual
earner couples.
Pay periods reflected occupational divisions with six in ten workers being
paid weekly . Monthly salaries were common (exceeding a third) for only
two groups: non-earning couples, where a quarter were ex-professional
and managerial workers ; and young single women, where clerical jobs
(such as secretarial work) were common.
4 The `benefit fault line ' is the hypothesised division within low-income families
between those claiming income-tested benefits and living in social rented
accommodation, and those not doing so who tended to be owner occupiers (Marsh,
1994) .
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2.7 Industry type Data on industrial location are limited to employed workers . They show
a dominance of manufacturing and utility sector jobs and of work in
distribution industries, especially among workers without partners . Three
in ten young single men and one in five young single women worked in
the manufacturing and utility sector, as did a quarter of older single workers.
Another quarter of single workers worked in distribution.
A tiny percentage (four per cent) worked in construction industries, though
these jobs were disproportionately found among men, particularly among
single men out of work (11 per cent) . Many jobs in construction are
temporary and used by young men to fill time between more permanent
posts . This may explain the higher proportion of construction industry
jobs among non-workers compared to workers . It is also possible that
some construction workers classified themselves as self-employed and
thus were not asked the industry question.
Women were concentrated in the health sector (23 per cent of single
women aged 25 and over and 23 per cent of women supporting a non-
working partner) . Interestingly, a quarter of dual earner couples reported
work in this sector.
Table 2 .5 Occupational group
Base Prof/
Man
Clerical Craft Personal
Service
Sales Plant Other
operatives
	
low skill
Row percentages
ALL 2241 12 17 II 17 13 14 15
Single male, under 25, working 16+hrs 165 7 18 23 13 9 15 14
Single male, 25 or over; working 16+hrs 186 14 9 15 14 8 22 18
Single female, under 25, working 16+hrs 217 9 24 4 26 20 13 4
Single female, 25 or over; working 16+ hrs 283 8 14 6 26 17 12 17
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 106 6 13 18 17 10 18 20
Single male, 25 or over; not working 16+ hrs 140 16 II 17 16 9 19 12
Single female, under 25, not working I 6+hrs 57 8 24 2 24 22 12 9
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 110 16 16 I 16 14 16 22
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 171 15 19 12 16 12 13 14
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 312 13 17 II 19 10 13 18
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 110 12 16 20 8 11 18 17
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 211 10 24 8 14 17 8 20
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 162 25 16 15 8 II II 15
Although hotel and catering work accounted for fewer than one in ten of
the sample, it was more common among young single men (15 per cent)
and older single women (13 per cent).
Most employed respondents worked for commercial companies (72 per
cent overall) with fewer than a quarter in the public sector . Thirteen per
cent worked for a local authority/education authority, five per cent for a
health authority, three per cent for a nationalised industry, two per cent
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for national government, two per cent for a charity or trust and five per
cent elsewhere
. Public sector employment was disproportionately high
among women sole earners in couples (39 per cent), older dual earners
(38 per cent) and non-earning couples (36 per cent).
Among the 272 who were self employed in their current or most recent
job, two-thirds owned their own firm . Such ownership was most common
among dual earners and single women and least common among single
men
. Eighteen per cent were labour-only sub-contractors to other firms,
13 per cent worked for individual clients, and four per cent combined
these practices.
2 .7 .1 Stability of employment and Most current workers (86 per cent) felt they had permanent jobs . This
earnings figure will be inflated slightly by a sampling method that selected them as
having held onto work for at least a year already . Those most prone to
report temporary jobs (lasting less than twelve months) were single men,
men in couples with non-working partners and younger single women.
Older women and those who were the sole breadwinner in couples were
very unlikely to have temporary jobs (about three per cent, provided
they still had jobs) when interviewed.
A quarter of the `employed' sample were trade union members in their
current or most recent jobs, although those who were out of work were
less likely to have belonged to a union . Generally few single people
belonged to unions, except for older single women (who, as we saw
above, were concentrated in the health sector) - among whom 30 per
cent were union members . In couples too, union membership was more
common among women . Thirty-seven per cent of older dual earner
couples and 42 per cent of women breadwinners reported union
membership, compared to just one in five male breadwinners.
Roughly a third of all groups had weekly pay which varied from when
they were last paid
. The most common reason accounting for different
rates of pay was overtime (for 55 per cent), and seven per cent were paid
on a piecework basis, but 16 per cent said the variation was due to them
working only when work was available . This means that at least seven
per cent of the sample, and seven per cent of those currently in work, had
varying pay for reasons almost completely beyond their control.
Among those with varying pay, the group for whom this variation was
most often caused by overtime were young dual earners (74 per cent),
while piecework was most common among young single women (15
per cent) . Almost a quarter of older single men whose pay varied only
worked when work was available . Those least likely to have this
arrangement were couples where the woman was the sole breadwinner.
It is worth considering in a little more detail how overtime might impact
upon ETU. In the assessment of income for an ETU application, earnings
3I
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over the six week period preceding the application were considered . If
the person was paid monthly or every four weeks, three previous payment
periods (that is, totalling to three months or twelve weeks, respectively)
were checked . Paid overtime during this period will inflate earnings and
result in a lower ETU entitlement . Extra pay for overtime may even
draw the worker out of scope of ETU altogether.
One in five of the workers-in-work sample, with current jobs, did
overtime which made their pay vary regularly . The questionnaire was
designed to capture variations in pay from weekly to every nine to ten
weeks . Around a third saw their pay fluctuate due to overtime every
week or every other week . For five out of every six for whom it fluctuated,
it did so at least once every six weeks . And half of the remaining one in
six were paid four-weekly or monthly and had pay fluctuating at least
every nine to ten weeks . So, in total two per cent did overtime which
would most likely affect their ETU assessment, and the remaining eight
per cent had overtime which might affect their claim if their overtime
payments fell within their assessment period.
In total more than half of respondents (56 per cent) had received pay in
the week they were interviewed which differed from the amount they
were usually paid, due to overtime . Four-fifths (81 per cent) who reported
such a difference had overtime pay included in their most recent earnings
and said they were usually paid less than they got in the last week. They
were better off at the time of interview to the tune of £25 on average
(median £17) . The remainder who had missed out on overtime in the
week of interview, were used to receiving a larger combined pay packet.
The mean amount of overtime pay among this group was £20 per week
(median L17).
The role of overtime is thus not trivial for those for whom it is a regular
feature of their pay packets . The maximum level of ETU payment varies
by age, partnership status, hours of work and area, but starts at 22 .75 for
young single applicants at 1996/97 rates and £28 for older single
applicants . The majority of overtime recipients were single and thus
liable for overtime payments equivalent to substantial proportions of the
maximum possible ETU payment . The average level of entitlement
reported there (L20 to £25 depending on area) is not dissimilar to the
levels of overtime pay reported in the week of interview . Across these
people (one in ten workers) whose pay differed from its usual amount
due to overtime, their income assessable for ETU purposes had either
been inflated by overtime (median level of inflation : 12 per cent) or -
more rarely - reduced (median level of shortfall in current wages : 12 per
cent) . Workers reporting overtime were found slightly less likely to be
entitled to ETU 5 .
5 Two thirds of workers in this sample would be eligible for ETU at Scheme B rates
if they applied to their area of residence . Fifty eight per cent who reported fluctuations
due to overtime would be so entitled. Combined earnings in the week of interview
were used to estimate ETU entitlement. Which meant that the entitlements of nine
per cent of working respondents were based on pay which was at variance from
usual earnings due to overtime . For seven per cent pay was inclusive of overtime,
while for two per cent, earnings excluded overtime which normally would be
received .
So up to one in five workers had pay which fluctuated due to overtime
and which might affect their ETU entitlement. Overtime might also
have altered the balance of hours they worked and altered eligibility, if
overtime hours in the assessment period exceed 15 each week, or
entitlement, if overtime means hours fluctuate either side of the 30 hours
which in 1996/97 qualify for an addition ofL10 .30 to maximum ETU.
For one in ten, overtime was sufficiently frequent feature of their working
lives to have altered their pay from its usual amount at the time of interview.
Among the (now) unemployed, the most commonly reported reason for
a job coming to an end was that the job had been a temporary one or had
been taken on a fixed term contract (28 per cent) . A fifth had been made
redundant, four per cent saw their employer shut down and one in seven
left due to sickness . Nine per cent retired - which accounts for the
unexpectedly high proportion of pensioners in the sample (see Receipt
of benefits section, below) . Small numbers were dismissed (six per cent)
while 22 per cent left for some other reason.
As might be expected, benefit receipt (other than Housing Benefit) was
low among workers, and high among those who had lost their jobs (Table
2 .6) . The exception was female older workers without partners, a quarter
of whom received benefit - most commonly Council Tax Benefit (CTB)
and widow's benefit.
Table 2 .6 Receipt of benefits - per cent receiving when
interviewed
Base
	
Disability'
	
TA' IS UB State
Pension
Widow Mate CTB Any'
benefit
Cell percentages
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hrs 165 I - - - - - - I 2
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+hrs 188 2 I I I I - - 3 8
Single female, under 25, working 16+hrs 220 - - - - - - - I 2
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+hrs 286 3 - 0 I 3 9 0 II 23
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 110 - 4 52 16 - - - 4 71
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 147 4 3 50 22 I - - 18 77
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 63 2 2 33 16 - - 2 13 55
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 115 II 2 34 20 13 17 I 28 81
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 174 I - - I - - 2 5
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 320 3 - - 0 5 0 - I II
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 117 4 - 3 6 II - I 9 50
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 219 4 I I 11 21 - - 4 70
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 180 13 I 24 8 25 - I 19 77
Includes any disability or sickness related benefit.
Government training allowance.
Either of Maternity Allowance or Statutory Maternity Pay.
9 Includes other benefits not included in earlier columns.
2.7.2 Job exits
2 .8 Receipt of benefits
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As noted earlier, a substantial proportion of these women were likely to
have been lone parents of dependent children, a group known to have
relatively high awareness of the benefit system 10
Unemployment Benefit (UB)" was important for a sub-group of the
single unemployed . The reasons for Unemployment Benefit not being
more widely claimed were probably threefold:
• young respondents may have had insufficient National Insurance
contributions to qualify for the benefit;
• they may have exhausted their entitlement and had to transfer to
income-based Income Support;
• some would have failed to satisfy the entitlement conditions to either
Income Support or Unemployment Benefit in that they were not
seeking work.
Surprisingly high proportions of the out of work said they were not
actively seeking work, ranging from three in ten of the out of work
young single men and half of young single women to two-thirds of out
of work older single women and three quarters of couples (where neither
partner reported seeking work) . These differences appear less stark if it is
taken into account that, respectively, 13 per cent and 25 per cent of these
last two groups now comprised pensioners.
Even so, those who had dropped out of the low-paid employment into
economic inactivity show a marked reluctance to secure low-paid work.
Out of work young women were less likely to claim benefits than out of
work young men, largely because of their reduced propensity to claim
Income Support . This may be because these women had been out of
work for shorter periods or because they had a poorer knowledge of
benefits, or because they were more likely to rely on their parents for
help . As Table 2 .6 reports the findings for the workers-in-work sample,
it is unwise to extrapolate these findings to the unemployed generally
(see Chapter Three).
2 .9 Wages, job satisfaction and ETU is designed to supplement low wages and so to increase participation
wage expectations in paid work, and to help keep low paid workers in paid work . It is
intended to provide an earnings supplement in a way that preserves the
incentive for a single person or a couple to undertake paid work and to
be slower to return to unemployed benefits . It is important therefore to
be precise about wages paid to the sample of low earners, and to examine
° Although they were no more likely than other groups to have claimed Family Credit
in the past.
The ETU pilot evaluation baseline surveys were conducted before the introduction
of the Jobseeker ' s Allowance in October 1996.
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equally carefully how well this matches their own expectations of what
such a job should pay. If there is a shortfall between earnings and
expectations, the policy question becomes `will ETU act to restore the
incentive to work' , if the labour market no longer provides it?
In the following section we examine the wages and total household
incomes of low earners and, later, how well these matched their wage
expectations
. An analysis of the key determinants of earnings appears at
Appendix D.
Table 2 .7 presents a series of key measures of income for both individual
respondents and for the benefit unit (b .u.) to which the respondent
belonged . Many respondents shared their household with other people,
such as their parents, with whom they were not assumed to pool their
income . It is the net income entering the benefit unit which most closely
reflects how well off respondents are in work . So in virtually all cases,
the benefit unit income is the income of the respondent and his or her
partner, if any.
Table 2.7 Summary of key economic variables
Mean Mean Mean Benefit Equiv.*
net hours current income income
weekly worked net b.u . (including (E)
earnings each income (f) Housing
in week Benefit
current and
work (f) mortgage
interest)' 2 (f)
Base Those in work All respondents Base
ALL 1522 102 34 125 36 153 2303
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hrs 161 113 38 115 0 189 165
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hrs 165 109 41 III 5 174 187
Single female, under 25, working 16+hrs 217 101 35 104 I 169 220
Single female, 25 or over working 16+hrs 272 98 32 III 14 170 286
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 10 (64) (I
	
I) 78 69 128 110
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 9 (37) (12) 98 105 157 147
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 7 (55) (I
	
I) 36 25 58 63
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 5 (47) (10) 97 106 150 115
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 151 113 36 232 12 205 174
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 262 100 35 195 14 180 320
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 66 I10 41 143 45 125 117
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 190 102 30 138 58 123 219
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 7 (64) (10) 74 74 68 180
*Equivalent income, taking account of household size
t2 ETU was not a component of such income since it was not available at the time of
the survey.
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2.9.1 Earnings The workers-in-work sample was selected on the basis of a truncated
wages distribution. The earnings threshold for the workers without
partners was below £140 per week, while for each earner in couples it
was £200 per week . Thus dual earner couples could have combined
earnings close to £400 per week before they were excluded from the
sample . In practice, only the younger dual earner couples approached
such sums, and even for these couples, average combined earnings were
just £226 per week. This is still a long way ahead of ETU at about £150
maximum earnings, but they were included as potential claimants because
either they might lose a job or they may cease as a couple.
At face value, earnings were low, averaging £100 for those in work, a
net hourly wage across the population of around £3 .00 per hour (Table
2 .7) 73 . The lowest full-time weekly earnings were paid to single men
and male sole breadwinners, for some of the longest hours . The best paid
were women sole breadwinners in couples, although even here the average
hourly wage was £3.40.
The wage figures given in Table 2 .7 for those not working full-time
appear as much higher hourly rates of pay, but these figures are less reliable.
High levels of hourly part-time earnings were not excluded from the
sample, whereas high full-time earnings were, and the number of workers
in each non-full time working group was low . This may account for
more better-paid women in the sample, since they typically worked shorter
hours.
When both members of a couple ' s earnings were combined, and benefits,
other income and tariff income from savings included, net income figures
could be estimated. For those without partners, net earnings and net
income were virtually synonymous . Perhaps not surprisingly, dual earning
couples had net incomes virtually double the earnings of the respondent
alone. What was perhaps more surprising was the differing reliance on
benefits within net income . The contrast between older and younger
single women was particularly stark . Younger single women had very
low use of benefits, even when out of work, whereas older women had
the highest level of benefit receipt, in and out of work . Single earner
couples made considerable use of benefits to supplement their one source
of earnings, including Retirement Pension, Unemployment Benefit and
Housing Benefit.
t3 These group- and population-specific hourly wage rates were obtained by dividing
mean weekly wages (eg. L102) by mean weekly hours (eg . 34) . The resulting estimate
is NOT the same as the mean of respondents ' hourly wage rates . For example, the
mean of all hourly wage rates is L3.37 .
It was difficult to compare net income between different groups because
it had to meet different needs within each benefit unit . In theory, a
couple should need more income than a single person to meet their
needs, although such assumptions have been recently questioned (see
Berthoud and Ford, 1996) and ETU benefit amounts tend to discriminate
more on age grounds rather than couple/single status . Using the
McClements equivalence scale commonly adopted by the DSS
(McClements, 1977), it was possible to re-estimate the value of income
to a benefit unit based on the number of members who depend on it.
The scale is applied to incomes net of housing costs, which are another
major source of variation in need for income and which can be
compensated by the benefit system . The resulting figures (given in the
final column of Table 2 .7) allows the relative value of different total
incomes to be compared between groups.
Equivalising income in this way reduces the apparent differences between
groups considerably - with one or two exceptions they had similar mean
equivalent incomes . As expected, all groups out of work averaged
equivalent incomes lower than their counterparts in work, particularly
for couples and young single women . Among those in work, the position
ofsingle earner couples appeared to worsen, once housing costs have been
netted out . Young dual earner couples fared best, while older dual earners
and all those in work without partners had similar mean equivalent
incomes.
2.9 .2 Job satisfaction Among a sample of such low earners, it might be expected that many
would be looking to improve their incomes by seeking new jobs with
higher wages, especially among the younger low-paid workers . If the
rewards of work were not sufficient to justify the effort of working, and
they could not secure a better income from a higher paying job (or a top
up like ETU), sticking with the current job may no longer appear
worthwhile . However, as this section shows, the majority of respondents
were not seeking new jobs, and seemed to be content where they were.
Current workers were asked how much they liked or disliked the work
they did in their job . Job satisfaction was very high: 43 per cent said they
liked it very much, and 46 per cent said they usually liked it . Just seven
per cent said they usually disliked it and five per cent said they disliked it
very much. Women were more likely to say they liked their jobs than
men. Fifteen per cent of single men disliked their jobs, along with 17 per
cent of male sole breadwinners in couples, compared with 10 per cent of
single women and five per cent of female sole breadwinners.
Among those currently in work, those who felt their jobs offered a path
to better things tended to be younger . Young single men and women
were much more likely to think their jobs offered prospects for promotion
than older single men and women (44 versus 26 per cent for men, 38
versus 24 per cent for women) . Young dual earners were twice as likely
as older dual earners to feel this was the case .
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Given reported educational differentials, such anticipation would seem a
reasonable reflection of likely labour market prospects . Those who start
out in low paid jobs are much more likely to feel they are at the bottom
end of established and known career paths than those who occupy low-
paid jobs at older ages . Nonetheless, fewer than half in each group held
t
out the hope of such promotion, which means more than half (in fact, 70
per cent of the working sample) were in jobs which they viewed as ` dead
end ' . A parallel can be drawn here with the lack of job progression
experienced by Family Credit recipients (Bryson and Marsh, 1995).
Perhaps surprisingly then, 62 per cent of workers felt they were in the
kind of work they wanted to continue doing in the future. However, it
was the young single workers who were least likely to want to stay in the
same line of work (just 48 per cent of men and 49 per cent of women).
Eighty per cent of female sole breadwinners in couples wanted to stay in
the same line of work . Many older workers were nearing retirement age
(some were already supporting retired partners) which would perhaps
make career change a risky venture.
Consequently, very few older workers were actively seeking new jobs,
ranging from six per cent of women breadwinners in couples to 27 per
cent of older single men . A quarter of younger dual-earning couples
reported seeking new work, as did 31 per cent of young single men and
37 per cent of young single women.
Table 2 .8 Minimum acceptance wages and anticipated
response to ETU
Minimum
acceptance
wages (E)
Who would claim an earnings
top-up (%)
Base
Those seeking
work
Those seeking
work
Those not
seeking work
ALL 690 £118 71% 73%
Working 16+ hours
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hours 51 119 80 82
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 50 122 85 74
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hours 76 103 82 76
Single female, 25 or over ; working 16+ hours 47 118 81 77
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 40 155 90 80
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 48 119 89 70
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 12 93 60 71
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work II III 63 69
Not working 16+ hours
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 87 116 58 60
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 120 125 63 58
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 44 116 54 83
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 56 112 71 87
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 48 125 67 54
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2.9.3 Wage expectations and the Those seeking new jobs were asked how much money they would need
prospect of ETU to be offered in take-home wages in a new job before they felt it worth
taking. These ` target wages' were typically higher than current wages,
averaging £166 across the sample . Only one in eight respondents quoted
a target wage below the level of their current wage 14
Respondents were then asked how easy it would be to find a job paying
these wages in their area. Half (48 per cent) thought it would be very
difficult, and most of the rest (41 per cent) thought it would be quite
difficult . Just nine per cent thought it would be very easy or quite easy.
Those of the majority who felt it would be difficult to obtain their target
wage were asked what was the lowest amount they would be willing to
accept in a new position . This minimum acceptance wage was much
lower than the stated target wage in most cases, and averaged just under
three-quarters of the target wage value.
Minimum acceptance wages ts showed remarkably little variation between
groups (Table 2 .8) . These typically averaged 120, with a typical standard
deviation of £40 . The comparable figure for lone parents (Finlayson and
Marsh, 1997) was £132. The exceptions were younger dual earner
couples who aimed higher and sole male earners in couples and younger
single women in work, who aimed lower . There was generally little to
distinguish between workers and non-workers in terms of wage
expectations.
Those out of work produced a greater range of expectations than those
in work (indicated by significantly higher standard deviations) . There
are a number of potential explanations, the first simply a product of in-
work status: each worker has a current wage which will act as a reference
when judging what they would accept in a new job . As discussed above,
few will go lower than their current wage which places a lower boundary
on their likely expectations, reducing the variance of estimates . A second
explanation is that after time out of the labour market, non-workers were
less able to put a realistic price on their labour, and varied considerably in
their estimates . The third explanation is that unemployed people had a
greater range of earnings potentials than workers, and that these potentials
are reflected in their acceptance wages.
" It may seem odd that anyone at all in work would name a figure lower than their
current wage . But some interpret the question, realistically in many cases, as asking
about the wage they would feel they could accept in a new job having lost their
present one, rather than having given in their notice in favour of a better prospect.
15 The minimum acceptance wage was defined as the target wage of those who thought
it easy to obtain, and the minimum acceptance wage of the rest.
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Each of these hypotheses is considered below:
The first explanation cannot be explicitly tested . But the distributions of
acceptance wages between the two samples are revealing (Figure 2 .2).
These show the overwhelming similarity in the distribution of acceptance
wages . The statistically lower variation of the workers-in-work estimates
is thus hard to explain but appears due to a somewhat more pronounced
peak around the mean and somewhat lower proportions naming a figure
higher than L180 per week.
Figure 2 .2 Acceptance wage by employment status
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There is little evidence here to suggest a significant lack of low acceptance
wages by workers . Some appeared to work for nearly nothing (eight per
cent gave acceptance wages below L20) . However, to examine the
hypothesis fully, current or previous wage information must also be taken
into consideration . Figure 2 .3 shows how many respondents were
prepared to quote an acceptance wage very different from their current
or most recent wage . The graph plots the difference between current/
most recent wage and acceptance wage . So positive values indicate higher
acceptance than current most recent wages, negative values indicate lower
ones, and values close to zero suggest that respondents would go for an
acceptance wage close to what they were used to.
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Figure 2 .3 Difference between current/last wage and
acceptance wage, by employment.
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The graph shows that while rather more current workers were prepared
to venture acceptance wages just below their current wage, this was part
of a more general trend for workers to cluster their estimates around their
current wage . Sixty nine per cent were within £40 of their current
wage. Among non-workers, rather more were prepared to venture
substantially higher or lower acceptance wages than had been their previous
experience . Just 56 per cent quoted within £40 of their previous wage.
Generally, though, there was very little evidence to suggest workers were
more likely to quote above their current wage.
The second hypothesis suggests that acceptance wage-setting is a product
of time out of the labour market. The influence on wage expectations of
time spent out of work is considered alongside a range of other factors in
Table 2 .5 . Once these other factors had been controlled for, time out of
work had no significant effect . Among this workers-in-work sample,
again, no significant correlation emerged between acceptance wage and
time out of work.
This finding was robust to the definition of time out of work used, and to
the subset being considered 76 . It therefore seems unlikely that there was
a relationship between time out of the labour market and the level of
acceptance wages.
'6 The time in any non-work activity ; in self-defined unemployment ; as claimant
unemployed were all considered . These durations were expressed both in absolute
units - eg . total duration of the current unemployment spell, and as a proportion of
all activity spells undertaken between 1991 and the interview.
Relationships were considered for the currently out of work (on each definition),
and for the sample as a whole.
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The third explanation was that acceptance wages were related to earnings
potential of respondents, and that the latter would have a wider distribution
among the unemployed
. This argument would be likely to apply to a
comparison between the workers-in-work sample (selected from NI
records of low earners) and the unemployed sample
. After all, the
unemployed were selected because they were not in (any type of) work,
whereas workers were selected because they were in low-paid work. But
the argument would seem less strong applied to the comparison between
those in the workers-in-work sample who had stayed in work, and those
who had fallen out of work since the sample frame was last updated.
Nonetheless, Table 2
.4 suggests that more among those out of work had
higher qualifications
. And, certainly among the older non-workers in
Table 2 .5, more had last been working in professional or managerial
occupations than was the case across the workers-in-work as a whole.
These markers suggest a higher earnings potential existed among some of
the out of work.
And this would seem to offer the explanation for greater variation in
acceptance wages set by non-workers compared to workers . Table 2.9
illustrates how acceptance wages were much higher.
Whereas degree-holding workers in the sample tended to venture
acceptance wages in the same order of magnitude, or indeed lower than
those of other workers, among non-workers there was a tendency for
people with degrees (perhaps who had recently acquired them) to stick
out for higher acceptance wages . This was a significant difference
(z=-2.24) . Professional and managerial workers in the sample also tended
to venture acceptance wages in the same order of magnitude as other
workers . Again, among non-workers, there was a tendency for people
with such former occupations to stick out for higher acceptance wages,
but this difference was not significant.
Table 2 .9 Acceptance wages of workers and non-workers by
occupation and education
Median Mean Base
Professional and managerial occupations
Workers
Non-workers
120.92
140.00
111 .50
144.71
21
45
Other occupations
Workers
Non-workers
108.31
100.00
129 .80
115 .43
330
297
Degree holders
Workers
Non-workers
100.00
125.00
94 .09
147
.26
23
34
Non-degree holders
Workers
Non-workers
110.00
100.00
130 .44
116 .55
334
330
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So it would seem that the principal reason why non-workers had more
variable acceptance wages was because there were more among them
who were well-qualified, or had experience of highly skilled work, who
were not prepared to accept a low paying job to move into work.
Undoubtedly there is a sampling effect at work here too . The sample
frame reflected respondents ' earnings position more than a year before
interview. Since then, some of the better qualified workers among the
sample (with their accompanying higher wage expectations) may well
have moved into higher paid jobs . Those would have been eliminated
from the sample by the doorstep sift. Thus the sift systematically eliminated
some of those among the workers with higher wage expectations, but
did not do so from among the non-workers.
2 .10 Intention to claim ETU A carefully-worded question asked respondents whether they would prefer
to hold out for their minimum acceptance wage or to accept an even
lower paid job supplemented by a ` wage top up benefit ' (described as
similar to Family Credit or Disability Working Allowance) . Those in
full-time work were simply asked whether or not they would prefer to
top up their current earnings with such a benefit.
The final two columns of Table 2 .8 give the proportions who said they
would respond positively to the benefit . The response was strongly positive
among the employed, but perhaps disappointingly lower among the out of
work. This was particularly the case among those who were seeking
work - a substantial proportion of whom said they would prefer to hold
out for their minimum wage . The exception was older out of work
women without partners, most of whom responded positively to the idea
of ETU, especially those not currently seeking work.
Nonetheless a majority of all groups, and seven in ten overall, said they
would prefer to combine ETU with lower wages (or with their existing
wages) than hold out for higher earnings from work.
2
.11 Summary The field surveys in the ETU pilot areas located fewer of the lowest-paid
workers-in-work than the sample design had specified
. And those found
and interviewed included a large minority who had lately lost their jobs
or were doing other things . But those still in work appeared to be very
much the kind of worker who would be within range of the new benefit
to be introduced shortly after the interviewing ended . They were typically
low-paid clerical, sales, service, distribution or unskilled production
workers, earning an average of just L100 per week . A narrow majority
were women . The exclusion of people with dependent children split the
sample by age into young workers and the later middle-aged . The younger
were typically single, the older were typically single-earner couples, often
relying on women's wages . Relatively few were found in owner-
occupation; most were low-cost tenants or lived with relatives, often
their own parents .
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This data on housing tenure led to an important finding : the majority of
the low-paid workers had no housing costs and the rest contributed only
small amounts . Few had the kind of housing costs that would see them
carry into work large entitlements to Housing Benefit - certainly nothing
of the order that would swamp the effects of ETU in providing new
incentives to work . This means that their in-work incomes will nearly
always be larger than their incomes out of work, and with ETU they will
be larger still. This in part may account for their modest wage expectations
in a new job and perhaps also their relative satisfaction of what many
admitted were jobs with few prospects.
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3 DESCRIPTIVE PR FILE OF THE NE PLOYED SAGV p L~EE
3
.1 Introduction The second main aim of extending in-work benefits to those without
dependent children is to improve incentives to move into work of 16
hours or more a week (DSS, 1995).
This chapter provides analyses concerning the baseline ETU unemployed
sample, together with some comparisons with the parallel sample of
employed people (Chapter Two), and (at some points) with earlier surveys
of unemployment . The results are preceded with a brief account of the
design, sampling and fieldwork for this strand of the evaluation, and a
brief comparison with other recent surveys of the unemployed. Descriptive
results are then outlined.
As with the workers-in-work sample, there is a potential source of
confusion which should be stressed at the outset . The `unemployed
sample' refers to those sampled from the Departmental Central Index
(DCI) file as unemployed in April 1996 . By that date, they had been
claiming out of work benefits for more than 25 but less than 66 weeks.
By the time they were interviewed for this survey (on average about four
months later), many of them had obtained jobs, while others had moved
into some form of economic inactivity
. This movement mirrors the
workers-in-work sample who were identified on a central record system
(NIRS file) as employed during the preceding year, many of whom had
become unemployed or inactive by the time of the survey . We will
continue to refer to the ` unemployed sample ' or to the `employed sample '
according to their original sample membership and not to their current
employment status. The reason for this is simple : the samples were
representative (within the limits set in each case) at the time of sampling,
but this is not necessarily the case for any current economic activity
status . Change in economic activity status is, of course, an outcome of
the greatest interest in this study.
To illustrate and underline this point further, Table 3
.1 shows the
employment status at time of interview for the unemployed sample . This
is broken down by gender and by marital status ; it is comparable with
Table 2 .2 in Chapter Two. In the case of the unemployed sample, rather
more have left their sampled status as `unemployed ' to employed, retired
or something else, leaving just 64 per cent of the sample unemployed and
seeking work at the time of the survey interview.
3.1 .1 The analyses There are two main reasons for considering the characteristics of the
unemployed sample in a descriptive way
. The first, as with any study of
unemployment, is to obtain a preliminary view of the degree and nature
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of labour market disadvantage likely to be experienced by the sample.
The second is to consider how far the particular criteria for the ETU
programme - that is, the exclusion of those with dependent children and
the restriction of the sample to twelve areas of the country - affects other
characteristics in the obtained sample.
It is, of course, essential for future analysis to have as comprehensive an
understanding as possible of individuals ' disadvantages, since these need
to be correctly controlled in order to net-out the effects of ETU . Failure
to understand and control them would lead to a biased analysis which
could either over-state or under-state the impact of ETU . Further, the
extent and nature of these disadvantages may help to explain issues such
as take-up or non-take-up of the benefit . A descriptive exploration of
the data helps to ensure that possible disadvantages or related influences
are not overlooked.
Table 3 .1 Unemployed sample: Employment status at time of
interview, by sex and marital status
MEN WOMEN
(column percentages) Has
	
Div/Sep/
Partner
	
Widow
	
Single
Has
Partner
Div/Sep/
Widow Single ALL
Employed (16+ hours) 10 3 13 23 4 13 I
	
I
Employed (<16 hours) I 3 I 8 7 7 3
Self-employed 3 I 3 2 0 I 2
Govt. training 2 2 3 I I 4 2
Claimant unemployed 45 71 68 24 41 60 57
Unemployed no claim 16 4 4 20 5 I 7
Full-time education I 0 2 0 0 I
Temporary sick 2 I I 8 2 I 2
Long-term sick or 16 14 5 8 25 10 I
	
I
disabled
Housework 0 1 0 4 0 0
Retired 4 I 0 2 13 I 2
Other 2 0 I I 1 * 1
Base 423 181 794 132 177 284 1991
less than 0 .5 per cent but greater than 0
3.1 .2 The sample The usual sources for samples of (claimant) unemployed individuals are
either the National Unemployment Benefit System (NUBS), or the Joint
Unemployment and Vacancies Operating Statistics (JUVOS) . JUVOS
was not a possibility here, however, because it would not yield a sufficiently
large sample in each ETU pilot area, and access to NUBS proved
impossible in the time available . Therefore, it was decided to draw the
sample from the Departmental Central Index (DCI) at the Department of
Social Security . This uses a somewhat different definition of claim duration
from that used in NUBS/JUVOS, and contains other types of claimants
apart from the unemployed . However, the difference in start dates of
claims was not expected to be large, and it was considered possible to
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draw the sample in such a way as to identify unemployed claimants,
including those on government training programmes.
The sample was taken from those with 26-65 weeks of unemployment at
the point of sampling. This duration-band constituted about 20-25 per
cent of all claimant unemployed in each of the twelve localities . However,
because of the different sizes and unemployment rates of the localities,
different sampling fractions had to be calculated for each, in order to
equalise the sample size across them.
An important difference from the employed sample has to be noted at
this point . The employed sample was drawn by a multi-stage procedure,
which first of all selected within-locality spatial clusters on a probability-
proportional-to-size (PPS) basis, and then selected an equal number of
individuals within each cluster. To simplify both fieldwork, and
comparability between the employed and unemployed samples, the
unemployed sample took the clusters defined for the employed sample as
given. It was therefore not a PPS sample . Accordingly, numbers of
individuals were drawn from each cluster in proportion to the numbers
unemployed there. The imposition of the employed clusters on the
unemployed sample creates some sample bias (likely to be small), which
can be corrected by weighting.
As explained more fully in Appendix B, two complications arose for the
analysis . First, the overall achieved sample size was 1,991 compared to a
planned total of 2,400 (i .e, it was 83 per cent of the target sample).
However, preliminary work in statistically modelling various aspects of
the data indicated that the sample remained statistically adequate for the
task ahead (see Section 3 .5) . Second, there was an unusually large
proportion of economically inactive claimants in the sample, partly due
to the sampling frame used which included disability claimants . This
economically inactive group might be of considerable interest for ETU.
3 .2 How distinctive is the The exclusion of people with dependent children may be expected, in
ETU unemployed sample? general, to produce a sample with characteristics that differ in important
respects from previous surveys of unemployment . Differences to be
expected include lower variability in benefit entitlements, a polarisation
of the age distribution with an exceptionally low proportion from the
prime-age groups, and a large proportion of older single people, who
may on average be particularly disadvantaged.
As described above, the unemployed sample for the ETU study was
confined to those without dependent children, consistent with ETU
eligibility requirements . It was also designed to concentrate on those
claimants most likely to be responsive to the new benefit . These were
expected to be those in `medium-to-long-term ' unemployment, defined
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as a qualifying (incomplete) claimant period of 26-65 weeks . This sample
is most similar, among previous studies, to the Restart Cohort Study
sample (White and Lakey, 1992), which considered the inflow to 26
weeks of unemployment . Although 26 weeks was the lower band
considered in the ETU sample, it was from 26 weeks onwards that a
marked slowing of the exit rate from unemployment became visible . A
further marked slowing of the exit rate next became visible for those
with two or more years of unemployment . Thus, you would not expect
to find large differences between a 26-week inflow sample, and one drawn
from the 26-65 week band. A limited range of comparisons are made
below between the characteristics of the ETU sample, and those of the
Restart survey sample, and they have generally been found to be similar
except where directly affected by the exclusion of claimants with
dependent children from the ETU sample . Such differences will shortly
be described . Where this source does not provide comparative
information, a 1992 survey of the unemployed stock excluding those
with a claim of less than three months, conducted as part of the
` Employment in Britain' study, is sometimes useful (White et al ., 1995).
A further question is how far the ETU unemployed sample could be
expected to differ from other kinds of sample which are commonly
considered when analysing unemployment . Consideration of this question
will be helpful in assessing how far the characteristics of the sample obtained
were in line with expectations, and hence in focusing on any issues which
were contrary to expectation.
For example, this sample might be expected to differ considerably from
an inflow sample to unemployment . Inflow samples generally contain
large proportions of young people and those with qualifications and skills
in demand, and many of these get jobs quickly . So the ETU sample
would be expected to have considerably less advantageous characteristics
than an inflow sample.
The ETU sample would also be expected to differ from the stock of all
unemployed claimants, but these differences would go in two different
directions which might partly balance out . On the one hand, their
characteristics would on average be less advantageous, from a labour market
viewpoint, than those with periods of unemployment of less than 26
weeks for the reasons just noted. On the other hand, their characteristics
would be less disadvantageous than those with longer periods of
unemployment (say 1 .5 years plus) . Since there are more people in the
stock of unemployed with below 26 weeks unemployment than with
1 .5 years or more of unemployment (the ratio is about 3 :2), on balance
one would expect the ETU sample to be somewhat more disadvantaged
than the stock as a whole, although not greatly.
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To test this reasoning, some comparisons can been made with the flow
and stock figures published from the JSA evaluation study (Bottomley et
al ., 1997) (Table 3 .2) though we must also bear in mind that our sample
were all seen prior to the introduction of the Jobseeker ' s Allowance which
came in at the same time as ETU in October 1996.
Table 3 .2 Comparison of the ETU unemployed sample with
the JSA unemployed samples
(cell percentages)
ETU unemployed
sample
JSA
Flow sample
JSA
Stock sample
Female 30 34 26
Married 28 37 37
Widowed/divorced/ separated 18 10 14
Living independently 56 56 63
No educational qualifications 56 39 48
No vocational qualifications 60 49 54
Aged under 25 32 37 31
Aged 45+ 37 20 23
In job at interview 18 37 22
Inactive at interview 26 (16) 1
	
I
	
(9) 9 (7)
No recent job application 32 n/a 25
Base 1991 1,740 3,349
(Bracketed figures exclude those on disability/sickness benefits).
In general, these comparisons were in line with the expectation that the
ETU sample would be slightly more disadvantaged than the whole
unemployed stock, and considerably more disadvantaged than the
unemployed inflow.
All but two of the differences between the ETU and Jobseeker ' s Allowance
stock samples are within ten percentage points . Of these, one was simply
explained: the particularly large proportion of people aged 45-plus in the
ETU sample is a consequence of excluding those with dependent children.
This left just one difference which is substantially out of line, and hard to
explain: the proportion in an inactive economic status at interview. Here
the ETU result has almost certainly been inflated by the `leakage ' of
disability claimants into the sample (drawn from the DCI instead of the
more usual NUBS) . However, even after excluding disability or Incapacity
Benefit claimants, the inactivity rate was more than twice as high in ETU
as in the Jobseeker ' s Allowance stock sample.
To what extent could this be the result of the higher proportion of over-
45s in the ETU sample, just referred to? This was tested in a multivariate
analysis (see section 3 .5, Table 3 .31) . It was found that age was associated
with reduced economic inactivity, but the effect was rather small, and
statistically significant only in the case of women ; it would account for
only a small part of the observed difference between the samples .
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The lag between sampling and fieldwork was longer for the ETU study
than for the Jobseeker 's Allowance study, by about two months . This
would make some further contribution to the difference, but on the basis
of previous experience (see White, 1983 : Table III .2), a small one.
Yet another possibility was that the relatively high inactivity rate in the
ETU sample reflects economic conditions in the selected areas where the
survey took place (whereas the Jobseeker 's Allowance study was a national
sample) . It should also be noted that the inactivity rate for the Jobseeker's
Allowance stock sample was lower than for the Jobseeker 's Allowance
flow sample, which was contrary to expectation.
Thus, the ETU sample differed from previous samples of the unemployed
by focusing on the claim duration of26-65 weeks, as well as by excluding
those without dependent children . This generated a number of predictable
differences from an inflow or a stock sample of unemployed claimants.
Some initial comparisons with results from the Jobseeker ' s Allowance
evaluation were broadly in line with these predictions, except for one
anomalous result ; the extent of inactivity . A number of possible
contributory factors have been reviewed, but as yet a convincing
explanation has not been found.
It is also important, for the eventual aims of the study, to be able to bring
together information from the employed and unemployed samples, to
understand the workings of ETU for its complete set of potential clients
- those in scope of the benefit . This raises the issue of how far the two
samples are homogeneous . This is not an entirely straightforward question,
since the unemployed sample may be experiencing a temporary shift
towards disadvantage which artificially separates them from the employed
sample . The analyses below provide a comparison of the two samples.
3 .3 The unemployed in the An initial point, affecting all other comparisons, was that the employed
ETU evaluation areas and unemployed samples differed substantially in their composition by
3 .3 .1 Gender gender : only three in ten of the unemployed were women but they were
the majority among the employed sample (Table 3 .3) . It will generally be
desirable, therefore, when making comparisons between the samples, to
do so separately for men and women.
50
Table 3 .3 Gender composition of unemployed and employed
samples
(column percentages)
Unemployed sample Employed sample
Female
Male
30
70
56
44
Base 1991 2316
3
.3 .2 Human capital While `human capital' has a particular technical sense in economics, it is
used here simply as a convenient label for such variables as educational
qualifications, skills, experience and job tenure, that are likely to enhance
a person's value in the labour market.
Table 3 .4 shows the highest educational qualification obtained in each
sample . Somewhat more than half of the unemployed sample lacked
educational qualification of any kind . Nearly 12 per cent had an A-level
or higher, and 18 per cent an 0-level or equivalent . Results for the
employed sample were similar in overall terms, but whereas the male
unemployed sample was slightly less qualified than the male employed
sample, the reverse applied in the case of women.
The overall proportion without any educational qualification was virtually
the same as reported for the 1989 Restart Cohort Study, despite several
intervening years of rising qualification rates in Britain.
For a national comparison, it is convenient to consider those with a
qualification at 0-level equivalent or above, as published by the General
Household Survey. The national figure (for 1995) was 56 per cent for
the population aged 16-69 . The corresponding figure for the unemployed
sample was 28 per cent and for the employed sample 33 per cent . This
suggests a fairly severe level of educational disadvantage for both ETU
samples.
Table 3.4 Highest educational qualification
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men Women Men Women
Degree or equiv. 5 7 5 3
A-level or equiv. 6 8 7 5
0-level or equiv. 17 20 24 22
CSE-level or equiv. 15 14 17 13
NONE 57 52 48 57
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
The unemployed sample also resembled the earlier Restart sample in the
proportion who had some kind of vocational qualification . This was 34
per cent (31 per cent for the 1989 Restart sample) . The present survey
collected fairly detailed information about the types of vocational
qualification held, and these are summarised in Table 3 .5 . Since it is
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notoriously difficult to obtain clear or precise information about vocational
qualifications from respondents, the categories are inherently very rough.
This table, and the figure of 34 per cent given above, does not include
those who said they had a nursing qualification or other professional
qualification . In some classifications, these are counted among higher
educational qualifications rather than among vocational qualifications
(though they were not included in Table 3 .4 above) . They amounted to
5 .5 per cent of the unemployed sample and 6 .4 per cent of the employed,
evenly spread by gender. (This additional group has been included in the
figure for comparison with the Jobseeker 's Allowance sample shown in
Table 3 .2).
Table 3 .5
	
Summary of vocational qualifications
(cell percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men Women Men Women
Apprenticeship 9 9
RSA or similar 5 17 7 5
City & Guilds 21 13 22 4
ONCorOND 4 I 4
HNC or HND 3 I 4
TEC orBTEC 5 5 5 5
Other, including HGV 4 2 5
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
Note: an individual may have had more than one type of qualification and so be counted several times.
As well as educational qualifications, the survey collected information
about educational deficits (functional difficulties with basic skills of reading,
writing and numeracy) and - for those aged under 25 only - about prior
truanting from school . The proportions stating that they were seriously
affected by problems of reading, writing or numeracy were quite small -
in the region of five per cent in each case . However, truancy was reported
by a very substantial proportion of the under-25s, amounting to 46 per
cent of the unemployed sample and 40 per cent of the employed, with
higher proportions of former truants among young men than among
young women (Table 3 .6)" . Approximately one in three of those who
reported truanting in the unemployed sample said they did so `frequently';
the corresponding proportion in the employed sample was around one
in four . A substantial amount of research evidence exists showing links
between truancy and later employment, economic and social problems,
even after allowing for educational attainment (Casey and Smith, 1995).
This, accordingly, is another indication of disadvantage.
17 The question wording was ` School pupils do not always attend every class they
should and stay out of school instead . Did you ever do this at school?' . The figures
quoted in Table 3 .6 represent the reply ` yes ' to this question.
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Table 3 .6 Truanting among under-25s
(cell percentages)
Unemployed
Men Women
Employed
Men Women
Truanting reported 49 40 43 36
Base 444 I92 293 316
While qualifications tend to be the strongest predictors of favourable
outcomes in the labour market as a whole, job experience may be a
better predictor at the bottom of the labour market where qualifications
matter less . Work history information was limited to the past five-and-a-
half years (from the beginning of 1991 to interview in mid-1996), which
provides a picture of recent experience . However, this is not a valid
comparator with the employed sample since it is biased by the current
employment status . For the unemployed sample only, the figures were
as follows (Table 3 .7).
Table 3 .7 Proportion of time in various labour market
statuses (since end 1990) - unemployed sample
(column percentages)
Men Women ALL
Full-time employment 27 29 28
Part-time employment I 5 2
Self-employment 4 I 3
Claimant unemployment 38 27 35
Non-claimant unemployed
. 5 4 5
Full-time education 10 12 10
Sick 7 9 8
Other 8 13 9
ANY EMPLOYMENT 33 35 33
Base 1398 593 1991
While no comparators for these figures are available, it can hardly be
doubted that to have spent only one-third of the past five years in
employment, the same proportion unemployed and only half the
remaining time doing anything that would improve their attractiveness
to any employer, indicates a very weak competitive position in the jobs
market for the unemployed sample as a whole.
Health or ill-health can also be considered as an aspect of human capital
since it may limit paid work in various ways, or be a source of
discrimination . Table 3 .8 below shows that there was substantially more
illness, of a persistent type, in the unemployed sample than in the employed.
Unemployed women were more likely to have had persistent illness than
were unemployed men but there was no difference by gender in the
employed sample . The overall proportion experiencing persistent illness
in the unemployed sample, 35 per cent, was virtually the same as in the
earlier Restart survey.
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If those currently receiving disability benefit are excluded, the difference
between the unemployed and employed samples is reduced but does not
completely disappear : for men and women combined, 25 per cent of the
unemployed sample and 21 per cent of the employed sample reported
persistent illness but not receipt of disability benefits.
Table 3 .8 "ersistent illness in the unemployed and employed
samples
(cell percentages)
Unemployed
	
Employed
Men
	
Women
	
Men
	
Women
Persistent illness 33
	
42
	
24
	
22
Base
	
1398
	
593
	
1011
	
1305
3.3 .3 Life-cycle Because those with dependent children were excluded from the survey,
it was expected that there would be an abnormally low proportion from
the prime-age groups, when children are being born and brought up,
and that the sample would be concentrated among younger and older
individuals.
However, the unemployed sample was not markedly skewed towards
younger people (compared with previous experience) . Just under one
third (32 per cent) of the present unemployed sample was under-25,
almost the same as in the 1989 Restart survey (34 per cent) . The expected
reduction of respondents in the prime years was found, with only 30 per
cent being aged 25-44 (compared to 43 per cent in Restart), but the shift
was towards older age bands . In fact, 37 per cent of the unemployed
sample was aged 45 or over (compared to 23 per cent in Restart) . The
same shift was even more marked in the case of the employed sample,
where no less than 44 per cent of the sample were aged 45-plus (Table
3.9).
Table 3 .9 Age groups of unemployed and employed samples
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
16-24 32 26
25-34 18 19
35-44 12 10
45-54 20 24
55-64 17 21
Missing/not valid 2
Base 1991 2316
Crossing gender by age, for the unemployed sample only, we obtain
Table 3 .10. The sexes had equal proportions of under-25s, but there
were fewer women aged 25-34 and somewhat more aged 45 or more.
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Table 3 .10 Age group by geer - unemployed sample
(column percentages)
Men Women
16-24 32 32
25-34 20 13
35-44 12 13
45-54 19 23
55-64 17 18
Missing/ not valid I I
Base 1398 593
The exclusion of households with children resulted, as would be expected,
in a marked drop in the proportion of people in couples for the
unemployed sample, compared with the Restart survey . There were 28
per cent in the present survey, and 47 per cent in Restart ; conversely,
there were 18 per cent separated, divorced or widowed (Restart, ten per
cent) and 54 per cent single (Restart, 43 per cent).
The proportions in different categories of marital status differed markedly
between the two ETU samples . The employed sample had considerably
more couples and correspondingly fewer in the other two categories,
and this difference between the samples was particularly marked in the
case of women (Table 3 .11).
Table 3 .11 Marital status of unemployed and employed
samples
(column percentages)
Unemployed
Men Women
Employed
Men Women
In couple
Separated/ divorced/widowed
Single
30
13
57
22
30
48
40
8
53
48
17
36
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
Since marital status can be an important factor for employment chances,
and was likely to be the single major influence on benefit entitlement in
the present survey, it was worth analysing it by age as well as by gender.
For men and women alike, most of those under 35 in the unemployed
sample were single . For men only, the majority were still single in the
35-44 group, while above 44 the majority were married . For women,
the largest proportion from 35 on was the separated, divorced or widowed.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 .1.
Although not having children to look after, respondents might still have
had care responsibilities for their spouse or another adult . Quite a sizeable
minority (eight per cent) of the unemployed reported that they were in
this position, but there were 10 per cent in the employed sample . Higher
proportions of women than of men were carers in both samples, and
those under 35 had a slightly lower probability of being carers (table not
shown) .
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3 .3 .4 Households Household composition has been found, in previous research on
unemployment, to offer one of the most important clusters of variables
that determine entry into the labour market . Part of the reason is financial,
with the availability of sources of income other than the individual ' s own
earnings capacity being largely determined by household structure and
activity . In addition, the members of a household provide direct support
and links to wider social networks, which are of crucial and increasing
importance for job search as unemployment is prolonged (Daniel, 1990).
The stereotype of household formation is that young people remain in
the parental home until finding a stable partner, when they establish a
separate household . The stereotype was maintained up to a point with
the unemployed sample, since 91 per cent of those living in the parental
home were single (Table 3 .12) . However, the stereotype did not extend
to those living independently, less than one half of whom were married
or with a partner. There were large numbers living independently who
remained single, or who were separated, divorced or widowed . In broad
terms this picture applied more strongly for women than men . Some 56
per cent of the men living independently were in couples compared with
only 32 per cent of women living independently . This difference was
attributable to the much higher proportion of women who were separated,
divorced or widowed.
The employed sample came closer to the stereotypical picture, with the
majority of the respondents who lived in independent households being
in couples . This was almost as true of women (66 per cent) as it was of
men (71 per cent), even though here too there were more separated,
divorced or widowed women than men.
Table 3 .12 Proportion living independently by marital status,
unemployed and employed samples
(column percentages)
Independent
Household
Living with
parents
Living with
others
(a) Unemployed
Couples 48 2 16
Separated/ divorced/ widowed 26 7 24
Single 27 9 I 60
Base 1107 821 63
(b) Employed
Couples 68 6 53
Separated/ divorced/widowed 18 5 15
Single 15 89 32
Base 1387 876 53
Table 3 .13 considers marital status in relation to the number of employed
workers in the household (excluding the respondent ; other workers were
mostly spouses or parents) . Whereas 61 per cent of the unemployed
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sample had no other employed person in their household, the proportion
was only 42 per cent for the employed sample ; gender made no difference
here.
Figure 3 .1 Marital status and age-group by gender in the
unemployed and employed samples
qSep/Div/Wid
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ESingle
Male
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Female
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It is often assumed that polarisation into two-earner and no-earner couples
results from the treatment of partner ' s earnings in benefits . However, it
can be seen from Table 3 .13 that the difference between the samples in
this respect persisted irrespective of marital status . It was those who were
separated, divorced or widowed who were least likely to have had other
earners in the household.
The separated, divorced and widowed were also most likely to be living
alone (table not shown) : in the unemployed sample, 71 per cent did so
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3 .3 .5 Tenure and housing
(compared with 25 per cent of single people), and in the employed sample,
53 per cent did so (compared with 16 per cent of single people).
Table 3 .13 Other workers in household by marital status -
unemployed and employed samples
(Row percentages)
None One Two or more Base
(a) Unemployed
Couples 56 38 6 555
Separated/ divorced/ widowed 85 I
	
I 4 358
Single 56 21 23 1078
(b) Employed
Couples 37 50 13 1019
Separated/ divorced/ widowed 71 22 7 296
Single 39 26 35 1001
The relationship between workers ' housing tenure, their entitlement to
in-work benefits, and their consequent incentives to work, is complex.
Entitlement to Housing Benefit, which pays all or most of tenants' rent
during spells of unemployment, can nevertheless be carried into work.
Such entitlement can persist unabated for new job entrants for a month
to help tide them over the awkward shift of benefit regimes that work
entry entails . If their wages are low - and low entry-level wages are
common among social tenants leaving Income Support for the labour
market - entitlement to some HB will persist . Rising real rents and
falling entry-wages have made this persistence more common . Mortgage-
payers, by contrast, face less favourable terms of transition to work . They
get help with their mortgage interest payments while on IS, but receive
no equivalent help in work . On the other hand, mortgage-payers more
often enter work at wages that vault them clear of entitlement to any in-
work benefits anyway . But in the case of the majority - the tenants
staying on in-work benefits - a problem could arise with their relationship
to ETU. Small entitlements might simply replace larger amounts of residual
entitlement to HB and even CTB too. A key element may be the
proportion of likely claimants who have few housing costs, typically
younger people still living with their parents.
The proportion living in a parental household was similar in both samples
(around 45 per cent of the men and one-third of the women) . Another
similarity between the samples was the proportions making no rent
contribution to parents they lived with (Table 3 .14) . The main differences
in individual tenure between the two samples came among those living
independently.
The unemployed included considerably fewer who owned their
accommodation outright, and fewer who were buying on a mortgage.
This difference was present for both men and women, but appeared to be
more marked in the case of women. The unemployed conversely included
more who were renting than in the case of the employed sample.
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Since moves between renting and buying can be assumed to be infrequent,
these housing characteristics appear to represent fairly long-term differences
in circumstances between unemployed and (low-paid) employed groups.
Furthermore, 13 per cent of the unemployed sample were having all
their rent covered by Housing Benefit, whereas this happened only for
two per cent of the employed sample . In this case, however, changes in
receipt could take place in the short-term.
Table 3 .14 Housing tenure of respondent - unemployed and
employed samples
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men Women Men Women
Parental home - rent free 12 I
	
I 13 I
	
I
Parental home - paying rent 33 22 34 21
Owns outright I 0 10 14 18
Owns with mortgage 12 14 16 22
Rents - 100% HB I
	
I 17 3 2
Rents - no or partial HB 15 20 14 19
Other/missing data 7 7 8 7
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
Note : HB = Housing Benefit
Next, classifying housing by tenure, irrespective of who was the head of
household, underlines the distinction made above":
• 20 per cent of the unemployed lived in properties owned outright
compared with 29 per cent of the employed sample;
• 29 per cent of the unemployed sample lived in properties being bought
on a mortgage compared with 37 per cent of the employed sample;
• 38 per cent of the unemployed sample were in social tenancies
(employed sample, 25 per cent) and 12 per cent were in privately
rented accommodation (employed sample, six per cent).
3 .3 .6 Housing costs As we have seen in the last chapter, housing costs are of considerable
interest to the evaluation of ETU 19 . They may have incentive or
disincentive effects through Housing Benefit or mortgage interest support,
and they are likely to interact with ETU effects.
Gross housing costs (that is, ignoring the effects of benefits) appeared
somewhat higher in the unemployed sample than in the employed . As
would be expected, once benefits were netted out, the positions of the
two samples were reversed with the unemployed having lower net housing
This takes account of the housing tenure of those respondents living in the parental
home (the first two rows of table 3 .14).
'9 At the present stage, no attempt has been made to estimate housing costs where
these were missing, but this will be attempted in future analyses . For the present
analyses, a few cases with outlying or improbable values have been excluded, as is
the case with all other financial variables .
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costs . These figures are summarised in Table 3 .15a . They include the
people with no housing costs, chiefly those who were living with parents,
and who have already been noted in the previous section.
Table 3 .15a Housing costs, gross (excluding effects of benefits)
and net (including the effects of benefits)
Figures are mean pounds per week
Unemployed Employed
Men WomenMen Women
Gross housing costs £26 .20 £29 .50 £22 .60 £21 .50
Base 1264 544 927 1207
Net housing costs £16 .10 £ 14 .70 £ 19 .60 £ 19 .60
Base 1248 535 917 1I96
The median and upper and lower quartiles for the same housing cost
variables are shown in table 3 .15b 20 .
In the unemployed sample, 81 per cent of renters were receiving Housing
Benefit, with an average weekly amount of £45.50 . (Across all renters,
including those getting no Housing Benefit, the average weekly Housing
Benefit amount was £37 .00) . In the employed sample, nearly one in
three (31 per cent) received Housing Benefit and the average payment
was £35 .70 per week (and higher for men, £40.50, than for women,
£31 .10).
Mortgage interest subsidy (through Income Support) was received by a
relatively small number (128), most of whom (107) were in the
unemployed sample and were joined by the remainder sampled as workers
but who had lost their jobs . For the unemployed, these payments in
respect of mortgages were on average somewhat higher than for housing
benefits (averaging £52 .80 per week) . Differences in the amounts reported
by men and women were quite small . The number from the employed
sample obtaining mortgage interest support was too few (21) for the
average to be reliable . These were mostly cases where the individuals
had moved, subsequent to sampling, into unemployment, sickness or
retirement.
20 The median is the value of the person who occupies the middle position (the 50th
percentile) in the distribution
. Similarly, the lower quartile is the value of the person
who occupies the 25th percentile and the upper quartile is the value of the person
who occupies the 75th percentile.
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3.3 .7 Receipt of benefits
Table 3e15b Quartiles of housing costs, gross (excluding effects
of benefits) and net (including the effects of benefits)
Figures are pounds per week
Unemployed Employed
Men Women Men Women
Gross
Lower quartile 0 0 0
Median 20 23 20 20
Upper quartile 37 42 34 34
Base 1264 544 927 1207
Net
Lower quartile 0 0 0 0
Median 10 6 17 16
Upper quartile 23 20 30 32
Base 1248 535 917 1196
In view of the widely varying current activity status of the unemployed
sample (Table 3 .1), it was of interest to assess their receipt of benefits at
the time of interview . Table 3.16 summarises this in terms of receipt of
monetary benefit, excluding Housing Benefit.
Table 3A6 Receipt of benefit by the working status at
interview in the unemployed sample
(Row percentages)
Status At Interview Any benefit No benefit Base
Full-time employed (16+ hours) 7 93 220
Part-time employed (<16 hours) 65 35 65
Self-employed 8 92 39
Govt . training 98 2 46
Claimant unemployed 96 4 1 134
Unemployed, no claim 25 75 144
Full-time education 21 79 19
Temporary sick 82 18 39
Long-term sick or disabled 86 14 216
Looking after home/family 67 33 6
Retired 69 3 I 45
Other 61 39 18
By far the largest category of benefit was Income Support (the date of the
1996 survey fieldwork preceded the introduction of the Jobseeker ' s
Allowance) . A minority of the respondents reported themselves as
receiving Unemployment Benefit . Both types of benefit are reported in
Table 3
.17, which includes a small number of cases - less than four per
cent - where the benefit was said to come from the partner 's status rather
than, or as well as, the respondent 's (note that there can be some overlap
between the two types of benefit) .
6I
In general, these results suggest that most of the claims were related in the
expected ways to employment status . The group with the most complex
claiming pattern were the long-term sick or disabled . Surprisingly, while
two-thirds of them were claiming Income Support, which is perhaps as
might be expected, only 61 per cent were claiming some kind of disability
benefit . All but seven per cent were receiving either Income Support or
disability benefits . Also, the long-term sick or disabled group constituted
only 54 per cent of all those stating they received disability benefits . The
majority of the remaining disability claimants classified themselves as
unemployed rather than long-term sick or disabled . These points indicate
that long-term sickness or disability is not a simple or homogeneous
category whether considered from a benefit viewpoint or a labour market
viewpoint.
Table 3 .17 Receipt of Income Support and Unemployment
enefit in the unemployed sample
(cell percentages)
Status At Interview IS UB Base
Full-time employed (16+ hours) (3)* (2)* 220
Part-time employed (<16 hours) 47 8 65
Self-employed 4 4 39
Govt. training 65 2 46
Claimant unemployed 82 17 1 134
Unemployed, no claim 12 4 144
Full-time education 16 0 19
Temporary sick 44 0 39
Long-term sick or disabled 69 I 216
Looking after home/family 33 17 6
Retired 36 2 45
Other 0 0 18
*These are either data-errors or people so recently on benefit that they report themselves 'receiving .
.'
A few may also leave partners receiving contributory JSA.
3.3 .8 Income other than own Income received when not working, according to standard economic
earnings theory, enters into the calculation of reservation wages and hence affects
labour supply and job search choices . Rent or mortgage subsidies have
been discussed in the preceding section . The other main elements of
non-wage income were unemployment and welfare benefits, partner ' s
earnings, savings, and miscellaneous other income such as from renting
rooms. This section concerns these elements of income, and all figures
exclude housing benefits.
Three quarters of the unemployed sample were receiving some social
security benefits at the time of interview, with virtually no difference
here between men and women . The proportion in the employed sample
was 29 per cent, and again there was no gender difference . Table 3 .18
shows the average amounts reported ; there was no difference between
men and women in the unemployed sample, but women from the
employed sample reported significantly greater payments than the men.
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Retirement pensions were included in the list of benefits (since partners
may have been receiving these even though the respondent was ofworking
age), but as a few of the figures given under this heading were large, it
may be that some respondents included occupational as well as state
pensions . The table was re-calculated excluding retirement pensions to
assess the upper limit of any bias resulting from this . This reduced the
average benefit amount for men in the unemployed sample to L56 .40,
and for women to L55 .70 . In the employed sample, the male average
fell to £53 .10, and the female more substantially to £59 .00; there were
65 women in this part of the sample with partners receiving pensions.
Table 3 .18 Average benefit amounts (all types), for those
receiving benefits at the time of the interview
Figures are in pounds per week
Unemployed sample,
	
Employed sample,
still unemployed
	
now unemployed
Men
	
Women
	
Men
	
Women
All benefits, mean payment per week £57.70
	
£57 .50
	
£54.90
	
£65 .10
Base
	
1043
	
437
	
296
	
374
There was a substantial number of disability benefit recipients in the
unemployed sample, and their payments were higher on average than
the average benefit receipt figures shown above . The apparent differences
between the employed and unemployed samples here should be treated
with caution because of smaller numbers (Table 3 .19).
Table 3 .19 Average sickness or disability benefit amounts, for
those receiving these benefits at the time of interview
Figures are in pounds per week
Unemployed
	
Employed
Men
	
Women
	
Men
	
Women
Mean payment per week
	
{83 .50
	
£81 .60
	
£80 .20
	
£70.30
Base
	
147
	
93
	
23
	
30
Turning to partner ' s earnings, it must be borne in mind that the employed
sample was screened on the doorstep to eliminate, as far as possible, anyone
with a high-paid partner . This filter was not, however, applied to the
unemployed sample, so there might be some bias in cross-sample
comparisons.
There were indeed some unemployed women with high-paid partners,
but they were very few . Indeed, altogether there were few respondents
in the unemployed sample who had employed partners : less than five per
cent of the sample . Even among the employed sample, the figure rose to
only a little more than 15 per cent . Table 3 .20 summarizes the mean
income from partner's earnings, for those where this was a source of
household income .
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Table 3 .20 Average earnings of partners who were employed
Figures are in pounds per week
Unemployed
	
Employed
Men
	
Women Men
	
Women
Mean earnings per week
	
£83 .70
	
£ 190 .40
	
£96 .00
	
£ 140 .60
Base
	
67
	
20
	
16I
	
201
The quartiles are perhaps more interesting, and these are shown in Table
3 .21, amalgamating men and women in each sample.
Table 3 .21
earnings
Quartiles (rounded to nearest L5) of partner's
Unemployed Employed
Lower quartile
Median
Upper quartile
£35
£95
£ 145
£75
£ 125
£ 150
Base 89 367
This suggests that, even among the few employed partners in the
unemployed sample, there was a concentration with very small earnings.
Overall, then, partners ' employment was an insignificant element of
household income for all but a small minority of the unemployed.
The proportion of the unemployed with ` other income ' , such as from
renting rooms, was slightly larger (seven per cent), and closer to the
position in the employed sample (11 per cent) . As before, a few outlying
values were excluded from the analysis (Table 3 .22).
Mean income from these other sources was, for those receiving any, of a
similar order of magnitude to earnings of partners, but the dispersion was
greater . One half of recipients (in both samples) obtained £50 or less,
but the means were inflated by a minority of large values . The amounts
were similar across the unemployed and employed samples, but larger
figures, on average, were reported by men in both samples . Overall,
other income was scarcely more important for the household income of
the unemployed than was partner's earnings.
Table 3 .22 Average receipts from `other income'
Figures are in pounds per week Those with no 'other earnings' are excluded.
Unemployed
	
Employed
Men
	
Women
	
Men
	
Women
Mean earnings per week
	
£ 102.50
	
£72.30
	
£110.50
	
£77.70
Base
	
93
	
34
	
101
	
158
The final item to be considered in this section is savings (Table 3 .23).
Nearly one in four (23 per cent) of the unemployed sample reported
some savings, but this was considerably less than in the case of the employed
sample (40 per cent) . The mean amounts, for those with some savings,
were similar across samples, being just above 1900 for the unemployed
3 .3 .9 Indicators of hardship
and about £2150 for the employed . Unemployed women had
substantially lower savings than unemployed men or than employed
women.
Table 3 .23 Average savings
Figures are in pounds.
Unemployed
Men Women
Employed
Men Women
Mean savings £2093 £ 1429 £2102 £2187
Base 327 I28 406 515
These average values of people 's savings are increased by a few who
reported large amounts, so they are not really typical . A quarter of the
unemployed who had any savings had £50 or less, and half had £300 or
less . Only the upper quarter had more than £1,700 in savings, while
only a few - four per cent of the unemployed and nine per cent of the
employed - had more than £3000.
The greater dependence on benefits of the unemployed sample, and their
generally lower receipts of non-benefit, non-wage income, suggest that
they were more likely to experience financial and material hardship than
in the case of the employed sample . Indicators of hardship are usually
studied because of a concern for equity, but recent research has suggested
that high levels of hardship may reduce individuals ' capacity to search
effectively for work (Bryson, Ford and White, 1997).
The great majority of both samples, but slightly more among the
unemployed, stated that they had worries over money (Table 3 .24).
Slightly more than one half of the unemployed sample said that these
worries occurred almost all the time or quite often, men and women
equally.
Table 3 .24 Frequency of worries over money
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men WomenMen Women
Almost all the time 31 36 26 22
Quite often 20 20 18 18
Only sometimes 25 25 27 29
Never 24 19 30 31
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
Difficulties in repaying debts were also slightly more prevalent among
the unemployed than the employed sample ; women from the employed
sample were least likely to experience this type of problem (Table 3 .25).
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Table 3 .25 Frequency of difficulties in the repayment of debts
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men Women Men Women
Almost all the time 9 10 6 3
Quite often 12 13 8 8
Only sometimes 29 24 3 I 27
Never 51 53 55 62
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
A third question asked how well the respondent was managing her or his
finances (Table 3 .26) . The majority felt that they were at least `getting by
all right' , but more of the unemployed felt that they had difficulties
managing. Gender differences were once again slight.
Table 3 .26 How well individuals were managing financially
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
Men WomenMen Women
Manage very well 8 10 10 14
Manage quite well 14 19 20 26
Get by all right 47 45 49 46
Don't manage very well 14 7 9 5
Have some financial difficulties 14 15 10 7
Am in deep financial trouble 4 4 2 2
Base 1398 593 1011 1305
Overall, the expectation that the unemployed sample would experience
greater hardship appeared to be borne out . However, the differences
were not great, and one could equally interpret the results as indicating
that the low-waged employed sample experienced hardship to nearly the
same extent as the unemployed . The message such a conclusion holds
for the study of work incentives may be interesting . It does not suggest
to the unemployed that waged incomes leave people all that better off
than life on benefit.
Given that many of the unemployed sample were young, an interesting
issue was whether hardship is reduced by living in the shelter of the
parental home . In general, this was found to make surprisingly little
difference ; however, those living at home generally appeared better off;
especially in avoiding problems of debt, and particularly in the case of
women. For example, in the unemployed sample, 69 per cent of women
living with parents had never had problems repaying debts, but of those
living independently, only 46 per cent had avoided debt repayment
problems. The corresponding proportions for men were 54 per cent and
49 per cent . Conversely, 27 per cent of the female unemployed sample
living independently had difficulties of debt repayment ` almost all the
time' or `quite often ' , but this fell to 13 per cent for those living with their
parents.
66
3 .4 Job search activities and Job search was a central focus for the evaluation, since changes in search
networks behaviour constitute one of the main channels through which ETU can
affect the labour market.
At the time of the interview, 18 per cent of the unemployed sample were
in a job or waiting to take up a job ; 57 per cent were claiming benefit
and actively seeking work; and 26 per cent had not (recently) been actively
seeking a job . The inactive proportion (defined as those who had not
sought a job during the previous four weeks) was 22 per cent in the case
of men but 36 per cent in the case of women.
To interpret these figures, it has to be borne in mind that the average
time between sampling (unemployed as at April 1996) and interview was
four months . The transition rate into jobs during this period was closely
similar to that from the Employment in Britain study of 1992, interviewed
after a similar time-lag (White et al ., 1995).
The 1992 survey of unemployed people just cited, which used a similar
criterion of active search, as well as a similar follow-up period from
sampling, reported nine per cent currently inactive . Part, though not all,
of the difference in activity rates between the present study and the past
surveys can be accounted for by the proportions receiving various forms
of disability benefit . These constituted 14 per cent of the unemployed
sample (12 .7 per cent of men and 17 .9 per cent of women) . This can be
contrasted with a proportion of about five per cent in the Restart survey,
where the follow-up period was longer (six months instead of four).
Even after excluding those with disability benefits, the currently inactive
amounted to 13 per cent of men and 23 per cent of women . Of those
with disability benefits, 13 per cent of men were actively seeking (and
four per cent were in jobs), but only three per cent of women were
actively seeking, and three per cent were in jobs.
The measure of activity, as noted above, was based on search over the last
four weeks before interview . It is known that many people switch between
active search and periods of inactivity, and indeed many jobs are obtained
following periods of inactivity (Bryson and White, 1996) . A question
later in the interview asked whether the respondent envisaged looking
for a job in the future . One in three of those classified as inactive thought
that they would, while two thirds thought not.
Among those currently searching for employment, wide variations of
search intensity were observed, as is usual in surveys of unemployment.
Useful indicators of search intensity are the amount of time spent in
looking for work, and the number of job applications made. It must be
borne in mind, however, that both measures - and especially the latter -
may also reflect other factors such as self-confidence . These questions
were asked both of those currently seeking work, and of those in work:
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in the latter case, the questions were worded to refer to the period when
they were seeking work immediately before obtaining their job.
The distribution of search hours is shown in Table 3 .27 below. The
median was in the 4-5 hours per week bracket, for both men and women.
This seems a little below previous experience, which suggests a ` normal '
figure in the region of 5-6 hours per week (Layard, Nickell and Jackman,
1991).
Table 3 .27 Hours per week spent looking for jobs
Unemployed sample, currently active job-seekers and those in a job . For those
in a job, period referred to is prior to obtaining the job.
(column percentages)
Men Women
I hour or less 9 15
2-3 hours 22 25
4-5 hours 21 8
6-9 hours 14 6
10-14 hours 13 9
15-19 hours 6 3
20 or more hours 1
	
1 9
Don't know how many 5 6
MEDIAN 4.9 4 .6
Base 1055 337
The frequency of job applications (Table 3 .28) gave a rather stronger
indication that this sample might have had an unusually low search
intensity. Thirty-two per cent of currently active jobseekers (including
those back in work) had made no application in the previous four weeks.
This can be contrasted with 14 per cent in the corresponding category in
the Restart survey . Similarly, less than 50 per cent had made between
one and nine job applications, compared with 70 per cent in the Restart
survey . However, 21 per cent of the present survey's jobseekers had
made ten or more applications, compared with 15 per cent in the Restart
survey, so there seems to be some polarisation of search activity.
Table 3 .28 Number ofjob applications in a four-week period
Unemployed sample, currently active job-seekers and those in a job . For those
in a job, period referred to is prior to obtaining the job.
(column percentages)
Men Women
None 30 38
1-2 15 5
3-5 23 8
6-9 10 8
10-19 10 10
20 or more I
	
I 10
MEDIAN 3 2
Base 1023 345
68
These apparently low rates of application could result from heterogeneity
in the sample, by comparison with one which was confined strictly to
current claimant unemployment . Indeed, only 57 per cent of the
unemployed sample described themselves as claimant unemployed by the
time of the survey interview . However, there was hardly any difference
between the claimant unemployed and the remainder, in terms of the job
search intensity measures just outlined' .
Job refusals constituted another aspect where ETU might have an impact.
The proportion refusing any job (out of current jobseekers, and those in
work) was five per cent of men and eight per cent of women, roughly
one third of the rate ofjob acceptance or one quarter of all offers received.
This relates to the preceding period of six months . Several other studies,
including the Restart survey, have reported similar refusal rates among
unemployed samples.
An explanation which has sometimes been advanced for the difficulties
of the long-term unemployed is lack of social networks which would
assist them to find jobs . A group of questions which addressed this issue
found little evidence of a lack of such contact. For example, 60 per cent
of the unemployed sample saw relatives (other than those they lived with)
at least weekly, and 70 per cent saw friends at least weekly . The employed
sample reported similar frequencies of contact.
Table 3 .29 Proportion who meet work-mates or former work-
mates socially - unemployed and employed samples
(column percentages)
Unemployed Employed
At least monthly
Less often than monthly
Never
28
18
54
38
28
34
Base 1985 2311
However, there were strong indications that the social networks of the
unemployed sample contained fewer employed people compared with the
employed sample . Over one half (54 per cent) said that they never met
work-mates or former work-mates socially, while the corresponding figure
for the employed sample was 34 per cent (Table 3 .29) . Some 40 per cent
of the unemployed sample said that unemployed people constituted at
least half of their friends, but this figure dropped to 21 per cent of the
employed sample (Table 3 .30) . If, as might reasonably be assumed,
employed people are more useful for providing information about
vacancies, then the unemployed sample was evidently at a disadvantage.
Z' Those who were not claimant unemployed and did not describe themselves as active
jobseekers, were wholly excluded from the present analysis .
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Table 3 .30 Employed and unemployed friends of respondents-
unemployed and employed samples
(cell percentage)
Unemployed Employed
Employed are the minority 5 I 30
Unemployed are the majority 41 21
Base 1991 2316
3 .5 Analysis of labour market So far, this chapter has concentrated on the characteristics of the
behaviour and outcome among unemployed. But what were the implications of these characteristics for
the unemployed the introduction of ETU? ETU aims to alter the labour market behaviour
of those who claim it by changing the ratio of in-work to out-of-work
incomes . Three sections below address important concerns in this regard:
the current labour market behaviour of the unemployed; their likely
components of the income they would receive in work ; and how
respondents perceived their likely mix of income sources in work.
3 .5 . 1 Rationale for analysing ETU could affect an equation describing labour market behaviour and
labour market behaviour outcomes in several ways . By identifying a set of significant influences
on behaviour and outcomes prior to the introduction ETU, the strength
of a causal interpretation for ETU effects in the subsequent analysis can
be greatly increased.
An important aim for ETU is to test its effects on the transitions into
employment for unemployed people . ETU may prove particularly useful
for the long-term unemployed, for whom the job market seems to work
poorly. Increased rates of transition to employment as a result of ETU
could come about in three main ways:
a By making it rational for individuals to accept jobs at lower wages -
hence increasing the range of jobs which people apply for, and the
acceptance rate for job offers.
b By offering the prospect of higher income conditional on working -
thus increasing job search intensity through an incentive effect.
c By increasing the flow of vacancies (at low wages) from employers,
since they will perceive or expect an increased supply of people willing
to take such jobs.
Of these, (c) is outside the scope of this preliminary analysis (in due
course it will be addressed through the employer data from the evaluation).
However, the ideas underlying (a) and (b) can be examined as part of the
initial analytical investigation.
The findings presented in this section come from multivariate modelling
of the unemployed sample, in which the effects of numerous variables on
the outcome are simultaneously evaluated . The main purpose of the
models was to test the capacity of the sample and the survey measures
used for assessing the issues of interest to the ETU evaluation . Several
` time models ' were estimated to examine the current determinants of
70
economic activity ; the rate of entry into employment ; job-search
intensities; and wage expectations.
Technical description of the multivariate methods used is kept to a
minimum, although some information of this sort is provided in footnotes,
and a full account of all the models and their coefficients are given in
Appendix E . When considering the effect of any one variable in the
models presented, we mean the effect of that variable net of the influences
of all the other variables included in the model.
3 .5.2 Analysis of activity or Attention has already been drawn to the presence of a substantial group
inactivity of people among the unemployed who appeared to be economically
inactive (that is, they were not actively looking for paid work) . This is
potentially a most interesting group, as one of the effects of ETU might
be to raise the activity of this group thereby widening the potential
customer base of ETU well beyond simply current jobseekers . The
estimation of this model predicts the probability of an individual in the
unemployed sample being active and seeking work at the time ofinterview.
Individuals are assumed not to seek work because:
•
it is not worth their while (they would earn too little, or they have
sufficient non-work income to meet their needs);
• there are practical constraints preventing them from seeking work
(for instance, they are sick, or their time is taken up looking after
someone else);
• it is too hard for them to find a job (the `discouraged worker ' effect).
Results from the analysis are discussed chiefly in terms of a combined
analysis22 for men and women, before considering separately differences
between men and women in what influenced their labour market activity.
The significant effects from all three analyses are summarised in Table
3 .31.
Sickness By far the strongest influences on current economic activity, reducing
the probability of being active, were current sickness and the proportion
of time spent as sick during 1991-96 . These had a dominant place in the
analysis . It was therefore confirmed that sickness was a very important
factor in the high levels of inactivity observed in the unemployed sample
(which, as we noted earlier, may have been an effect of the sampling
frame used) . Sickness is most simply interpreted as a ` barrier' to activity,
although other interpretations are possible . Certainly this finding mirrors
recent research on lone parents, at least 10 per cent of whom seem
permanently locked out of the labour market by ill-health (Finlayson and
Marsh, 1998).
Z'- The dependent variable is binary, taking values 1 (active) and 0 (inactive) . The
analysis was carried out by non-linear regression, assuming a probit distribution.
The model statistics were : N = 1942 ; log likelihood= -789 .6 ; chi-squared for fit =
675 .5 on 28 d .f.
1 1
Women Apart from sickness, the largest influence on activity or inactivity was
gender. Women were less likely to be active jobseekers than men . There
are several possible explanations . One possibility, for women of child-
bearing age, is pregnancy (see White and McRae, 1989) . This cannot be
checked with the available information, but will be checked at the follow-
up interview. More generally, women may be deterred from job search
by their acceptance of household roles . However, women who were
single (neither married nor cohabiting) were no more likely to be active
jobseekers than married women, nor were women who were carers less
likely to be active; these findings point against an explanation based on
household barriers to working . The low wages on offer to unemployed
women (see below) are a more plausible explanation for their lower levels
of economic activity.
For women, there was one other factor of significance ; this was the amount
of other non-wage income available, which decreased the probability of
their remaining an active jobseeker . This income came from a variety of
sources, including grown-up children, rents, investments, and so on.
Perhaps surprisingly, women's activity was unaffected by partner ' s earnings,
but this may have been because so few unemployed women had partners
in employment . Men were equally likely to report receiving ` other
income ' but it did not affect their activity levels in the same way.
Men There were several further influences on men 's probability of being active
jobseekers. They were more likely to be active if they had a recent
work-history with numerous short events, rather than few longer onesz3 .
This may reflect a greater willingness to take temporary jobs or generally
to be more ` flexible ' . Men were also more likely to be active if they had
frequent contacts with their friends . Both men who were in the social
rented sector, and those who had mortgages, were more likely to remain
economically active than those who owned their property outright.
Other factors The only other influence which appeared significant for both men and
women was age, with activity levels falling off in the older age groups.
However, this effect was relatively minor and was more marked for women
than for men.
There was no indication, for either men or women, of differences in
activity rates in the unemployed sample between the various ETU pilot
and control areas, nor by whether the area was in an urban, rural or
seaside location.
Other than sickness, past and present, the analysis did not throw up any
factor which would account for the high overall level of inactivity in the
23 The significant variable in the model, NACTS, is the number of separate events in
the work history, including spells of employment unemployment, inactivity etc.
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unemployed sample, especially in one containing so many men. If
anything, then, it underlines concern about the possibility of a declining
activity rate . If this results from low wage offers in the job market, the
potential for an ETU effect on increasing activity rates could be
considerable.
The presence of a fairly substantial group of currently inactive individuals,
including claimants of disability benefits, in the unemployed sample may
give some cause for concern. This may have partly resulted from the
unavoidable use of the DCI sampling frame in place of the NUBS sampling
frame . However, the preliminary analyses were broadly reassuring in
this respect . It was shown that the inactive individuals could be included
in or excluded from analyses without much impact on the results obtained.
Further, there were indications that many of the inactive group were
` discouraged workers ' - that is, their lack of success in finding a job had
discouraged them from actively looking any further - who could be
influenced by ETU . So their presence in the sample may turn out to be
of practical value.
Table 3 .31 Summary of influences on the probability of
remaining an active jobseeker - the unemployed sample
Variable
	
Combined analysis Male Female
(male and female)
Gender
	
women - n .a n .a
Persistent illness
	
- - -
Percentage of time off sick, 199 I -96
	
- - -
Age
	
- n .s -
Other non-wage income
	
- n .s -
Number of events in work-history, 1991-96
	
+ + n .s
Driver
	
+ n .s n .s
Contacts with friends
	
+ + n .s
Mortgage or social renting
	
+ + n .s
Note: - reduces activity; + increases activity ; n .a=not applicable ; n .s=not significant at 95 per cent confidence
level
3 .5.3 Analysis of entry to The rate of entry to employment can in principle be measured in a variety
employment of different ways . In many circumstances, the most informative measure
is the time taken from starting unemployment to entering employment
(often referred to, more technically, as the hazard rate) . In the present
survey, the relatively short period between sampling and fieldwork made
this less useful . Instead, it was decided to focus on employment status at
the time of the survey interview . This measure had the great virtue of
being as simple and free of error as possible.
The presence of a large group of inactive people, however, complicates
the analysis of entry to employment . Should they be included or excluded
from such an analysis? If they are inactive, it might be argued, they can
hardly get into jobs . The presence of a large inactive group in the analysis
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could bias the result . However, past research (White et al ., 1995 ; Bryson
and White, 1996) has shown that many people do move out of inactive
unemployment into jobs without overt job search . For example, family
members or friends may find a job opening for the unemployed person,
or the long term sick may recover and return to a job informally held
open for them . Also, nearly one in three of the currently inactive in the
unemployed sample said they expected to become active jobseekers in
the future . Therefore, if the inactive were to be excluded from the
analysis of job outcomes, this could bias the results by failing to take
account of people who would subsequently seek or obtain jobs.
To deal with this complication, analysis of entry into jobs at the time of
interview was conducted in three ways 24 . The first approach was to
include everyone, including those who were currently inactive, in the
analysis of job entry. The second was to exclude those who were on
some kind of sickness or disability benefit at the time of the interview, on
the grounds that these would usually be excluded in a sample of claimant
unemployed. In the third analysis, a type of sample selection model was
introduced, in which those currently inactive were excluded from the
analysis of job entry, but the results were adjusted to minimise any bias
resulting from their exclusion2s .
It turned out that the results from all three approaches were closely similar,
with one exception . In the analysis with the whole of the unemployed
sample, the probability of being in a job was reduced if the individual
reported persistent illness or disability . When those on disability benefits
were removed from the sample, this effect disappeared. The effect of
sickness or disability was also not significant in the sample selection model
which excluded the currently inactive. The interpretation, then, is that
sickness or disability operates chiefly by increasing inactivity, but has no
additional effect on employment chances for those remaining active.
Since, with this exception, the analyses were similar in their results, we
focus below on the findings as they appeared from the sample selection
model26 . We also, in this case, use results for men and women combined,
rather than considering the sexes separately . The results for men and
women were broadly similar, but less clear in the case of women because
24 The dependent variable is binary, taking the values 1 (in job) and 0 (not in job)
. The
probit analysis was used.
2s The technique is similar to the sample selection method for analysing wages while
taking account of the absence of wage data for those who are not in jobs . Here,
however, the outcome variables are binary (active/inactive ; in a job/not in a job)
and the appropriate model is the bivariate probit . This is a two-stage estimation
procedure which incorporates an estimate of the correlation between the unobserved
influences on the two outcomes.
26 The statistics for the bivariate probit model are : N = 1942; log likelihood = -
1420 .8 ; correlation of residuals = 0 .66.
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of a smaller sample size . Table 3 .32 provides a summary of the influences
on the probability of being employed for the combined unemployed
sample.
Recent work experience The most powerful variable in this analysis was recent employment experience,
measured by the percentage of time spent employed in the period 1991-
96. The more experience unemployed people were able to offer, the
sooner they returned to work. This is consistent with the widely held
assumption that employers use applicants ' employment record as a
screening device for recruitment. The dominant effect of this factor
could constitute a barrier for ETU. If employers remain resistant to the
recruitment of people with poor recent employment records, the impact
of ETU-induced changes in their search behaviour or reservation wages
may be weakened . Other interpretations are, however, possible : for
example, a poor recent employment record could reflect low employment
motivation or unmeasured barriers to working.
Flexibility Another positive factor was the number of changes of status which had
taken place in the past five years or so (measured by the number of separate
events in the work-history), which might (tentatively) be an indicator of
`flexibility ' . (In the previous section, we noted that this was also an
important influence on continuing activity of job search).
Education and training The longer-term `human capital ' variables were surprisingly weak
influences on job entry chances. Having an A-level or equivalent
qualification provided a significant advantage over having no qualifications,
but the other qualification levels were inconsequential . Vocational
qualifications also failed to improve job entry, while a professional or
nursing qualification was actually associated with lower entry rates to jobs.
Previous participation in government programmes was also linked to
lower job entry rates . The general lack of positive benefit from education
and training might be a selection effect, with those who turn their human
capital to good advantage not appearing in a sample of unemployed.
A valid driving licence was found to have a positive influence on the
probability of being employed at interview.
Sex, age and household structure Women were more likely than men to get jobs (despite also being more
likely to become inactive) ; this has been a consistent finding of recent
years (White et al, 1997, Chapter 9) . Another familiar finding was that
job entry for both men and women fell with increasing age.
A factor often found to be important for labour market behaviour and
outcomes is marital status . Here though it was not related, as such, to job
entry. To explore this further, an alternative analysis was carried out in
which the ` married' variable was split between married people who had
working spouses and married people with non-working spouses 27 . Because
of benefit structures, it is generally assumed that a non-working spouse
would depress job search incentives for the unemployed. Here, however,
a non-working spouse in fact made job entry more probable.
The total number of employed people in the household (including any
partner but not the respondent) was also positively related to the
respondent 's probability of returning to employment 2" . A plausible
interpretation is that other employed people in the household (such as
parents or non-dependent offspring) help to provide contacts with the
job market and to maintain a norm of employment . Consistent with this
was the finding that those in the unemployed sample who had many
contacts with their friends were also more likely to be observed in a job
than those with relatively few contacts.
Housing and household , nce Housing variables, which are also potentially related to social security
benefits, produced only one significant result, and again one which was
hard to explain . It appeared that private-sector renters among the
unemployed sample were the least likely to be observed in work at
interview.
Some other financial variables failed to accord with standard interpretations
of work incentives or disincentives . Both savings29 and ` other' non-
work income would be expected to reduce job entry (because of the
predictions of labour supply theory) but neither of these were linked
reliably to job entry in the present case . The financial aspects of the
results, therefore, were puzzling . Further work of this kind, for example,
combining all the separate indicators into an integrated `potential out-of-
work income ' variable, will produce a clearer picture . This is planned
for the next stage of analysis, using the 1996 and 1997 follow-up data.
ETU area Finally, and of special concern for this study, differences in job entry by
ETU areas were considered . ETU pilot areas (A and B) were combined
and jointly contrasted with the control areas . There was some indication
that the rate of job entry might be higher in the ETU pilot areas (A and
B), but this effect was only at the borderline of statistical significance and
Z7 To obtain a clear interpretation, another variable representing the number of employed
people in the household (excluding the respondent) was alternately omitted from or
included in this analysis
. This made no difference to the results described.
28 When the employment of the spouse is also included in the analysis, this ` nets out'
the effect of the spouse from the effect of total household employment
. There is,
therefore, no virtue in deducting the spouse's employment from the household
employment.
29 Savings were represented in two ways in alternative versions of the model : first as a
continuous variable, and then as dummies for `high' (L5,000 or more) and `moderate '
(L500-L4,999) savings.
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could be a chance result 30 . However, a separate analysis for the men in
the unemployed sample produced a more clearly significant difference
between areas 31 (there was no indication of a difference for the female
part of the sample) . Also, on replacing the overall ETU pilot area variable
with separate variables for Scheme A and Scheme B areas, the effect for
Scheme B areas was even more significant, while that for Scheme A areas
was non-significant, though in the same direction 32 .
These are estimates of net effects after taking account of many other
individual differences . The gross job entry rates were, in fact, quite similar
across the ETU evaluation areas, with Scheme A areas having 17 .2 per
cent employed, Scheme B areas having 16 .2 per cent, and control areas
having 15 .5 per cent employed at interview . A possible interpretation is
that the sample in ETU pilot areas (A and B) had somewhat more
disadvantageous characteristics which were not included in the measures
at this stage of the project, but some local factors were working against
these disadvantages in a relatively effective way, though we have, as yet,
no direct evidence for this supposition (though an in-depth analysis of
the local labour markets constitutes a strand of the ETU evaluation) .
It is tempting to interpret this as an anticipatory ETU effect . For example,
if ETU had been advertised and promoted effectively before launch, this
could have affected the performance of local Employment Service offices
or the attitudes of unemployed claimants . If however there was an
anticipatory ETU effect, it would be expected to be stronger close to the
launch of ETU and weaker at earlier dates33 . So the hypothesis could be
tested through the interaction between ETU pilot areas (A and B) and
date of interview . This interaction, when added to the model, proved to
be non-significant . The interpretation of an anticipatory ETU effect was
therefore not supported. Rather, it seems there may be some underlying
difference in job market effectiveness between the areas, with Scheme B
areas being somewhat more effective than the rest . And, of course, any
one result may be a statistical anomaly.
Overall, the analysis of job entry after unemployment produced some
expected results, but as many which were unexpected and hard to explain.
30 The probit coefficient for ETU pilot areas (A and B) was 0 .15 and the t-statistic was
1 .88, p<0 .07.
31 The probit coefficient for ETU pilot areas (A and B) was 0 .22 and the t-statistic was
2 .06, p<0 .04.
32 The probit coefficient for the ETU Scheme B areas was 0 .28 and the t-statistic was
2 .21, p<0 .03.
33 Those interviewed in the last two months of the survey were significantly more
likely to be employed than those interviewed in the first two months . This is as
expected (irrespective of ETU) since, unless new jobs are extremely unstable, there
will be a gradual shift towards employment over time . Also, after the summer
period, firms may increase recruitment in the build-up to Christmas .
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These findings provide pointers to aspects of the analysis which can be
investigated in more depth as the evaluation proceeds.
Table 3 .32 Summary of influences on the probability of being
employed at the time of the interview - unemployed sample,
combined analysis for men and women.
Variables increasing probability of being employed
The percentage of time spent employed, 1991-96 (extremely strong influence)
The number of events in the work history, 1991-96
Education - Having 'A' levels or equivalent
Gender -Women were more likely to be employed than men
Age -Younger people were more likely to be employed
Being married with a spouse who is not working
Having Other employed earners in household
Having relatively frequent contacts with friends
Having a driving licence
Living in Scheme A or Scheme B areas (borderline effect)*
Variables reducing probability of being employed
Education - Having nursing/other qualifications
Previous participation in government programme
Housing tenure - Private renter
*This effect was found to be significant for men and stronger for men in Scheme B areas
3 .5 .4 Job-search processes and We have already stressed the potential value of understanding processes
wage expectations of job search . This section of multivariate results for the unemployed
sample focused on this area . Two related aspects were examined, (a) job-
search intensity, and (b) wage expectations.
Job-search intensity Job-search intensity may be important for the efficiency of the labour
market, and for wage flexibility . Job-search theory (Barron and Mellow,
1979) suggests that search intensity falls with rising reservation wages but
rises with higher average wage offers . ETU could be expected to affect
search intensity both by reducing reservation wages and by changing
jobseekers ' perceptions of the value ofjobs on offer . The survey contained
several questions relevant to the issue of search intensity . Reservation
wages - what workers would actually accept when they took a job -
could not be directly measured through the survey questions, but a related
indicator was the individual's report of the lowest wage she or he would
be willing to consider : this we refer to as their `wage expectations ' .
In addition to those in the unemployed sample remaining out-of-work,
questions about search intensity were asked of people now in work, though
it was decided to exclude this latter group from the analyses reported
here, since they were asked about wage expectations in a different sense.
For the analyses of search intensity, it was also necessary to exclude both
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the currently inactive (who were not asked these questions) and those
not providing information about wage expectations (since this was a
potentially important explanatory variable) . For the analyses of wage
expectations, some of the currently inactive were restored, since they
were asked the wage questions if they expected to resume job-search
sometime in the future.
For all these analyses, then, the numbers were considerably reduced, which
made results for men and women combined more reliable than separate
analyses . It is the overall results which are reported here . However, the
separate runs for men and women suggested that there may well be
substantial differences in search behaviour between the male and female
samples, which we will be better able to analyse at the follow-up".
In previous research, reasonably clear explanatory models have been
developed for two measures of search intensity, hours per week spent
searching, and number of applications made (for hours, see White et al .,
1995 ; for applications, see White and Lakey, 1992) . Here, however, the
results for hours of search proved unreliable for the baseline data', and
we therefore focused on the more satisfactory results obtained for number
ofjob applications . Table 3 .33 summarises the numbers ofjob applications
made by the unemployed sample (including those who had since found
employment) . Three out of ten men and nearly four out of ten women
had made no job applications over a four-week period.
Table 3 .33 Number of job applications in a four-week period
- Unemployed sample, currently active jobseekers and those in
a job . For those in a job, period referred to is prior to
obtaining the job.
(column percentages)
Men Women
None 30 38
1-2 15 15
3-5 23 18
6-9 10 8
10-19 10 10
20 or more I
	
I 10
Base 1023 345
To carry out the multivariate analysis, the number of job applications
made over a four-week period was collapsed into three categories (0 = no
applications, 1 = 1-5 applications, 2=6 or more applications) . This resulted
in three groups of roughly similar size . The analysis simultaneously
compared those who made 1-5 applications ('moderate' application rate)
34 At the follow-up, we will be able to use data from both waves, increasing reliability
through a panel analysis.
35 This was indicated by poor goodness-of-fit statistics for the overall models obtained.
Poor results could arise for a variety of reasons, including misreporting by respondents
or the omission of important variables from the model .
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with those who made no applications ; and those who made six or more
applications ('high' application rate) with those who made no applications.
This method 36 allowed the influences on moderate rates of application to
be different from the influences on high rates of application . The significant
results from the analysis are summarised in Table 3 .34.
Moderate rates-vs-none Those making applications at the moderate (1-5 applications) rate differed
from those making none : they were younger, on average, with lower
non-wage income and lower wage expectations . Other variables which
were near the borderline of statistical significance were gender, with
women less likely37 to make a moderate number of applications ; persistent
illness, which acted similarly; and having an A level qualification or
equivalent, which had a positive effect on moderate intensity search.
High rates-vs-none Making applications at a high rate (six or more applications) was similarly
affected by age and gender, but high rates were not affected by non-wage
income and wage expectations . Instead, human capital variables came to
the forefront . All those with educational qualifications, especially at
GCSE/O level and A level, were more likely to have a high application
rate, and this was also true of those who had participated in government
programmes for the unemployed . A high job application rate was also
more likely among those who had spent a greater proportion of time in
employment since 1991.
The job application rate was unaffected by living in ETU pilot areas
combined (A and B) compared with living in the control areas . However,
a key pointer for ETU was contained in the significant effect of wage
expectations on job-search activity . There appeared to be many people
approaching the labour market with a very low level of search-intensity,
possibly because the wages they saw on offer provided them with
insufficient incentive relative to their wage expectations . By increasing
the return from low-waged jobs, ETU might be expected to shift some
of these into at least a moderate level of search intensity.
36 This was a multinomial logit model . The model statistics were : N = 873 ; log likelihood
= -878 .1 ; chi-squared for fit = 675 .5 on 64 d.f.
The phrase `less likely' is loosely used here . This type of analysis produces estimates
in the form of relative odds . These are related to probabilities, but not in a direct
manner.
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Table 3 .34 Influences on `moderate' and `high job-search
intensity
Combined analysis for men and women . Search intensity is represented by
number of job applications in a four-week period. Both moderate and high
intensity are compared with low intensity, that is, no job applications
Effects on the odds of moderate intensity search (1-5 applications)
Variable
Age
Other non-wage income
Wage expectations
Variable
Gender
Persistent illness
Education
Effects significant at 95% confidence level
Odds higher for younger people
Higher as non-wage income decreases
Higher with lower wage expectations
Effects significant at 90% confidence level
Higher for men than for women
Higher for those with no illness/disability
Higher for those with A-level qualification
Effects on the odds of high intensity search (six or more applications)
Effects significant at 95% confidence level
Higher for younger people
Increase as percentage rises
Higher for previous participants
Higher for those with GCSE/O level,
A level or degree qualification
Variable
	
Effects significant at 90% confidence level
Gender
	
Higher for men than for women
Qualifications
	
Higher for those with CSE level
Wage expectations Respondents were asked to say how much in weekly take-home wages
they would need to be offered before they considered a job worth taking
(target wage) . They were then asked how likely or unlikely it would be
that they would actually find such a job, and, if they felt it unlikely, how
much they might actually settle for in the end (acceptance wage) . Wage
expectations were calculated by taking the target wage (the offer that
would make a job `worth taking ') by those who felt it likely they would
receive such an offer, and the acceptance wage given by those who felt
their first estimate was unlikely to come their way.
To assess wage expectations, it is possible to consider both weekly and
hourly figures and details of these kinds are examined more closely in
section 3 .7 .1 . For the moment and for the sake of simplicity, the
presentation was confined to their expected weekly wages . These are
more relevant in terms of eligibility for ETU, and more comparable with
actual wages reported by those in work in the sample . However, the
model presented below included `expected hours ' as a control variable,
which helps to make effects on weekly wages more comparable across
Variable
Age
Percentage of time spent
spent employed, 1991-96
Government programme
Education
8I
individuals wanting to work different hours . A few cases with outlying
or implausible values in their data were excluded.
The mean net weekly wage expectation for the group so defined was
about L122 . This was substantially higher than the average current wage
reported for those who were in work when interviewed from the two
samples together (L100), and even higher compared to the wages earned
at interview by those obtaining jobs after being sampled among the
unemployed (L97) . This comparison may not, however, be an entirely
reliable guide, since individuals with a particular wage in mind are known
often to have accepted lower wages, involving fewer hours, in the hope
of increasing hours and wage income later . The significant influences on
wage expectations are summarised in Table 3 .35 38 .
ETU area The most directly interesting of these findings was that jobseekers in
Scheme A areas had significantly higher wage expectations (after allowing
for all background characteristics) than those in Scheme B or in the control
areas (there was no significant difference in wage expectations between
Scheme B and control areas) . Analysis described in section 3 .5 .3 showed
that the job entry rate in ETU pilot areas (A and B) was higher for
unemployed men, but in that case the effect seemed stronger in Scheme
B areas . This difference in wage expectations appeared in the raw averages,
which were as follows:
•
Scheme A areas L127 .30
•
Scheme B areas L116 .40
• Control Areas L121 .40
It seems implausible that the result in Scheme A areas could have been
influenced by the preparatory build-up for the introduction of ETU,
since that should have worked to lower wage expectations . None the
less, we tested this in the same way as for job entry rates, and with the
same result : there was no sign that the Scheme A area effect was stronger
as the implementation of ETU drew nearer . The difference in wage
expectations by area appears to have been prior to and independent of
ETU.
Other influences on wage The remaining influences shown in Table 3 .35 contain little that was
expectations surprising. People with higher qualifications, either degree or professional,
had higher wage expectations . So too did people with a driving licence,
who would be able to search over a wider area to find a suitable job
provided, of course, they had access to a motor vehicle . Wage
expectations, like actual wages, initially rose with age but then fell as
workers grew older . This was one factor that depressed the average wage
sought by the unemployed sample : there were relatively few people in
38 This was an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model of the log weekly wage.
Model statistics were : N = 1024 ; d .f = 989 ; adjusted R-squared = 0 .37.
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the middle, higher-earning years because the majority of such people
have children and/or earning partners . People with actual or potential
housing costs in the form of rents or mortgage payments sought higher
wages than those with outright ownership or living with parents . Those
who were married also sought higher wages, but having extra earners in
the household reduced the wages they sought.
One final finding, which accords with some previous research
(McLaughlin, Millar and Cooke, 1989 ; Marsh and McKay, 1993), was
the relationship of debt and wage expectations . Those with significant
problems of debt (about 20 per cent of the group analysed) required
higher wages, on average . Hence debt seems to act as a barrier to re-
entering employment.
Table 3 .35 Influences on weekly wage expectations among
jobseekers in the unemployed sample
Combined analysis for men and women
Variable
	
Effects significant at 95% confidence level
Gender
	
Men had higher wage expectations
Age
	
Expectations increased with age initially, then
decreased
Qualifications
	
Degree or professional qualification increased wage
expectations
Driving licence
	
Drivers had higher wage expectations than non-
drivers
Housing tenure
	
Those with a mortgage or renting had higher wage
expectations than outright owners or living with
parents
Other earners
	
Higher if no additional earners in household
Debt
	
Having debts increased wage expectations
ETU area
	
Higher wage expectations in Scheme A areas
Variable
	
Effects significant at 90% confidence level
Marital status
	
Married people had higher wage expectations
Other non-wage income
	
Wage expectations increased with additional
non-wage income
In practice, earnings is the main criterion for eligibility for ETU, so it
was useful to begin by considering influences on the earnings received
by those at the bottom of the income distribution : large samples of such
workers are not commonly available for analysis in this way . Those
influences which raised earnings could be regarded as `incentives ' to labour
supply and job-search, while those which depressed earnings were
` disincentives ' that might have been expected to have the opposite effect
on labour market behaviour . These incentives and disincentives might
well have been altered by ETU.
Initially, we assumed that the employed and the unemployed were a
broadly homogeneous set of workers, but that women's and men ' s wages
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were better considered separately . We therefore estimated the influences
on wages for all currently employed men, whether from the employed
or unemployed sample, and did this separately for women . One of the
main questions of interest was whether the people from the unemployed
sample who were getting jobs were receiving similar wages to those in
continuing employment.
Less than one half of the total sample (unweighted) were currently
employed at the time of the survey . The earnings of those currently
employed might give a biased view of the earnings capacity for the sample
as a whole : some might have done better when they got a job, or have
done worse . A standard method of dealing with this is known as the
sample selection method (Heckman, 1979 ; Maddala, 1983) . First, we
performed an analysis to explain any differences between those currently
in work and those currently out of work at the time of the survey39 .
Certain results of this analysis were then used to adjust the earnings analysis
to make it more representative of the whole sample 4o
Since the samples were selected from those in the lowest-paid jobs or
those who were disadvantaged jobseekers, the variation in earnings was
naturally very much curtailed . Many factors which greatly affect earnings
in the general labour market will be concealed in such a narrow sample.
One should not expect to obtain a model of earnings which is as strong
as in a general sample of the labour force 41
The results confirmed this expectation : the proportions of this restricted
variation in earnings accounted for were generally rather low, and some
standard variables of wage analysis, such as educational attainment, did
not exert their usual effects in improving wages . None the less, a number
of useful points emerged. The three most important were as follows:
i . For both men and women, the dominant influence on weekly earnings
was simply hours worked. Inclusion of a simple dummy variable
contrasting part-time workers (less than 16 hours per week) with full-
time workers (16-plus hours per week), was sufficient to increase the
variance explained by the model from about 15 per cent to about 35
per cent.
3' More precisely, we model differences between those current employees who reported
full wage information, and those who were out of work, while those who had
missing wage information, or were self-employed, are excluded from the analysis.
40 In essence, this adjustment takes account of unobserved influences on employment
which also affect earnings
. Analyses of employment and earnings are thereby made
consistent.
41 For women, the model statistics were : N = 1010, d .f. = 968, adjusted R = squared
= 0 .14 . For men, N = 607, d .f = 566, adjusted R-squared = 0 .09 . Note that,
because of the sample selection adjustment, this is not an OLS regression and the R-
squared values are only indicative.
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ii. People from the unemployed sample, who had got into work, were
on average paid appreciably less than the current workers from the
employed sample . This remained a significant factor after controlling
for other characteristics such as qualifications and occupational and
industry group. For men, the difference was 14 per cent less for new
entrants; for women it was 25 per cent' . Unemployed re-entrants to
work, therefore, were clearly near the bottom of the wage distribution.
iii. There was no indication of differences in earnings levels between the
ETU Scheme A areas, ETU Scheme B areas, and control areas . There
was also no effect by date of interview.
Other findings of interest are summarised in Table 3 .36 . Human capital
influences were generally weak, but stronger for men than for women,
with both job tenure and vocational qualifications having some positive
impact on earnings . Age was also important for men (but not for women),
with earnings increasing with experience initially, but then falling back
for older workers . Women's earnings (but not men 's) were positively
affected by the amount of time they had spent in employment since the
end of 1990 . They also earned more, on average, if they had prior
experience of Family Credit.
There were some important earnings differentials by industry and
occupation . Among women, there was a significant wage advantage to
those in the health services, while earnings were depressed by working in
` other services ' or hotels and catering . The lowest-paid occupational
group for women was ` other occupations ' , which covered a range of
lower-skilled jobs mostly in services, and ` sales occupations ' , which
covered mainly routine jobs in distribution.
For men, manufacturing and transport offered the best earnings on average,
while the lower wages were found in education, health and `other services ' .
Occupationally, the lowest male earnings were found in sales.
42 In terms of raw means, the difference was much smaller, only three per cent overall.
The multivariate analysis takes into account the characteristics of those getting jobs,
and so brings out more clearly the underlying difference between those established
in jobs and the recently unemployed .
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Table 3 .36 . Selected results from models of weekly earnings.
(pooled workers from the unemployed and employed samples)
(The measure of earnings used was log net weekly pay . Effects noted were
significant at least at the 95% confidence level .)
Variables that increased earnings:
	
Women
	
Men
	
time employed, 1991-96
	
Age (prime aged worker)
	
Experience of Family Credit
	
Job tenure
	
Health service job
	
Any vocational qualification
Manufacturing job
Transport job
Variables that reduced earnings :
	
Women
	
Men
	
Unemployed sample
	
Unemployed sample
	
Sales occupation job
	
Sales occupation job
	
Other occupation (low-skilled)
	
Health service job
Age (older worker)
Notes: The results are from an analysis omitting hours worked from the explanatory variables . Industry
groups are compared with 'other services'. Occupational groups are compared with 'management, professional
and associate professional' (SOC groups I -3 combined)
3.6 Financial incentives among This section examines how much financially better off in work the
out-of-work households unemployed might become if they were to find jobs at their preferred or
`acceptance ' wages and, having found such work, what difference claiming
ETU would make to their final incomes in work . The questions tackled
include:
•
Which respondents would be better off in work and by how much?
• Who would be entitled to ETU?
•
What difference do housing costs make to the `better off in work '
estimates?
• What difference would ETU receipt make to the ` better off in work'
estimates?
To undertake these analyses, it was necessary to make some assumptions
about the level of in-work incomes . The approach adopted here was to
use respondents ' estimates of the minimum weekly pay they would accept
in work, and the hours they would be prepared to work for this pay.
This enabled us to see how much each respondent felt they needed as a
`minimum in-work income' to be able to justify the effort of working.
Later, we look at how the availability of ETU could alter the balance of
earnings-to-benefit in this in-work income.
Mention should first be made of the out-of-work respondents who were
not included in the following analyses . Although there were 1938 out-
of-work respondents with valid income information available for analyses,
only 1366 quoted an acceptance minimum wage in work . Only for these
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respondents could target wages and incomes in work be estimated in
order to say something meaningful about the likely impact of ETU . The
majority of the 572 excluded were people who said they were not currently
looking for work and would not in the future (for whom ETU is unlikely
to make a difference), and some who said they wanted to be self-employed.
The self-employed are not excluded from receipt ofETU but they would
find it more difficult than most to predict future `earnings ' .
Some respondents sought to work hours each week which were below
the minimum qualifying for ETU - 16 per week - and these respondents
were included in early analyses . These respondents would have nil
estimated in-work benefit entitlement - although some might retain
Income Support while working short part-time hours.
As ETU is awarded at the benefit unit level, all calculations were
undertaken at the benefit unit level . Where the benefit unit included the
respondent's partner, it was assumed that changes in respondents ' working
status produced no immediate changes in the employment participation
of the partner . Actual and estimated incomes presented are those of the
benefit unit.
3.6 . 1 Wages and final incomes in The mean minimum in-work incomes were derived from the questions
work described above and are presented in Table 3 .37 . This figure appears in
the first column of Table 3 .37 . Four estimates were then derived:
The second column shows the mean income which would arise if this
minimum wage was received in work together with that portion of their
unearned and other income which would be retained if the person was
working their preferred hours (and earning their acceptance wages) rather
than being out of work . This is an estimate of their `final ' income in
work when receiving their minimum acceptance wages.
The third column simply gives the proportion of respondents for whom
this resultant net income in work was greater than their actual income
out of work.
The fourth column gives the proportion of respondents for whom the
resultant income, less housing costs but with any help received with
housing costs in work, was greater than their out-of-work income, again
less housing costs but plus any help received with housing costs when
out of work . Since full rent and council tax and some or all mortgage
interest payments are commonly met out of work, but only part of rent
and council tax expenditure is met in work, the proportion better off in
work is reduced
.
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The final column gives the mean difference between in-work and out-
of-work incomes.
Although the minimum wages respondents were prepared to accept were
low, they were typically not as low as the earnings those in work from
the workers-in-work sample received . There is some evidence here to
suggest that out-of-work respondents had higher wage expectations or
needs which priced some out of the low paid work the workers-in-work
had accepted43 . Given that the mean anticipated hours to be worked for
the acceptance wages in Table 3 .37 is 34, respondents would be working
for L3 .30 per hour in wages, on average . Older men and couples had the
highest expectations . There was generally little difference between
minimum net income and acceptance wages . Older single women and
couples were most likely to have unearned income to add to their earnings,
largely comprised of benefits portable into work, like widows ' benefit
and partners ' state pensions . For all out of work, estimated final incomes
in work averaged just L12 more than acceptance wages.
The majority (87 per cent) of out-of-work respondents stated minimum
wage rates which would make them better off in work and it is perhaps
surprising that 13 per cent looked for wages which would leave them out
of pocket . These were made up of a handful of single men, and rather
more single women . One in five both of single women and potential
sole-earners in couples were prepared to accept wages in work which
would leave them worse off than their out-of-work incomes.
43 It is worth noting an apparent anomaly in income differences in work . Among those
currently in work, earnings were lower than the acceptance wages of the currently
out of work . The hypothesised net gain from work would be expected to be greater
for those out of work - based on their acceptance wages . But the incentive is smaller
for the out of work . This is because the hypothesised out-of-work incomes of the
currently employed are lower than the actual out-of-work incomes of the
unemployed. The unemployed have access to more benefits and other income,
which are portable into work, than the employed.
88
Table 3 .37 Minimum acceptance in-work incomes by
respondent type
Minimum
	
Minimum
	
Proportion
	
Proportion Mean
acceptance net income better off
	
better off
	
difference
wage (E)
	
in work (L) in work (%)
	
in work, net between
of housing
	
incomes in
costs (%)
	
and out of
work (E)
ALL OUT OF WORK 112 124 87 84 44
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 99 101 93 93 44
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 127 133 93 89 35
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 92 91 82 81 45
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hours 96 113 78 72 41
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 130 169 79 74 60
The average net gain looked for in work was £44, with only couples as
a group looking for substantially more (L60) . This £44 may seem high,
but it was equivalent to just £1 .30 ofadditional income per hour worked.
The net gain ofL44 was, co-incidentally, an amount exactly comparable
to the income difference achieved (in 1994) by lone parents in work on
Family Credit compared to their out-of-work incomes (Marsh, Finlayson
and Ford, 1997).
Older single men had relatively higher out-of-work income and would
therefore see a smaller net gain in work despite higher wage expectations.
They also said they were prepared to supply more hours to achieve this
income difference (a mean of 37 hours each week) . This means these
men would be working for a net gain of less than £1 .00 per hour worked.
At the other extreme, couples - with greater household needs - looked
for a much higher return (an average net gain of£ 1 .80 per hour worked).
So from Table 3 .37 we can see what sort of return out-of-work respondents
wanted from their efforts when they returned to work . They were
prepared to work full-time hours, on average, for the equivalent of less
than half average hourly earnings for their area (see Green, 1997) . They
sought a final income gain of around £40 per week if they did not have
partners, and about £60 if they did.
Taking housing costs into account How much better off respondents would be in work depends on outgoings
as well as income . Table 3.38 illustrated that once housing costs were
taken into account, fewer would see a net gain from work . Housing
Benefit acts as a substantial subsidy for renters in work, but a minority of
respondents pay rent and thus qualify. Council Tax Benefit represents
another, smaller subsidy to most low-income earning households . When
incomes in and out of work, net of housing costs and these respective
benefits are compared, 84 per cent were better off in work on their
minimum acceptance wage . More than a quarter of older single women
and single earners in couples would not be better off in work, once the
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additional housing costs they would have to meet were taken into account.
The tenure which is typically most likely to lose out in net income when
moving into work are those with mortgage liabilities . In work, there is
no direct help available for mortgage costs . Out of work, on Income
Support, mortgage holders can receive a full reimbursement of their
mortgage interest payments . One reason underlying differences in the
proportions better off between customer groups are the underlying tenure
differences between customer groups (Table 3 .38).
Table 3 .38 Tenure and in-work incomes by respondent type
Base Home
owners
Live with
parents
Renters Own with
mortgage
Others
Row percentages
ALL OUT OF WORK 615 7 48 29 10 6
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 110 I 85 II 4
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 147 6 47 31 8 9
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 63 3 71 22 I 4
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 115 9 23 47 15 6
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 180 21 2 39 31 8
Base 43 295 178 62 37
cell percentages
Proportion better off in work, net of housing costs 67 92 77 77 86
Table 3 .38 illustrates the dominance of residence with parents as a tenure
type . This was particularly strong among young single respondents, but
also older single men . Renting was more common than living with
parents for two groups: older single women and couples . Older single
women and couples were the groups where mortgages were most likely.
Outright home ownership was negligible for most groups except couples.
The final row of Table 3.38 indicates how important tenure was in
influencing likely in-work income differentials . Housing costs were
irrelevant to the proportions identified as better off among those who
lived with parents . There are no identifiable housing costs to compare in
and out of work . Preliminary analyses suggested that few among the out
of work made significant financial contributions to their parents for living
with them, and the best assumption we could make was that those who
did pay would face identical housing costs when in work, making no
difference to the levels of in-work and out-of-work income . It is possible
that parents ` charged ' more to children who worked (or encouraged
working children to move out), but this would need to be tested once
longitudinal data is available next year.
A quarter of renters, and a quarter of mortgage payers were calculated to
be worse off in work on their acceptance wages, as were just over a third
of outright owners.
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Outright owners had no attributable differences between in and out-of-
work housing costs apart from relatively small changes in entitlement to
Council Tax Benefit . One third were worse off both before and after
housing costs were taken into account . That outright owners would be
out of pocket at all was somewhat surprising, but stemmed from two
related findings . One, that most were couples and thus had high out-of-
work entitlements . Moreover, half of these `worse off in work ' owner
occupier respondents were women, and women in particular tended to
report a low acceptance wage . One in five such owner-occupier
households had income from a retirement pension, for example, and
might need a relatively low income from work to make it worth their
effort. Another one in five claimed widows ' benefits 44 . Two thirds of
`worse off in work ' owner occupiers had an acceptance wage of less than
£60.
Renters by contrast, quoted much higher acceptance wages, half of those
`worse off in work ' quoted figures in excess of L100 per week . Still one
in six were worse off due to a low acceptance wage, however. The
problem for the remaining five per cent - which made them unable to
achieve an in-work income in excess of out-of-work income once housing
costs were taken into account - was that Housing Benefit in work covered
less than half the rent costs these respondents had to meet . Rents - and
consequently Housing Benefit out of work - averaged £44 per week.
Housing Benefit in work for those `worse off in work ' averaged just £19
per week . This £23 average increase in weekly outgoings was a significant
proportion of their acceptance wage (26 per cent on average) and meant
such respondents had anticipated final incomes in work which were lower
than out of work.
Contrary to expectations, mortgage holders were no more likely than
renters to be predicted worse off in work once housing costs were taken
into account . Again the majority predicted `worse off' (one in six of all
with mortgage liabilities) were in this position because of a low acceptance
wage . For another five per cent, the loss of mortgage interest payments
was the issue . Mortgage interest payments averaged £36 per week, and
help out of work with mortgage interest payments through Income
Support averaged £30 per week . Such help would not be available in
work. While the loss of mortgage interest payments affected five in six
mortgage holders, for just five per cent it was this which meant that they
were calculated `worse off in work ' net of housing costs.
For those out of work and contemplating taking a job at their acceptance
wage, but for whom housing costs reduced the financial incentive in
such a move, ETU might help make up the difference.
" Widows' benefits and retirement pensions count in full as income assessable for
ETU claimants .
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3 .6 .2 The likely effect of ETU on One way to assess the impact of ETU is to examine how the benefit
in-work income would help claimants achieve these desired in-work incomes . More
specifically, how it will fit into the combination of wage and other income
that goes to make up the difference between the total out-of-work and
in-work incomes that respondents seek . How much lower, therefore,
would be the wages sought by respondents if ETU, rather than wages
alone, made up the in-work income they said they sought.
The first stage of this analysis was to calculate the in-work entitlement to
ETU, assuming wages in work matched the minimum wage expectations
described above. As two schemes will operate, and Scheme B is more
generous than Scheme A, ETU eligibility was calculated under each
scheme. Initially, eligibility was calculated for all respondents, regardless
of where they lived . The local availability of different ETU schemes is
considered later.
Table 3 .39 shows the proportion of respondents who would have been
eligible for ETU if they were to receive their minimum wage expectation
described above and still received their current unearned income, plus
any of their benefits which they would still be entitled to receive in
work.
Under Scheme A, half those currently out of work would qualify for
ETU in work, while under Scheme B, the proportion was nearer two-
thirds.
These potential levels of eligibility matched closely those of the workers-
in-work sample had ETU been available at the time . That eligibility
extended to at least half of all out-of-work respondents and in-work
respondents pointed to a large potential customer base for ETU . All
these respondents would be better off in work on their minimum
acceptance wages with ETU than without it and would have an incentive
to claim.
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Table 3 .39 ETU Eligibility in work given acceptance wages by
respondent type
Base Proportion
eligible for
Scheme A
rates (%)
Proportion
	
Proportion
better off
	
eligible for
in work with
	
Scheme B
Proportion
better off
in work
with
Scheme B (%)
Scheme A (%) rates (%)
ALL OUT OF WORK 615 51 88
	
63 89
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 110 65 93
	
77 93
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 147 37 93
	
52 94
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 63 72 84
	
81 85
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 115 46 79
	
59 80
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 180 48 82
	
54 84
It is important to remember that nearly nine in ten already expected to
obtain minimum wages which would make their total in-work incomes
higher, usually substantially higher, than their out-of-work incomes.
Receiving ETU would just have raised their in-work incomes higher
still . Of course, if jobs at substantially lower wages were accepted, ETU
would not necessarily raise in-work income above out-of-work income
levels.
Taking into account housing costs raised the proportion gaining in work
from 84 per cent (Table 3 .38) to 86 per cent (Scheme A) or 87 per cent
(Scheme B) . So, generally, taking housing costs into account did not
alter the impression given by Table 3 .39 that the vast majority of
households would be financially better off in work on their acceptance
wages, and claiming ETU . Nonetheless a small proportion would be
newly better off because ETU would help compensate for additional in-
work housing costs.
Table 3 .40 repeats the same analyses as Table 3 .39, but solely for those
who lived in areas where ETU would become available during the pilot.
ETU rates were calculated according to the relevant Scheme (A or B)
prevailing in each area. The results were broadly similar to the findings
for the whole sample under Scheme A in Table 3 .39, with half found
eligible for ETU.
How many of the remaining unemployed people would have seen their
net gain in work raised from a negative to a positive figure due to ETU?
Table 3 .40 indicates what proportions would be made better off in this
way by the introduction of ETU. The effect was relatively small : most of
the impact was in increasing the income of those who would already be
better off in work if they received their minimum wage expectations.
Marginally more were predicted better off in work with their combined
minimum acceptance wages and ETU, with the most notable
improvement among couples.
The effect of housing costs
3.6 .3 Incentives in ETU Scheme
A and B areas
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Table 3 .40 ETU Eligibility in work in pilot areas, given
acceptance wages
ALL OUT OF WORK IN PILOT AREAS 467 50
	
88
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 87 60
	
93
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours III 42
	
94
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 45 55
	
84
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 99 52
	
77
Couple, no earner working 16+hours or more 125 48
	
83
So, only a small proportion were made newly better off by the availability
of ETU (the third column of Table 3 .40) compared to their in-work
income on minimum acceptance wages . This was partly because there
was only a small proportion who placed their acceptance wages so low
that they did not see a gain when in work without supplementation (13
per cent) . Of this small proportion, two thirds would not actually qualify
for ETU because their preferred hours were too few . Another three per
cent would not qualify because their savings were too high . Of the
remainder, some had very high out-of-work incomes, and many among
those who did not have high out-of-work incomes stated acceptance
wages which were too low to show a net gain from work, even with
supplementation . Hence, on average, only one in six would newly see a
gain from the availability of ETU.
The effect of housing costs Table 3 .41 repeats the analyses of Table 3 .40, concerning who would be
better off in work, but considers incomes in and out of work, net of
housing costs . The proportions made better off in work with ETU were
generally much the same as in the absence of ETU (Table 3 .39) . But
among one key subgroup - couples with no earner - ETU seemed likely
to make a difference . One in twelve would not gain from work in the
absence of ETU, but would do so if they claimed the ETU their acceptance
minimum wage made them entitled to.
Base
	
Proportion
	
Proportion
	
Proportion
	
Proportion newly
eligible for
	
better off
	
newly better better off excluding
ETU (%)
	
in work with off with
	
those who say they
ETU (%)
	
ETU (%)
	
would not claim (%)
2
I
I
	
0
2
	
1
2
	
I
5
	
5
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Table 3.41 ETU Eligibility in work in pilot areas, given
acceptance wages, net of housing costs
Proportion
better off in
work with
ETU, net of
Proportion Proportion
newly better newly better
off, net of
	
off excluding
housing costs those who
Who would actually claim ETU?
housing costs with ETU say they
would not
claim (%)
(%)
ALL OUT OF WORK IN PILOT AREAS 86 3 2
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 93 I
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hrs 93
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hrs 82 1
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 73 3
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 80 8 7
Another question asked and examined in more detail below concerns the
likely intention to claim a wage supplementation if one were made
available . This was as explicit as we felt we could be without actually
mentioning ETU itself to respondents . Note that even fewer would gain
if stated intentions to claim an ETU were taken at their word (final columns
of Table 3 .40 and 3.41).
Pointing out that the existence of ETU made little difference to the
likely proportions better off in work on a given set of wages is not to say
that ETU would have a small impact on work incentives . Over half the
out-of-work respondents would qualify for ETU and would thus see
more substantial and stable incomes in work than is first apparent from
their minimum wages expectation.
None the less one in seven respondents, rising to one quarter among
older single women, expected a wage which even when combined with
ETU would still leave them with an income in work which was less than
what they currently received out of work.
Three quarters in such a situation were there principally because they
quoted an acceptance wage below their current income out of work.
Once housing costs had been taken into account, even with ETU, such
households were very unlikely to be better off financially in work on
such a wage.
Of the remaining others ` worse off in work (n =30), a handful (three)
were working part-time for wages higher than their acceptance wages,
and the remainder were disqualified from ETU receipt on grounds of
savings, or anticipated hours.
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3.6.4 The relationship between It was clear from Tables 3 .39, 3 .40 and 3 .41, that a substantial proportion
ETU and acceptance wages of respondents - particularly older single men, but also older single women
and couples - looked for wages in a new job that would place them
beyond the scope of ETU. Their acceptance wages typically exceeded
the thresholds beyond which their personal entitlement to ETU would
expire . To a large extent, this was to be expected, since the maximum
qualifying wages for ETU are still low by average standards and respondents
were anyway asked to say what wages they needed from work before
they were given prior knowledge ofany wage supplementation that might
become available to them under ETU . They were simply estimating
what income they would need to make it worth their while entering
paid work. What might happen if they could combine ETU with their
expected wages?
The answer to this apparently simple question is complicated by two
factors:
Like all other income-tested in-work benefits, ETU will be `tapered',
that is withdrawn or added against, respectively, increases or decreases
in income, in this case at 70p in the pound.
This calculation is based on household income, not just wages, and
this income can include other benefits, in and out of work, whose
entitlement responds to the new ETU income, also in a tapered
calculation - typically HB and CTB.
The way to handle these complications was to focus on the outcome
measure that we really wanted to explain . In our case, the most interesting
figure was the `better-off calculation : ifjobseekers were to achieve their
expected wages (on average, L112 a week for all jobseekers - Table
3.37), how much better off would they be in work compared with their
total out-of-work incomes? And we know already from Table 3 .37 that
the answer to this question for all of our sample ofjobseekers was L44.
Among the people we are most interested in - jobseekers intending to
work 16 or more hours a week - this figure was higher at L56 a week -
a figure very similar to the sort of profit from work that lone parents
working 16 or more hours a week and receiving Family Credit can usually
count on . What we then needed to do was to instruct the computer to
`award' our jobseekers the additional amounts of income that would be
their entitlement if they got ETU . We could then work out what new
(and obviously, lower) wage expectations our jobseekers could then
embrace while at the same time maintaining that same L56 a week better-
off in work they already hoped to get before ETU comes along.
This calculation provides a simple estimate of the maximum scope the
unemployed will have to downwardly adjust their wage expectations in
the light of the introduction of ETU. For the following tables, only
those who qualified in principle by intending to work more than 16
hours a week were considered: those whose preferred hours were fewer
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than 16 each week (15 per cent of respondents) were excluded . It is also
worth noting at this point that 92 per cent of those intending to work 16
or more hours a week, actually intend to work more than 30 hours,
which will qualify them for the additional £10 a week or so `30 hour
bonus ' .
Table 3 .43 presents these `maximum scope ' estimates for all respondents
under the differing qualifying rules for the A and B versions of the new
benefit . The first column gives the new average wage expectations that
would correspond to the same better-off-in--work outcome now that
ETU has been added to their expressed expected wage . Thus our job-
seekers no longer need the £121 a week they said they sought in a new
job to achieve their £56 profit from work ; they need only about £90
under the rules of Scheme A and only £80 under Scheme B . The second
column calculates these revised wage expectations as a proportion of the
earlier expressed values; overall this is £90 compared with £121, or
about 70 per cent under Scheme A and only 62 per cent under Scheme
B . These are very large reductions and point up the scope of ETU to
impact on wage expectations and then, presumably, on actual wages.
These calculations, remember, are net of housing costs too . There is
strong evidence, therefore, from Table 3 .42 that ETU has the capacity to
enable nearly all those out of work, who are seeking work of 16 hours or
more each week, to accept substantially lower wages in work than the
minimum they would accept in the absence of ETU.
The calculations for women, especially the older women, are based on
strikingly lower weekly wage expectation compared to men's . This is
because the women expected to work shorter hours and, especially among
the older ones, many had prior experience of Family Credit where,
certainly for lone parents, their average working week would typically
have been about 25 hours.
Another way of looking at the estimated impact of ETU was to calculate
the wage our sample ofjobseekers actually need to get in order to achieve
any incentive to work, and then to compare this number with the same
result obtained when ETU is added to the calculation . Table 3 .42
summarises the minimum wage levels jobseekers needed to just break
even compared with their out-of-work income .
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Table 342 Minimum wages required to achieve desired
work to out-of-work income differential with ETU: income
net of housing costs
Base Acceptance Mean Mean New*
minimum
as a
proportion
Mean
minimum
wage
needed
New*
minimum
as a
proportion
wage
without
ETU (f)
preferred minimum
hours wage
needed to
achieve
the same
profit
of
acceptance
(%)
to achieve
the same
profit
of
acceptance
(%)
from work from work
(f) (E)
ETU Scheme A A B B
ALL OUT OF WORK 467 121 37 89 .70 70 80 .00 62
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ 87 103 37 87.90 81 76 .30 69
hours
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ 1
	
1
	
1 130 39 99 .00 72 92 .90 67
hours
Single female, under 25, not working
	
6+hrs 45 98 35 77.60 74 66.60 63
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ 99 113 36 65 .40 54 60.30 50
hours
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours 125 146.50 38 98 .50 60 82.10 49
or more
These percentages indicate the scope for deduction in acceptance wages if new ETU claimants were to enter work and maintain their hoped-for total in-work
income
In many cases - and this is an important finding of itself - this number is
not very large even without the intervention of ETU . Wages of just
over £50 a week, on average, saw our jobseekers break into profit on
entry to work, again with housing costs netted out, before anyone has
offered them any ETU on top of their wages . For a typical 35 hour
week, this was barely £1 .50 an hour and below the levels that even the
most rapacious employer might offer the most desperate jobseeker . For
young single people, only £40 a week will see them into profit, while
£75 for couples would still make them better off in work, on average.
These figures explain why this sample of jobseekers had such low wage
expectations . An average wage expectation of £121 a week suddenly
seems quite large compared with the £50 or so they actually need to
break even.
Small though these `break-even ' figures were, they almost vanished under
the impact of ETU . Under Scheme A, wages of only £19 .50 a week
found the average jobseeker breaking into profit from work ; under Scheme
B, only £17.80 a week did this . Among the young jobseekers, about
£10 a week in wages, or about 60p an hour for 16 hours a week took
them into profit compared with their out-of-work incomes. The effect
was more or less that of reducing the amounts in the first column of the
table by the maximum amounts of ETU likely to be received . This had
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some remarkable effects, for example:
• For some respondents (12 per cent under Scheme A, 13 per cent
under Scheme B) by receiving their maximum ETU, they would get
more in in-work benefits than they currently got in out-of-work
income, so their minimum weekly wage needed to break even in
work was zero;
• Many of the others (46 per cent under Scheme A, 59 per cent under
Scheme B) would need wages between zero and their ETU applicable
amount - the income level above which the amount of their ETU
entitlement starts to be reduced;
▪
Only a minority (17 per cent under both schemes) would need still
higher wages, which would be supplemented by less than maximum
ETU;
• Only a quarter of the sample ofjobseekers under Scheme A and only
nine per cent under Scheme B would, in order to break even, need to
get wages high enough to lift them clear of any entitlement to ETU.
Therefore, a high proportion of respondents seeking work of 16 hours or
more each week would be better off in work - almost regardless of wage
levels - if they claimed any ETU to which they become entitled. The
main reason for this is very simple: so few of them had housing costs that
would cause them to carry residual entitlement to HB and CTB into
work, even at their very low wage expectations . They were already
` better-off in work' at their very modest acceptance wages, even before
ETU entered their personal go-to-work calculation . With ETU, almost
no-one could avoid making a profit from work at almost any level of
starting wage that could reasonably be expected .
Table 3.43
with ETU:
Minimum
income
wages required
net of housing
to be
costs
better off in work
Base Mean
minimum
wage needed
to be better
off in work
without ETU
(f)
Mean
minimum
wage needed
to be better
off in work
(L)
New
minimum
as a
proportion
of wage
expectation
(%)
Mean
minimum
wage
needed to
still be
better off
in work
New
minimum
as a
proportion
of wage
expectation
(%)
(f)
ETU Scheme NONE A A B B
ALL OUT OF WORK 467 51 .30 19 .50 17 17.80 15
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 87 40.40 9 .10 10 9 .00 10
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours I
	
1
	
I 48.60 15 .20 13 14.90 13
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 45 40.70 10 .90 12 10.60 I
	
I
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 99 55 .60 27 .00 25 25 .20 24
Couple, no earner working 16+ hrs or more 125 75 .90 43 .50 31 35 .50 25
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3 .7 The components of The simulations so far have concentrated on the incomes in work
acceptance income in work : respondents could expect if they claim the benefits to which they were
how to judge a living wage entitled. We can see that nearly all those out of work would be better off
in work if they claimed ETU. The new benefit means they have a new
or, more usually, an enhanced incentive to take up a low-paid job . We
have shown how large the incentive would be if they took a job paying
the minimum wage they expect from work, by calculating their
entitlement to benefit in and out of work . This analysis suggests possible
future changes in the behaviour of out-of-work respondents following
the introduction of ETU . It clearly identifies those who could gain
additionally if they entered work, and those who would lose out . However
underlying the analyses are assumptions about the sources of income
respondents would have available to them in work . If behaviour changes
in response to incentives it will be respondents ' perceptions of those
incentives, rather than our assumed income composition, which are
important . Respondents might not be aware of their entitlements, or
our assumptions might oversimplify the complexities of their finances.
Whatever the potential income gain from moving into work, it is their
perception of the gain which matters, in the first instance 4s
In our calculations of the financial incentive to work, we made sure we
included all the ('disregarded') out-of-work income respondents were
entitled to keep while in work. A minimum income in work was estimated
as their minimum acceptance wage, plus any disregarded income, plus
any in-work benefit entitlement We assumed that the difference between
the resulting in-work and out-of-work incomes represented the incentive
the individual required to make working worthwhile.
If we are to replicate this approach based on perceived in-work income,
we need to know what sources of income respondents feel they will be
able to draw on in work and how much they expect to receive . Our
survey questionnaire contained direct questions about how respondents
perceived the different components and amounts of in-work income . It
also asked those out of work and in work how they would respond to the
introduction of an ETU . Using these data, we should be able to move a
little closer to learning how respondents actually see incentives arising,
and what difference the availability of a top-up like ETU might make.
This section looks at how people work out their likely total income in
work.
° Economists are entitled to argue that people who mis-perceive their advantage in
work and make a mistake - typically accepting work that gives them no profit from
their enterprise - will revert to unemployment . On the other hand, there is plenty
of evidence to suggest they do not revert (Kempson, 1996).
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3.7
.1 Income from work The methods used to assess minimum acceptable wages in work have
already been described (Section 2 .9) . Among those out of work at the
time of interview (regardless of whether they were sampled as workers-
in-work or unemployed) who said they were currently looking for work,
or would in the near future, the minimum wage they expected in work
averaged £122 per week, with a median value of £110 . The stated
amounts were concentrated around these parameters, with the lower
quartile at £90 and the upper quartile at £150 . The distribution was also
quite lumpy. More than a fifth said exactly £100, for example, and 13
per cent said £150 . Four per cent were unable to quote a figure - which,
interestingly, was much lower than among lone parents, a quarter of
whom could not quote a figure (McKay and Marsh, 1994, p .17).
The wage alone does not indicate the individual's anticipated returns
from work . Those out of work, seeking employment, must set against
in-work income other expenses incurred necessarily in work but not
when out of work (such as travel to work costs) . Sixty one per cent of
out-of-work jobseekers thought they would need to meet such costs at
an average amount of £21 .60 per week (median £19 .00) . Across all
job-seekers (including those predicting zero expenses) the average was
£13.30.
Jobseekers were also asked whether they would have to meet any additional
`one-off' expenses, such as buying new clothes, for work, over and above
usual in-work expenses . Just under half (47 per cent) said they would
face such costs . Thirty eight per cent said they would not, while the rest
were unsure . Of those who foresaw such costs, the median amount was
£100. The mean was high (at £190.30) because of a small number who
quoted very high start up costs . Only a quarter of respondents gave a
figure higher than the mean, and 88 per cent said £200 or less . Exactly
what the eleven people who quoted figures between £1000 and £14500
were planning to do with the money was not asked . All were looking
for - or prepared to accept - self-employed work . Perhaps the job they
envisaged required specialised equipment, premises or a vehicle.
There is some limited evidence here that some of the out of work faced
high in-work expenses or start up costs . Those in work were asked the
same questions about the needs of their current employment . The median
in-work expense was £10, and only a quarter met start-up costs (median
£50).
Those out of work and looking for work now or in the future were
asked what sources of income besides wages they would draw on if they
were working. The interviewer offered the respondent a set of cards,
each bearing the name of a different potential income source . Through a
series of questions, respondents separated income sources they felt they
would receive when in work, from those they would not . Four in ten
saw themselves drawing on an income source other than their earnings
and their predictions are summarised in Table 3 .44.
3 .7 .2 Other sources of income
when in work
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Taisle 3 .44 Out-of-work respondents looking for work: likely
income sources in work
Proportion
in receipt
of source
Mean
among
those in
receipt
of source
Median
among
those in
receipt of
source
Mean
across
sample
INCOME SOURCE % Pounds per week
Own minimum wage expectation 46 100 127.90 110 .00 127 .90
Earnings of spouse/partner I 0 97.60 82.50 5 .70
Benefit of spouse/partner 5 44.20 46.00 1 .33
Income Support 4 28 .10 30.00 0 .30
Maintenance payments I 10.00 10.00 0 .00
Housing Benefit 13 22
.60 20.00 1 .00
Council Tax Benefit 12 9 .20 7 .00 0 .30
Other Social Security benefits 4 32 .10 30 .50 0.40
Rent from lodgers 3 53 .10 35 .00 0.60
Contributions from other household
members 6 243 .20 20 .00 0.90
Student Grant 2 26 .30 25 .00 0.20
Pension II 90 .30 68 .00 5 .70
Some other source of income 7 66 .20 30 .00 2 .10
None other than wages 61
TOTAL INCOME" 147 .20 120 .00 147.20
Base: 615 respondents
Four sources were anticipated in almost equal measure, by around one in
ten of the sample - partner ' s earnings ; Housing Benefit ; Council Tax
Benefit and pensions . The most important of these in terms of amounts
contributed were partner's earnings and pensions.
Generally, single people were more likely than couples to expect all their
income to come from one source . The group least likely to see themselves
drawing on income other than wages was young single women (74 per
cent) . Couples where the respondent was out of work, but their partner
was in work, were the most likely to see themselves drawing on other
sources . Less than a fifth expected to live on their wages alone.
Respondents were asked to consider the components of in-work income in the
context of the amount they had already quoted as the minimum wage they would
accept in work
. After they had estimated the amounts of other income they would
receive in work, they were asked again for the wages to be included in their in-
work income package
. Nearly all 1172 respondents gave the same figure on both
occasions
. However ten respondents gave a figure which was higher and seven
respondents gave a figure which was lower
. Thus the mean wage to be compared
against other income sources is £127
.90, rather than the mean acceptance wage
which was L122 .10
. However, the medians for the two amounts were identical at
L110.
The mean for total income is the total income recorded for each respondent, divided
by the number of respondents . This is not identical to the sum of the averages across
the sample given in the last column (L146 .50), because some respondents gave
incomplete accounts . These respondents could contribute to averages for each source
against which they gave an answer, but not to the average across all sources.
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85 per cent of out-of-work women and 70 per cent of out-of-work men
would expect to share in their working partners ' earnings . It was not
clear why a minority in couples would not expect this source to be
available . It may have been an oversight, or represent a division in
household income such that earnings were not expected to be pooled.
The latter explanation might apply particularly where the partner ' s job
was seen to provide supplementary rather than breadwinner income.
Alternatively, those who did not include spousal earnings might expect
their partners to stop working when they found a job . Interestingly, in
only a fifth of couples where both partners were out of work did the
respondent expect to share in partners ' earnings . This was the group
most likely to expect to share in partner ' s benefits.
The group most likely to expect to share earnings with Income Support
was young single men - but the proportion was small (five per cent).
Out-of-work women in couples were the most likely to expect some
income from maintenance payments, but again the numbers involved
were small (just four per cent).
An unusual finding concerns Housing Benefit . Such support was fairly
uniformly expected across `customer' groups (around four to 14 per cent),
and of course was most likely to be anticipated by renters (27 per cent).
However, a fairly large proportion of those currently living with their
parents expected to receive Housing Benefit - 11 per cent of those who
paid their parents and nine per cent of those who did not . Among those
currently in receipt of Housing Benefit, 24 per cent expected the support
to continue when they were in work . Nine per cent of those not currently
in receipt expected to start receiving Housing Benefit when they moved
into work. Possible explanations include:
Respondents were confused by Housing Benefit rules, and failed to
count current rent rebates received when out of work as Housing
Benefit, but used the term to describe support received when in work.
Also, some might not feel Housing Benefit was payable to those in
work.
® Respondents expected to change their tenure as a consequence of
entering work, or even to enter work once they had changed tenure.
Those living with their parents might hope to move out once they
had their own earnings.
The pattern for Council Tax Benefit more or less mirrored that of Housing
Benefit . No group had a very high anticipated reliance on other social
security benefits - most likely to intend to claim were no earner couples
(seven per cent) . `Contributions from other sources ' were most common
among younger single men, and couples . These were most likely transfers
between household members: parents and their grown-up children .
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One important area of secondary income was pensions . The relatively
high proportion of respondents expecting to combine a pension with
earnings suggests this income source was not synonymous with retirement.
Eleven per cent of older single women expected to combine pensions
and earnings for example . Findings for couples were more equivocal,
however, since we could not be certain whether earnings and pension
would accrue to the same, or a different, partner . Nineteen per cent of
out-of-work women with working partners, nearly a third of out-of-
work men with working partners and 21 per cent of no earner couples
anticipated combining any future earnings with pensions.
How benefit units intended to combine income from different sources
was important for a full understanding of how employment related income
influences incentives . However, the overwhelmingly important finding
from Table 3 .44 was that the majority of respondents expected their
earnings from work to constitute their sole income source.
Correspondingly, 87 per cent (L128) of the average £147 they expected
from work would come from their acceptance minimum wage.
3.7.3 How do respondents' Out-of-work respondents' average current net income was L80 .1048 .
acceptance in-work incomes compare The above analysis indicates that they expected an average income in
with their current incomes? work of£147.20. This suggests that on average respondents expected to
gain £67.10 by moving into work, or to almost double their incomes . It
could be argued that this ` incentive ' should be adjusted to take into account
the expected in-work expenses described above . Doing this reduces the
incentive to £48 .80 - still a 60 per cent gain on out-of-work income.
Of course, this net gain (or financial incentive to work) was unevenly
distributed . It was generally higher for men than for women and higher
for couples than for single people (Table 3 .45) . Out-of-work men in
couples whose partner worked had particularly high expectations.
49 Respondents were asked about all potential sources of income in work, including
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit . A standard definition of net income
would exclude these ` housing-cost' related incomes . The current estimate of net
income includes Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, so it is comparable to
the combined sum of respondents' predictions for in-work income.
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Table 3.45 Expected net gain from work by out of work
`customer' group
Acceptance
in-work
income less
current
income
(E)
Adjusted
for
in-work
expenses
(L )
Number
means
ALL 67.10 48 .80 1234
Single male, under 25, not working 16+hrs 50.90 29 .30 300
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 74.30 59 .20 396
Single female, under 25, not working 16+hrs 53 .00 41 .70 116
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+hrs 39 .90 30 .00 122
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 80 .50 65 .50 25
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 154.20 139 .40 60
Couple, no earner working 16+hrs or more 74 .20 44 .80 212
Overall, 89 per cent expected to gain by moving into work at their
acceptance wage, 84 per cent after adjusting for in-work expenses . On
the same adjusted basis, 27 per cent expected a gain of L40 or less.
Twenty eight per cent expected a gain of L40-L80, and 29 per cent
expected to gain by more than L80.
In comparison with findings reported earlier based on in-work benefit
entitlements and disregards, the proportions expecting to gain from work
were remarkably similar. The adjusted mean gain here, L48.80,
corresponds closely to the L44 mean gain in Table 3 .31.
3 .7 .4 What difference would These out-of-work respondents were then asked how their financial
expected gains from work make? position would change - taking into account work expenses - if they got
this level of take home pay. A fifth said they would be much better off or
very much better off. A full 42 per cent said ` a little better off while a
quarter felt they would be in more or less the same financial position . So
nearly two-thirds had given wages which they felt would tip the balance
towards being better off, and 85 per cent anticipated being no worse off
in work with their minimum acceptance wage.
It was interesting to note that some respondents - when forced to consider
the lowest reward they would accept for working - chose a wage level
they felt would make them worse off in work . Eight per cent felt they
would be `a little worse off, with four per cent `much ' or `very much '
worse off. Three per cent could not say either way.
So most respondents expected an in-work income higher than their current
income and most thought they would be better off on their minimum
acceptance wage . But did these expectations align with the financial
incentives calculated above?
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3.8 Summary
The answer - by and large - was yes . Table 3 .46 presents the calculated
expected gains from work for respondents grouped by how much better
off they thought they would be in work. Three-quarters of those whose
expected take home pay plus likely other in-work income was £80 above
its present level thought they would be `a little','much' or ` very much'
better off. However, just one third of those who were calculated to lose
income in work anticipated being in the same categories . A consistent
pattern emerged for intervening levels of gain suggesting a strong
association between anticipated monetary gain and expectations of being
`better off .
Table 3 .46 'Better off expectations against calculated total
income gains in work
(adjusted for in-work expenses)
If you get [wage] how will Calculated gain in in-work income, less in-work
your financial position
change, compared with now?
expenses
Negative LO-E20 E40-E80 E80+
Column percentages
Very much better off I 2 5 16
Much better off 4 9 17 22
A little better off 3 I 46 52 35
More or less the same 37 30 17 19
A little worse off 15 8 6 5
Much worse off 7 3 I 2
Very much worse off 3 2 I 0
Don't know 2 I 0 I
Base 186 335 335 322
The unemployed sample has been compared with previous studies of
unemployment in a number of broad respects . The sample was limited
to the twelve ETU evaluation areas and excluded those with dependent
children . These limits had some further immediate consequences : fewer
people in marital couples, fewer in the prime years of family formation.
But there were not as many young people as expected, and rather more
in the older age groups (especially among women) . There were large
proportions of separated, divorced or widowed people in the unemployed
sample, again especially among women.
Despite these induced differences, the present unemployed sample looked
similar to previous samples in terms of qualifications and skills . It was also
similar in terms of the incidence of general sickness and disability, and yet
a notable difference from past experience was the high proportion in
receipt of disability benefits, indicating a greater incidence of more severe
and persistent disability.
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This high level of disability receipt, which may have partly been a
consequence of the sampling frame used, formed part but not all of the
explanation for another important feature . This was the relatively low
level of search activity among the unemployed sample, compared with
previous experience . But after excluding those on disability benefits,
there were quite high proportions who were not currently seeking work.
And even after excluding the currently inactive, there were quite high
proportions making only a few job applications, or none at all.
A partly overlapping and sometimes differing set of comparisons was
made between the unemployed sample and the employed sample . In
making these comparisons, a complication was that the unemployed sample
consisted more of men than women, while the employed sample consisted
more of women than men.
One issue that could be explored by this means was how far the
unemployed sample was disadvantaged, even relative to a very low-waged
employed sample . Overall, the unemployed sample did appear to be
relatively disadvantaged. They showed meagre `human capital ' in
educational qualifications, skills or job experience ; mustered fewer
household workers (excluding the respondent, and irrespective of the
respondent's marital status) ; fewer social contacts with the world of
employed people; small financial resources ; and experienced relatively
more hardship . The unemployed had lower levels of home ownership
and were more concentrated in the rented sector . And, of course, benefits,
including housing subsidies, were a much larger and enduring element
in household income.
Economic activity was low compared to other experience of samples of
unemployed people . Economic activity appeared to be depressed by high
rates ofsickness . Recent history of temporary work, and social exchanges
increased the chances of men ' s activity . Among the fit, the strongest
influence on work entry was recent employment experience . Women -
if economically active - tended to find work more easily, especially if
they had a non-working spouse . ETU pilot areas appeared to experience
greater movement into work.
Better education, more experience and age all influenced the likelihood
of making job applications . Minimum acceptance wages were L122 a
week and were lower in Scheme B areas . Better education, holding a
driving licence and being neither especially old nor young all raised wage
expectations . Most expected to be better off in work, by an average of
L44 each week. At these wages, half would qualify for ETU Scheme A,
two-thirds for Scheme B . A wage as low as £80 each week when
combined with any attributable ETU entitlement would still achieve the
preferred total incomes respondents sought .
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Even before the introduction of ETU, some of the unemployed held
expectations of supplementing their wages . The most commonly
anticipated sources of other income were Housing Benefit, Council Tax
Benefit, pensions and partners ' earnings . Only a quarter of renters expected
to get Housing Benefit, however. Eighty seven per cent of income was
expected to come from wages - gains were thus expected to be L49 each
week, close to the calculated gains based on acceptance wages, which
averaged L44 each week.
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4 THE SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS
4.1 Introduction The labour market effects of ETU are likely to be complex and offer the
greatest challenge to research . It is possible that employers may become
aware of ETU and adjust their behaviour as a consequence, either by
targeting their recruitment on those eligible for the benefit or by holding
down or reducing their wage offers. Experience with Family Credit
suggests that employers are unlikely to adopt a conscious strategy of this
kind (Calendar et al, 1994), though they may . It is more likely that the
effect will come via the operation of the labour market at the local level.
ETU, by increasing the number of people willing to come forward for
relatively low paying jobs, will make it less likely that employers will
need to increase wages in order to attract labour . There should be a
moderating effect on wages throughout the local labour market, not just
among employers ofETU recipients . This means, however, that individual
employers need not know about the existence or operation of the benefit
for it to have an effect on their wage-setting behaviour or other aspects of
the conditions of employment they offer, such as hours of work . Their
wage setting behaviour would simply respond to changed market
conditions . Employer awareness and knowledge of ETU may, of course,
accelerate the process.
4.1 .1 The analyses The main objective of the employers strand of the ETU pilot evaluation
is:
• to assess the impact on employers' wage-setting and labour recruitment
behaviour of providing universal in-work wage supplementation (DSS,
1995a).
The survey of employers aims to investigate change in wage and
employment flows over the evaluation period and to explore how these
changes were affected by employer perspectives of the benefit system,
and in particular ETU . In addition, employer responses to labour supply
changes, in particular the hours of work offered to low paid employees,
will be examined.
This chapter reports findings from the first survey of employers and
provides baseline data against which to assess the impact of ETU following
its introduction in the eight pilot areas . It is a descriptive account of
these employers' employment practices and awareness of social security
benefits before the introduction of ETU . The chapter concentrates on
four key issues : the characteristics of the employers ; pay and the extent of
low pay; recruitment and job turnover ; and the experience of and attitudes
towards social security benefits, especially in-work benefits .
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4.1 .2 77ie sample The sample of employers was drawn from the British Telecom
` Connections in Business ' database . The survey consisted of telephone
interviews with employers in the twelve ETU evaluation areas . A total
of 2,400 employers were interviewed in the Summer of 1996 just prior
to the introduction of ETU. The overall response rate was 78 per cent
(Appendix B) . Further surveys of employers will be conducted in the
twelve pilot areas nearly a year after introduction of ETU in 1997, and
during the last year of the ETU pilot in 1999 . Some employers will be
interviewed at all points to provide longitudinal data . In addition,
establishments newly opened following the introduction of ETU will be
included in these surveys in order to investigate the effect of ETU on the
provision of employment.
The survey of employers covered all industries but care was taken to
obtain a sufficient number of interviews in those industries within which
lower levels of pay were known to predominate . The survey was also
structured to provide an adequate representation of large as well as small
establishments . Two sets of weights were applied to the results to take
account of firstly, the distribution of establishments' industrial sector and
size (establishment basis) and secondly, the numbers of people employed
within three typically low-paid job types: semi/unskilled; skilled/craft;
and clerical/sales employment (employment basis) . This allowed an
analysis of the workforce (employment) as well as the employing unit
(establishment) 49
If ETU is to have any impact on employers, it is likely to have its most
noticeable impact in traditionally low-paid industries . Furthermore, any
initial impact may be discernable in these industries before it diffuses
more widely in the labour market . Therefore, the following industries
were over-sampled (corrected by weighting in the analysis):
distribution, hotels, restaurants and catering;
`other services' (personal and social services, public and private);
`other manufacturing' (including clothing and food).
The industrial distribution of the 2,400 employers surveyed is shown in
Table 4 .1 . A quarter of all establishments (unweighted) were in hotels
and catering, a sixth (16 per cent) were in distribution, a seventh (14 per
cent) in ` other services ' and an eighth (13 per cent) in manufacturing/
power. The remainder were spread fairly evenly between the other key
industries, though there were fewer cases in public administration and
education.
49 The weight applied and hence the unit of analysis is shown at the bottom of each
table and is made clear in the text where necessary.
4 .2 Characteristics of the
employers
4 .2 .1 Type of industry and sector
Itidttstrial distribution
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Type of sector The overwhelming majority of employers (87 per cent) were in the private
sector . The remaining public sector employers were in public
administration, education and health . Not surprisingly, there were
variations by the size of establishment . A greater proportion of medium-
to-large establishments (25 employees or more) were in the public sector
compared with small establishments.
Location of customers/clients Around four out of five employers operated in their immediate locality
servicing local customers, two out of five provided goods and services
regionally, three in ten had a national clientele, while one in six operated
internationally.
The employers ' ETU area group (A, B or C) made no difference to the
geographical spread of their client base but the type of ETU area they
operated from, their industry and size of establishment, did . Employers
based in seaside areas were more likely than those located in large urban
areas, for example, to have a national clientele (35 per cent compared
with 24 per cent respectively) . Moreover, the larger the establishment,
the wider the geographical spread of its client base . For example,
establishments with 200 or more employees were four times as likely as
those with under five employees to have international clients . Employers
in particular industries also had quite distinctive client bases . Not
surprisingly, public service establishments operated primarily within their
immediate locality while those in manufacturing and transport were most
likely to have a national and international clientele.
Table 4 .1 Industrial distribution
(column percentages)
Unweighted Weighted Base
Agriculture/mining/construction 5 7 127
Manufacturing/power-water 13 13 303
Distribution I 6 22 383
Hotel/catering 24 15 575
Transport/communications 4 6 105
Finance/business services I
	
I 5 26I
Public administration 2 I 42
Education 3 3 77
Health/social services 8 9 19I
Other services 14 9 336
=100% =100% 2,400
[weight: establishment]
Type of Organisation Nearly half of the establishments surveyed were part of a larger organisation
and, of those, 22 per cent were their organisations' Head Office branch
(11 per cent of all employers) . Establishments in rural (40 per cent) and
seaside (44 per cent) areas were less likely than those in large (57 per
cent) and small (51 per cent) urban areas to be part of a larger organisation.
Similarly, the smaller the establishment, the less likely they were to be
4.2.2 Number of employees and
types of jobs
Size of workforce
Types of jobs
part of a larger organisation . Twenty-eight per cent of establishments
with less than five employees, for example, were part of a larger
organisation compared with 85 per cent of establishments with 200 or
more employees . Establishments in some industries were much less likely
than those in others to be part of a larger organisation. For instance,
employers in agriculture/mining/construction (31 per cent) were the
least likely to form part of a larger organisation while those in public
administration (94 per cent) were the most likely.
The number of employees in each establishment varied by industry:
establishments in hotel and catering had the smallest workforces with an
average of 31 employees (unweighted) while those in public administration
had the largest with an average of 293 employees (Table 4 .2).
Table 4 .2 Average number of employees by industry
(mean)
Unweighted Weighted Base
Agriculture/mining/construction 53 18 127
Manufacturing/power-water 141 44 303
Distribution 51 19 383
Hotel/catering 31 12 575
Transport/communications 65 22 105
Finance/business services 57 21 261
Public administration 293 98 42
Education 143 42 77
Health/social services 93 32 191
Other services 35 I
	
I 336
All employers 67 24 2,400
[weight establishment]
It will be recalled that the sample of employers was selected to over-
represent those employing potential ETU recipients, namely, those at
the lower end of the occupational hierarchy . Employers were asked in
particular about people they employed in the following job types':
• semi/unskilled;
• skilled/craft;
® clerical/sales.
The most significant factor impacting on the mix of job types was the
establishments ' industry . Employers in hotels and catering were more
likely than employers in any other industry to employ semi/unskilled
employees - 89 per cent did so . Over four out of five (83 per cent)
educational establishments employed skilled/craft workers which was
higher than any other industry, while employers in public administration
(87 per cent) were the most likely to employ clerical/sales staff.
50 These three job types will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter,
where the unit of analysis will be employment in each job type.
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Gender composition of workforce Overall, total employment was divided equally between male and female
employees . The proportion of female employment was therefore slightly
greater than national figures, where 44 per cent of those of working age
in paid employment are women (Sly et al ., 1997) . This was perhaps not
surprising since the survey was concentrated in the low-paid sector where
women are known to predominate.
Predictably, the majority (70 per cent) of clerical/sales employment was
female while the majority (67 per cent) of skilled/craft employment was
male . Semi/unskilled employment divided equally between women and
men . By far the largest differences by gender were associated with
employers ' industry . There was considerable evidence of horizontal
occupational segregation by gender, which is the disproportionate
representation of women in certain occupations . For example, women
formed the majority of clerical/sales jobs in all industries with the exception
of agriculture/mining/construction . By contrast, the majority of skilled/
craft employees were men except in education and health . Similarly, the
majority of semi/unskilled workers were men in all industries except
distribution, hotel and catering, education, and health, even though men
and women were equally distributed in semi/unskilled employment
overall.
4.2.3 Hours of work In order to be eligible for ETU, people must work at least 16 hours each
week. An extra credit (worth 10.55 in 97/98) is available with ETU
for those working 30 hours or more each week . On average, employees
worked 37 hours per week . There was little variation in the average
number of hours worked by ETU Scheme or by the type of ETU area.
The average number of hours employees worked varied more substantially
by the size of the establishment they worked in (Table 4 .3a) and by
industry (Table 4 .3b).
The larger the employer, the greater hours semi/unskilled employees
worked, on average . For example, those working in small establishments
(under five employees) worked an average of 30 hours compared to the
38 hours worked by those in larger establishments (200 or more
employees) . This positive relationship was also evident among clerical/
sales staff but the overall differences in hours were not as great . The
relationship between average hours and size of establishment did not
hold for skilled workers, amongst whom there was little diversity in the
average hours worked, varying between 37 and 39 hours (Table 4 .3a).
Semi/unskilled employees in hotel and catering and `other service ' sectors
worked the shortest number of hours per week, on average - 33 and 31
hours respectively . There was less variation in average hours worked by
industry in the other job types (Table 4 .3b) .
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Table 4e3a Hours of work in each job type by size of
establishment
Skilled/unskilled employment (Row percentages)
1-15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
2-4 employees 46 19 35 30 hours 186
5-10 37 25 38 33 hours 325
11-24 30 21 49 35 hours 403
25-49 8 26 57 36 hours 250
50-99 9 9 62 37 hours 229
100-199 15 15 70 37 hours 162
200+ 7 13 80 38 hours 131
All I8 I8 63 37 hours 1686
Skilled/craft employment (Row percentages)
1-15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
2-4 employees I
	
I 13 76 37 hours 139
5-10 0 9 80 38 hours 277
11-24 5 9 85 39 hours 344
25-49 7 12 82 39 hours 228
50-99 3 9 88 38 hours 212
100-199 3 9 87 39 hours 169
200+ 4 8 88 38 hours 132
All 5 9 85 38 hours 1501
Clerical/sales employment (Row percentages)
I - 15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
2-4 employees 31 23 46 34 hours 174
5-10 23 24 53 36 hours 274
11-24 19 21 60 37 hours 364
25-49 12 16 72 37 hours 243
50-99 9 18 73 37 hours 243
100-199 13 14 73 37 hours 191
200+ 8 14 77 37 hours 150
All 14 18 68 37 hours 1639
[weight employment in job type]
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Table 4 .3b Hours of work in each job type by industrial sector
Skilled/unskilled employment (Row percentages)
1-15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
Agriculture 4 3 94 39 hours 93
Manufacturing I 5 94 39 hours 234
Distribution 22 23 54 37 hours 198
Hotel/catering 42 29 28 33 hours 529
Transport 10 I
	
I 79 39 hours 67
Finance 18 14 68 38 hours 121
Administration 15 45 39 38 hours 16
Education 42 24 34 35 hours 49
Health 20 36 44 35 hours 137
Other services 43 20 38 31 hours 241
All 18 18 63 37 hours 1686
Skilled/craft employment (Row percentages)
I-15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
Agriculture - I 99 39 hours 88
Manufacturing I 3 97 39 hours 257
Distribution 5 5 90 40 hours 158
Hotel/catering 12 19 69 39 hours 360
Transport 2 I 97 41 hours 63
Finance I 4 95 39 hours 127
Administration 9 12 80 37 hours 23
Education 12 22 66 35 hours 65
Health 9 20 70 37 hours 143
Other services 18 13 69 38 hours 217
All 5 9 85 38 hours 1501
Clerical/sales employment (Row percentages)
1-15 hrs 16-29 hrs 30+ hrs Mean Base
Agriculture 4 12 85 38 hours 98
Manufacturing 3 6 92 37 hours 265
Distribution 33 26 41 37 hours 31
	
I
Hotel/catering 20 25 55 38 hours 244
Transport 6 7 87 38 hours 81
Finance 5 12 83 37 hours 208
Administration 4 19 78 37 hours 38
Education 9 20 71 36 hours 59
Health 7 33 60 37 hours 133
Other services 15 19 66 36 hours 202
All 14 18 68 37 hours 1639
[weight: employment in job type]
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Workino, below the ETU hours The ` 16 hours ' threshold did not impact on the three job types equally.
threshold Overall, 18 per cent of semi/unskilled employees worked less than 16
hours a week and so would be ineligible for ETU on the basis of hours
worked, as did 14 per cent of clerical/sales workers, but just five per cent
of skilled/craft employees.
The proportion of each type of worker who would be excluded by the
hours-rule was similar by ETU area group (A, B or C) and type of area
but varied greatly by establishment size and industry . Those workers
who would be least likely to qualify for ETU because they worked less
than 16 hours a week were semi/unskilled employees in establishments
with less than five employees - over four in ten were affected . The
highest proportion of these ineligible semi/unskilled workers were found
in hotels and catering, education, and other services . By contrast, those
most likely to meet the hours minimum were skilled/craft employees
working in establishments with more than 50 employees and those in
agriculture/mining/construction, finance and manufacturing (Tables 4 .3a
and 4.3b).
Given the extent of occupational segregation by gender and the propensity
for women to work shorter hours than men, women are more likely to
be working less than 16 hours a week and therefore would be more
likely to be ineligible for ETU on the basis of hours worked.
4.3 Pay and the extent of low One of the objectives of the ETU evaluation is to assess the potential
pay `wage effect ' of the benefit . There is the possibility that ETU will have a
depressing effect on wages, either by employers directly reducing wage
offers or, more likely, by employers simply responding to an increase in
the labour supply at lower wage levels . The survey of employers provides
information on local labour market wages within the ETU pilot areas
and will provide information on wage dynamics over the course of the
evaluation.
The behaviour of establishments is dependent, of course, on the autonomy
of individual employers to set their own wage rates . Nationally agreed
wage levels will not respond to a pilot scheme of ETU in eight areas
(though they could if ETU were to be introduced nationally) . Thus it
was important to ascertain what factors influenced pay levels and the
extent to which employers were able to determine their own wage rates.
The way in which pay levels were set and the influences on this could
impact on the role ofETU in encouraging change in pay levels . Employers
were asked, therefore, about a range of influences on the levels of pay
offered in their establishment (Table 4 .4).
Employers' most frequent response was that it was ` the pay individuals are
willing to work for' that influenced their wage-setting behaviour - seven
out of ten mentioned this . This behaviour could be important if ETU,
4 .3
.1 Factors influencing pay
levels
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by acting as a supplement to low wages, were to reduce the pay individuals
were willing to work for. The second most frequently mentioned factor
influencing employers' wage setting strategies was ` the pay offered by other
local employers ' - over half (56 per cent) of the establishments mentioned
this . Again this may be important in terms of the ` wage-effect ' of ETU.
Individual employers need not know about the existence of ETU for the
benefit to have had an effect on their wage setting behaviour - they may
simply respond to the behaviour of other employers in their local labour
market and reduce their wage levels accordingly.
The third most frequently cited influence on levels of pay was the
`availability or scarcity of labour ' - cited again by nearly half of the employers
(48 per cent) . The introduction of ETU may increase the supply of
labour at lower wage levels by encouraging more people into low paid
jobs as a result of the top-up function of ETU . An increase in labour
supply would reduce wage offers, other things being equal . Taken
together, the three most common influences on wage levels suggest that
there is potentially considerable scope for ETU to impact on employers '
wage-setting behaviour.
The remaining factors which influenced employers ' pay levels are less
likely to be associated with reduced wage levels following the introduction
of ETU . ` National agreements and national pay trends ' influenced the levels
of pay offered in 46 per cent of establishments . ETU is unlikely to have
an effect on these employers ' pay levels given that they do not have
localised control over their wage-setting behaviour . It is of course possible
that if ETU was introduced nationally and had a very large take-up that
wage levels would be influenced eventually . `Local negotiations with trade
unions ' influenced just 11 per cent of establishments and once again, would
be unlikely to lead to a downward movement in wage levels 51 .
51 Wage levels, in any case, tend to be higher in unionised workplaces compared with
non-unionised ones (Stewart, 1995) .
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(row percentages, multiple response) Table 4 .4 Factors influencing levels of pay
National
agreements
and
national
pay trends
Pay
offered by
other local
employers
The
availability
or scarcity
of labour
Your own
local
negotiations
with Trade
Unions
The pay
individuals
are willing
to work
for Base
All 46 56 48 I
	
I 69 2,091
Scheme A 48 56 46 I 68 69 I
Scheme B 43 57 52 0 72 698
Control 46 53 44 I
	
I 67 702
Urban large 50 50 44 12 66 501
Urban small 50 54 39 4 66 527
Rural 44 58 52 I
	
I 70 547
Seaside 41 59 53 8 73 516
2-4 employees 34 55 46 6 81 323
5-10 43 59 48 9 69 427
II-24 51 54 46 9 67 473
25-49 57 56 49 15 58 276
50-99 62 54 56 28 54 247
100-199 74 49 50 31 50 188
200+ 67 49 45 57 51 155
Agriculture 45 52 44 8 72 III
Manufacturing 36 59 54 14 72 275
Distribution 49 54 48 10 66 325
Hotel/catering 37 62 48 4 75 487
Transport 42 69 53 16 69 89
Finance 34 64 52 7 76 229
Administration 100 25 25 32 39 39
Education 58 40 33 16 56 72
Health 73 47 44 8 54 170
Other services 47 47 40 II 75 294
[Weight : establishment]
There was little difference in the overall pattern of pay determinants
between ETU Scheme areas and control areas . However, there were
larger differences by type of ETU area . For example, employers in rural
and seaside areas were more likely than employers in other areas to be
influenced by other employers in their local labour markets (58 per cent
and 59 per cent respectively), the supply of labour (52 per cent and 54
per cent) and the pay individuals are willing to work for (70 per cent and
73 per cent) . Thus, there is potentially greater scope for employers in the
rural and seaside areas to adjust their wage offers as a result of ETU
compared with employers in urban areas.
The factors most likely to influence employers ' pay levels also varied
considerably by the size of the establishment. The smaller the
establishment, the greater the influence of the pay individuals were willing
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to accept : four out of five small establishments (under five employees)
were influenced in this way compared to just a half of large employers
(200 or more employees) . By contrast, the pay levels of larger employers
were greatly influenced by national agreements and local trade union
bargaining . Two-thirds of employers with 200 or more employees said
their pay levels were influenced by national agreements and well over
half (57 per cent) by local negotiations with trade unions compared with
just one-third (34 per cent) and one in twenty of employers with under
five employees, respectively.
Given the association between the size of establishment and the factors
influencing pay levels, it is not surprising that all establishments in public
administration, which also had the largest workforces on average, relied
on national agreements and a third on local trade union negotiations in
determining their wage offers . They too were the industry least likely to
be affected by all other potential influences on levels of pay. Thus, wage
levels in this sector would probably be the least likely to be affected
following the introduction of ETU in the pilot areas . By contrast,
establishments in hotel and catering, which had the smallest workforces
on average, were one of the least likely to be dependent on national
agreements and trade union negotiations (37 per cent and four per cent
respectively) . Thus, there is greater potential for ETU to have an effect
on wage offers in the hotel and catering industry.
4.3 .2 Wage policy autonomy The influences on pay levels were just one element in the overall
determinants of employers ' wage offers . Another was the extent to which
employers could in fact set their own wage levels, or whether they were
laid down by the head office of their organisation . Just over half (53 per
cent) of the employers in the survey did not form part of a larger
organisation and therefore had independence in their wage-setting
behaviour. In addition, 11 per cent of employers surveyed were Head
Office branches and, presumably, set the levels of pay for their own
establishment . The remaining employers (37 per cent overall) were
branches of a larger organisation and they were asked about their freedom
to set rates of pay . In particular, they were asked whether the rates of pay
they offered when recruiting were laid down by their head office, agreed
between local management and their head office, or decided themselves
by local management.
Overwhelmingly, the rates of pay offered by the branches of larger
organisations when recruiting were laid down by Head Office (62 per
cent) . A fifth were decided by management locally . Thus, if wages are
determined outside the pilot areas, this lack of independence in setting
wage offers may dampen the potential `wage-effect ' of ETU in these
branches . Though, again, if ETU were to be introduced nationally, this
restriction in wage-setting behaviour may not dampen any ETU ` wage-
effect' , as wage offers set by Head Office would eventually be affected.
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4.3 .3 Pay rates To assess the potential wage effect of ETU, baseline data on average pay
Average gross hourly pay rates before the introduction of ETU were collected for the three job
types . Not surprisingly, average gross hourly pay varied by type of job:
semi/unskilled employees earned on average £4 .20 per hour ; clerical/
sales employees earned £5 .07; and skilled/craft employees were paid
£6.74 per hour worked (Table 4 .5) 52 . Thus the average wage rates quoted
by employers were substantially higher than those earned by the workers-
in-work (Chapter 2) or sought by the unemployed (Chapter 3) . The
average wages offered by employers will be inflated somewhat by the
inclusion of all industries in the survey, not solely low-paying industries.
In addition, even within low-paying industries, there will be some
employees earning moderate-to-high wages which will have been included
in the average wage rates. In contrast, the vast majority of the workers-
in-work were low-paid by definition, because of their initial inclusion in
the sample.
Hourly pay levels within each job type were similar across ETU area
groups and area types, with no area consistently paying higher wages for
all three types of employees . There was, however, a significant pay
variation by size of establishment, with larger employers paying higher
hourly rates than smaller employers for both semi/unskilled and skilled/
craft employment. Taken together, job type and establishment size led
to large differences in hourly rates . Skilled/craft employees in
establishments with 100 or more employees were the best paid of all
employees, receiving on average £7 .63 per hour while semi/unskilled
workers in establishments with less than 5 employees were the lowest
paid at £3.41 per hour.
Again, differences were evident between industries, although no single
industry consistently paid either the lowest or the highest wage rates.
Semi/unskilled employees in the hotel/catering industry were paid the
lowest wages - as little as £3 .34 per hour on average, compared with the
top going rate of £5 .16 in manufacturing/power/water . The lowest
paid skilled/craft employees also worked in hotel and catering - their
hourly wage rate averaged only £4 .36 compared to the £10 .57 for those
employed in education . The lowest paid clerical/sales staff were employed
in distribution and were paid on average £3 .92 an hour compared with
the top rate of £5 .86 for equivalent workers in manufacturing/power/
water. Thus, the two sectors which stand out as having some of the
lowest and highest paid workers, respectively, were hotel and catering
and manufacturing/power/water.
52 Eligibility for ETU is based on weekly income
. The mean gross weekly pay reported
in the three job groups was L155 .55 for semi/unskilled employees ; L188 .28 for
clerical/sales workers; and L257 .53 for skilled/craft employees.
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Table 4 .5 Gross hourly pay of employees in e ..~oh job type
(Cs mean)
SEMI/
UNSKILLED
cell
base
SKILLED/
CRAFT
cell
base
CLERICAL/
SALES
cell
base
All E4.20 1521 E6 .74 1290 E5 .07 1328
ETU Scheme A 4 .23 497 6.93 411 5 .16 446
ETU Scheme B 4 .15 502 6.51 432 4 .90 448
Control areas 4 .21 522 6.74 447 5 .16 434
Urban large 4 .11 370 6.99 299 5 .01 324
Urban small 4 .32 415 6.68 351 4 .98 338
Rural 4 .26 382 6.61 320 5 .05 317
Seaside 4 .04 354 6.69 320 5 .19 349
2-4 employees 3 .41 166 5 .47 117 4 .51 148
5-10 3 .54 297 5 .55 240 4 .38 223
II-24 3 .81 371 5 .93 306 4 .62 292
25-49 3 .74 218 6.18 187 5 .23 194
50-99 4.05 212 6.89 183 5 .18 204
100-199 4.30 140 7
.63 142 4 .97 143
200+ 4 .85 117 7.63 115 5 .79 124
Agriculture/mining/construction 4.84 80 7.00 80 5 .78 83
Manufacturing/power/water 5 .18 202 6.97 216 6 .31 193
Distribution 3,82 169 4.95 129 3 .92 262
Hotel/catering 3 .34 515 4.36 330 3 .96 215
Transport/communication 4.40 59 5 .34 54 5 .71 67
Finance/business services 3 .93 102 7 .60 99 5 .86 153
Public administration 3 .84 12 7 .87 21 5 .71 30
Education 4.07 33 10 .57 46 5 .81 41
Health/Social Services 3 .84 127 6 .21 126 5 .19 114
Other services 3 .50 222 5 .73 189 4 .90 170
[Weight: employment in job type]
Proportion paid less than L4 an Of particular interest to the ETU pilot evaluation was the proportion of
hour employees within each establishment paid less than L4 per hour, as they
constitute the benefit ' s potential customer base if they met other
requirements of the benefit . Half the semi/unskilled employees were
paid less than L4 per hour, as were three in ten clerical/sales employees
and one in seven (14 per cent) skilled/craft employees (Table 4 .6).
Overall, as the size of the establishment increased, the proportion of
employees paid less than L4 per hour decreased, in all three job types.
For example, over three-quarters (77 per cent) of semi/unskilled employees
in small establishments (less than five employees) were paid less than L4
per hour compared with around two in five (37 per cent) working in
establishments with 200 or more employees . Again, looking at semi/
unskilled employment, nearly nine in ten employees (87 per cent) in the
hotel/catering industry were paid less than L4 per hour compared with
a fifth in transport/communications . For skilled/craft employment, the
greatest proportion of employees paid less than L4 per hour were in the
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hotel/catering industries (41 per cent) while for clerical/sales employment,
the greatest proportion of low-paid employment was found in distribution
(61 per cent) . By contrast, the lowest proportion of skilled/craft and
clerical/sales employees paid less than L4 an hour were found respectively
in public administration and manufacturing/power/water.
Looking at the gender composition of the industries with the highest
density of low paid employment, we see that there was a higher proportion
of female semi/unskilled employees in hotels/catering (64 per cent) and
female clerical/sales employees in distribution (76 per cent) . Therefore,
for these types of jobs, a higher concentration of female employment was
associated with a higher proportion oflow-paid employment . This pattern
was not repeated for skilled employment where women were the minority
(43 per cent) in hotels/catering industries . These findings add weight to
the idea that certain types of jobs are gendered, which may affect overall
pay levels and hours of work, and therefore potential eligibility for ETU.
Table 4 .6
	
Proportion of employees paid less than L4 per
hour in each job type
(Cell percentages)
SEMI/
UNSKILLED
cell
base
SKILLED/
CRAFT
cell
base
CLERICAL/
SALES
cell
base
All 51 1705 14 1510 28 1646
ETU Scheme A 47 543 II 478 31 542
ETU Scheme B 56 573 20 511 27 548
Control areas 51 589 0 521 26 556
Urban large 57 412 10 349 30 406
Urban small 52 461 14 403 29 423
Rural 51 432 17 386 29 388
Seaside 44 400 II 372 25 429
2-4 employees 77 187 32 141 52 174
5-10 74 326 26 277 50 274
11-24 64 406 8 347 38 365
25-49 60 251 14 228 26 243
50-99 55 235 0 214 21 244
100-199 39 164 4 169 24 191
200+ 37 137 II 135 14 155
Agriculture/mining/
construction 27 93 2 88 13 98
Manufacturing/Power/water 30 235 8 257 7 266
Distribution 61 203 19 160 61 313
Hotel/catering 87 535 41 362 57 244
Transport/communications 21 67 14 63 17 81
Finance/Business services 57 121 7 127 II 208
Public administration 47 17 * 23 9 39
Education 44 50 9 66 9 59
Health/Social Services 56 139 20 146 9 135
Other services 74 245 30 218 25 203
[Weight : employment in job type]
*Less than 0
.5 per cent but greater than 0
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4 .4 Recruitment One of the possible effects of ETU which we have discussed above was
4 .4 . 1 Recruitment policy that it may act to depress wage offers. This, in turn, may affect recruitment
and exacerbate the high job turnover associated with low-paid industries.
On the other hand, ETU may make people more willing to come forward
for lower paying jobs, helping to reduce recruitment difficulties at the
lower end of the occupational hierarchy . There may also be a `substitution '
effect whereby employers target their recruitment on potential recipients
of ETU in favour of non-ETU recipients.
Establishments were therefore asked about their recruitment policy and
procedures . Single establishments and Head Office branches were assumed
to have local autonomy in this respect but branches of larger organisations
may have less independence in recruitment . Forty-three per cent of
local branches had to follow procedures laid down by Head Office whereas
30 per cent of establishments had local autonomy in this respect and a
further quarter could negotiate recruitment procedures between Head
Office and local management . Overall, local branches had greater
independence in setting their recruitment procedure than they had in
setting their wage policy (see above).
4 .4.2 Recruitment d culties Over a quarter of establishments (27 per cent) said they had experienced
recruitment difficulties over the past year - that is, they were not able to
get enough staff or the kind of staff they required. There was little variation
in reported recruitment difficulties between ETU area groups or types of
ETU area . Overall, the larger the establishment, the greater the difficulties
reported: 38 per cent of large establishments (200 or more employees)
said they had experienced recent difficulty in recruitment compared with
17 per cent of small establishments (less than five employees).
Establishments in the hotel and catering sector experienced the greatest
difficulties in recruitment - a third said they had done so - while those in
public administration reported the least (15 per cent), which could again
be related to the size of industry.
Overall, employers reported some difficulties recruiting clerical/sales staff
(28 per cent), but had considerably more problems recruiting semi/
unskilled employees (41 per cent) and skilled/craft employees (46 per
cent) . A larger proportion of semi/unskilled employment in establishments
reporting recruitment difficulties were paid less than L4 per hour compared
with establishments who reported no recruitment difficulties (58 per cent
and 47 per cent of employment respectively) . However, there was no
association between low-pay and recruitment difficulties for skilled/craft
and clerical/sales employment.
4.4.3 Job turnover The low-paid sector is traditionally associated with high job turnover.
Employers were asked about the number of people in each job type who
had left their organisation or who had had their jobs terminated in the
past 12 months and how many people they had recruited over the same
period of time .
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Three-quarters of establishments said they had recruited semi/unskilled
employees over the past year, falling to about three in five employers
who said they had recruited skilled/craft and clerical/sales staff. A greater
proportion of establishments also said they had lost semi/unskilled workers
(56 per cent) compared with skilled/craft and clerical/sales workers (both
40 per cent) . The greatest turnover of employment, therefore, seemed
to be in the semi/unskilled workforce.
We can also look at job turnover on an employment weighted basis . Table
4.7 shows recruitment and termination of employment as a percentage of
total current employment in each job type . Semi/unskilled employment
had higher turnover than the other job types : the equivalent of 48 per
cent of the current semi/unskilled workforce had been recruited in the
past year, on average, and the equivalent of 31 per cent of semi/unskilled
employment had left . Skilled/craft employment had the smallest turnover
with the equivalent of 26 per cent of the current skilled workforce having
been recruited in the past year and the equivalent of 15 per cent terminating
employment.
An important factor associated with the turnover rate in all three job
types was the proportion of employees paid L4 or less per hour . As the
proportion of low-paid workers rose, so did the job termination rates.
This pattern was particularly dramatic for semi/unskilled employees.
Where there were no employees earning less than L4, the termination
rate was 18 per cent . As the proportion of low paid workers rose to 76
per cent or more of total semi/unskilled employment, the termination
rate rose to 43 per cent of current employment.
Table 4 .7 Recruitment and termination of employment - as
percentage of current employment
(Cell percentages)
SEMI/
UNSKILLED
SKILLED/
CRAFT
CLERICAL/
SALES
Recruitment
Termination
48
31
26
15
31
17
Base 1686 1501 1639
[Weight : employment in job type]
The type of ETU area also had some bearing on recruitment and turnover
levels . Both the recruitment and turnover levels of semi/unskilled and
skilled/craft employment in seaside areas were higher than in other types
of ETU area, as were turnover rates amongst clerical/sales staff.
Recruitment and turnover rates fell as the size of the establishment increased
for all three job types. The highest recruitment and turnover rates among
semi/unskilled workers were in finance/business ; among skilled/craft
workers in hotel/catering; and for clerical/sales staff they were found in
the distribution industries.
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4 .5 Experience of and attitudes One of the aims of the survey of employers was to investigate any change
towards Social Security benefits in wage and employment flows over the period of the evaluation, and to
determine how these changes are affected by employers ' perspectives of
the benefit system, and ETU in particular . Employers need not be aware
of ETU for it to have an effect on their wage setting behaviour or other
aspects of their conditions of employment . But knowledge and eventual
experience of ETU may serve to accelerate the process . One of the
essential elements of the research is to evaluate whether or not employers
actively use ETU as a wage subsidy to hold down wage offers.
This section provides data on employers ' awareness and experience of
social security benefits before the introduction of ETU in the pilot areas,
against which we can assess the impact of ETU as the evaluation progresses.
The degree of employers ' awareness of particular benefits varied. Overall,
employers were most familiar with Housing Benefit - 98 per cent said
they had heard of it - followed by Family Credit (96 per cent) ; Council
Tax Benefit (88 per cent) ; and Disability Working Allowance (DWA)
(76 per cent) . Not surprisingly, they were least acquainted with ETU -
just a third said they had heard of it . However, given that ETU had not
been introduced in the pilot areas at the time of the baseline survey and
had received minimal publicity, this low level of awareness is to be
expected, and perhaps some employers were even confusing ETU with
other social security benefits or simply felt a need to claim knowledge
when they had none ss
It would appear that a greater proportion of employers had generally
heard of particular social security benefits compared with previous research
evidence . For example, a survey of employers conducted in 1993 found
that 79 per cent of employers had heard of Family Credit (Calendar et al .,
1994) ; this compares with 96 per cent of employers in the ETU baseline
survey. It may well be the case that the general level of awareness of
particular benefits amongst employers has risen over recent years . Family
Credit, for example, was introduced in 1988 and has an ever-increasing
caseload. However, a high level of awareness ofbenefits is to be expected
since, unlike previous surveys, the ETU survey was specifically
concentrated in areas with a high proportion of unemployment and low-
paid employment - exactly the areas where ETU is expected to do good
business.
The size of the establishment had little bearing on whether employers
had heard of particular benefits except for Disability Working Allowance,
where knowledge of Disability Working Allowance grew with size of
53 Indeed, a slightly higher proportion of employers in the Earnings Top-up ` control '
areas said they had heard of Earnings Top-up compared with employers in the
Earnings Top-up pilot areas.
4 .5 Awareness of benefits
Awareness ofparticular social
security benefits
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establishment : 69 per cent of small employers (less than five employees)
said they had heard of Disability Working Allowance compared with 85
per cent of large establishments (Table 4 .8).
Establishments' industry had more of an influence on their familiarity
with particular benefits, especially in relation to Council Tax Benefit,
Disability Working Allowance and ETU . At one extreme, 95 per cent
of employers in health/social services had heard of Council Tax Benefit
and 87 per cent of them had heard of Disability Working Allowance . At
the other extreme, awareness of Council Tax Benefit fell to 83 per cent
of employers in manufacturing/power/water and awareness of Disability
Working Allowance fell to 72 per cent in hotel and catering industries.
Employers in hotel and catering also had the lowest levels of awareness of
ETU (29 per cent) while those in public administration had the highest
(45 per cent) . These findings suggest that there may be a public/private
sector divide in terms of awareness of certain social security benefits.
Somewhat surprisingly, the proportion of low-paid employment in each
job type had generally little bearing on employers ' awareness ofparticular
benefits . There were mixed results . For example, there was a higher
proportion oflow-paid semi/unskilled employment in establishments who
said they had heard of Family Credit and Council Tax Benefit compared
with establishments who had not heard of these benefits . However, the
reverse was true for Housing Benefit and Disability Working Allowance.
For clerical/sales employment, a greater proportion of employees were
low-paid in establishments who said they had not heard of Housing Benefit
and Disability Working Allowance, even though these employees would
be more likely to meet eligibility for these benefits while in work.
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Table 4 .8
	
Awareness of social security benefits by size of
establishment and industry - Percent who said they are aware
of each benefit
(Cell percentages)
Family
Credit
Housing
Benefit
Council Tax
Benefit DWA ETU Base
All 96 98 88 76 33 2380
2-4 employees 97 98 89 69 31 390
5-10 94 96 86 76 31 502
II-24 97 98 89 80 36 541
25-49 98 99 91 80 35 311
50-99 96 99 85 81 35 271
100-199 99 99 91 86 35 200
200+ 99 100 92 85 33 162
Agriculture 95 97 86 72 35 125
Manufacturing 95 97 83 75 30 300
Distribution 96 97 89 75 31 382
Hotel/catering 96 97 86 72 29 567
Transport/comm 99 98 91 78 32 105
Finance/Business 97 97 88 76 36 255
Public Admin 100 100 93 83 45 42
Education 100 100 92 85 36 77
Health/Social Service 99 100 95 87 40 191
Other services 94 99 91 73 31 335
[Weight : establishment]
Employers were asked specifically if they were aware of the availability of
in-work benefits for low-paid workers : three-quarters of employers said
they were . There was very little difference in employers ' level of awareness
of in-work benefits by either their ETU area group or type of area.
However, their awareness of in-work benefits grew with the size of
establishment : nine out of ten large employers (200 or more employees)
said they were aware of in-work benefits compared with seven out of ten
small employers (less than five employees) . Employers ' awareness of in-
work benefits was also influenced by their industry, ranging from three-
quarters of employers in agriculture/mining/construction to nine out of
ten in health/social services industries who said they had heard of them.
In addition to getting a sense of employers ' awareness of in-work benefits,
it was important to ascertain the extent of their actual exposure to them,
as this may well impact on their attitudes towards these benefits.
Overall, three out often establishments said they had previous experience
of in-work benefits . Establishments in the ` seaside ' areas reported the
least experience of in-work benefits (22 per cent) while those in large
urban areas (36 per cent) reported the most. As the size of the establishment
increased, so did their exposure to in-work benefits : more than twice as
many large establishments (200 or more employees) as establishments
with under five employees said they had had some prior involvement
with in-work benefits (50 per cent and 21 per cent respectively).
Awareness of in-work benefits
4.5 .2 Involvement with benefits
Employers' general experience of in-
work benefits
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Employers in health/social services industries reported the greatest
experience of in-work benefits (38 per cent) . Surprisingly, the industry
which reported the greatest awareness of in-work benefits - public
administration - reported the least experience of them (15 per cent).
Overall, about two out of every five employers who were aware of in-
work benefits also reported some actual experience of them.
Employers were asked the nature of their involvement with in-work
benefits . Three-quarters of employers who reported experience of in-
work benefits said they had completed a benefits claim form (31 per cent
of all employers) and half said they had been in contact with the DSS to
answer queries about their employees' benefit claim (27 per cent of all
employers).
Extent of employers' difficulties Overall, most employers (82 per cent) said they had experienced no
with in-work benefits difficulties with employee benefit claims, though 13 per cent said they
had experienced some or a lot of difficulties . Generally, employers with
the greatest involvement with these benefits in terms of form filling and
contact with the DSS, reported the most problems with benefit claims:
over a quarter of them (27 per cent) reported they had experienced either
some or a lot of difficulties.
Larger establishments were more likely than smaller ones to report
difficulties with their employees ' benefit claims . Among those who
reported experience of in-work benefits, half of the largest employers
(200+ employees) reported having difficulties compared with just one in
ten employers with under five employees . Establishments in manufacturing
who had experience of in-work benefits reported the greatest difficulties
with benefit claims compared with other industries - as many as 44 per
cent of them reported some or a lot of difficulties.
Nature of employers' experiences of
in-work benefits
4 .5 .3 Employers' role in
encouraging the take-up of in-work
benefits
Advice on in
.-work benefits
If employers were to encourage take-up of in-work benefits, or indeed,
they were to use the benefit system to help `compensate ' for their low
wage offers, we might expect employers to advise their employees about
their potential eligibility for in-work benefits (Table 4 .9) .
Table 4 .9 Employer's role in encouraging the take-up of in-
work benefits
(cell percentages)
Advise
employees
Base Discuss hours
of work
Base s4
about benefits with
employees
ALL 18 2397 40 499
2-4 employees 16 396 47 62
5-10 19 511 40 100
11-24 19 542 40 115
25-49 17 313 42 62
50-99 22 273 20 61
100-199 27 200 32 59
200+ 25 162 20 40
Agriculture 9 I 27 25 15
Manufacturing 13 303 16 50
Distribution 17 383 39 70
Hotel/catering 18 575 46 115
Transport/communications 23 105 23 23
Finance/Business services 20 261 53 56
Public Administration 18 42 13 9
Education 21 77 53 I8
Health/Social service 25 191 43 55
Other services 23 336 48 88
[weight: establishment]
In fact, only about a fifth (18 per cent) of employers overall said that they
advised their employees about eligibility for in-work benefits . This ranged
from three out often employers with actual experience of in-work benefits
to just 13 per cent of employers who reported no actual exposure to
these benefits . Of those employers who said they offered advice to their
employees, a quarter did so when employees were joining their
establishment, a further quarter did so some time later on and nearly half
said they offered advice at both times. Employers were more likely to say
they gave advice to their employees the greater the number of people
they employed . For example, around a quarter of establishments with
over 100 employees said they gave advice on in-work benefits compared
with 16 per cent of employers with under five employees . However,
these small establishments were much more likely to give advice about
eligibility for benefits, if at all, before an employee started working for
them compared with larger employers . This, in turn, was likely to reflect
the establishments' overall experience and awareness of these benefits
and the fact that larger establishments may have specialist personnel
functions who are involved in giving such advice . Surprisingly, those
who said they offered advice on in-work benefits were no more likely to
have low-paid employment than those who did not.
54 Some of the unweighted bases are small, so any interpretation must be treated with
caution.
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Employers in the public sector, especially in health/social services, were
the most likely to say they offered advice to their employees on in-work
benefit claims - a quarter did so, while those in manufacturing and
agriculture were the least likely to offer advice (13 per cent and nine per
cent respectively).
Advice on hours of work To be eligible for ETU, individuals must work at least 16 hours a week
and there is a credit for work of 30 hours or more . It was therefore
important to ascertain if employers, when counselling their employees
about their potential eligibility for in-work benefits, discussed hours of
work. Overall, four out of ten employers said that they had discussed
hours of work with their employees . Two out of five employers who
said they gave advice to employees about benefit claims also said they had
discussed with them the hours they should work to be eligible for these
benefits . Half of those with experience of in-work benefits said they had
discussed hours of work with their employees.
Although smaller establishments were less likely to advise their employees
about benefit claims, when they did, they were more likely to say they
discussed hours of work with them: employers with under five employees,
for example, were more than twice as likely as the largest employers (200
or more employees) to say they had done so (47 per cent and 20 per cent
respectively) . What this finding suggests, along with the fact that small
employers were the most likely of all to advise candidates about eligibility
for benefits when joining the establishment, is that small employers could
be more flexible in the hours of work they offered. Furthermore, employers
who said they discussed hours of work with their employees had a higher
proportion of low-paid employment in both semi/unskilled and clerical/
sales jobs than those who had not discussed hours of work . This suggests
that establishments with a greater concentration of low-paid jobs could
offer greater flexibility in the hours of work they offered.
4 .5 .4 Attitudes towards social Employers' attitudes to social security benefits could potentially impact
security benefts on the take-up of in-work benefits and the extent to which they actively
encourage their take-up . Employers ' views may vary depending on
whether or not they have actually employed people in receipt of these
benefits . Employers were asked a general question about the impact of
both out-of-work and in-work benefits on recruitment. They were then
asked some more detailed questions about the effect, or potential effect,
of in-work benefits on wage costs and working hours . For these questions,
employers were divided into three groups : those who had some experience
of in-work benefits ; those who were aware of the these benefits but had
no actual experience of them ; and those who were neither aware of these
benefits nor had any experience of them . The response of these three
groups were compared to highlight the impact, if any, of their familiarity
with in-work benefits on their attitudes towards social security benefits.
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Impact of out-of-work benefits on Nearly half of all employers (48 per cent) felt that ` . . .the social security
recruitment benefits which people can draw when they are unemployed make it
harder for you to recruit people for certain jobs ' . About one in eight (13
per cent) were unsure of the impact of out-of-work benefits . Employers
who thought that out-of-work benefits contributed to their recruitment
difficulties felt that it was particularly true for semi/unskilled employees.
These difficulties were not necessarily related to the establishments ' overall
recruitment difficulties but were associated with the establishments ' overall
patterns of recruitment" . Seven out of ten employers who had earlier
reported general recruitment difficulties said that out-of-work benefits
created recruitment problems for them, compared with four out of ten
who reported no overall recruitment difficulties.
Establishments of different sizes had divergent views on whether out-of-
work benefits created difficulties for recruiting employees to specific job
groups . For instance, the larger the establishment, the more likely they
were to attribute their difficulties in recruiting unskilled/semi-skilled
employees to out-of-work benefits : nearly nine out of ten (87 per cent)
of large establishments (200 or more employees) held this view compared
with about half (53 per cent) of establishments with under five employees.
There were also variations in the views held by employers depending on
their industry . Employers in hotels/catering were the most likely to report
that out-of-work benefits caused them recruitment difficulties (58 per
cent), particularly in relation to semi/unskilled workers - nine out of ten
identified these workers . Interestingly, this sector had the highest
proportion of semi/unskilled employees to total employment, and had
the greatest difficulties recruiting this job type compared with other
industries . By contrast, employers in public administration were the least
likely to say that out-of-work benefits led to recruitment difficulties for
them (16 per cent) . This follows the overall trend shown above where
establishments in public administration were the least likely to say they
experienced recruitment problems in all three jobs types, irrespective of
social security benefits.
Employers who said that out-of-work benefits caused them problems in
recruitment had a higher proportion of low-paid employment in each of
the three job types . For example, in establishments who reported
recruitment difficulties caused by out-of-work benefits, nearly two-thirds
of semi/unskilled employment was low-paid compared with 37 per cent
in other establishments.
ss It should be recalled that, irrespective of social security benefits, establishments
experienced greatest difficulties recruiting skilled employees . However, semi/unskilled
employment had seen the greatest overall recruitment and job turnover over the
previous twelve months.
131
Impact of in-work benefits on Employers were then asked whether they thought in-work benefits for
recruitment low paid employees made it easier for them to recruit people to low paid
jobs (Table 4 .10) . Over a third of employers who reported experience
of in-work benefits said they did help them in their recruitment, compared
with just 16 per cent of employers with no experience of these benefits
but who were at least aware of them. After consideration, over a third of
employers with neither awareness nor experience of in-work benefits
thought in-work benefits could make it easier for them to recruit people
to lower paid jobs, though a quarter did not know, nor could hazard a
guess as to what effect in-work benefits would have on their recruitment.
Employers who were unfamiliar with in-work benefits were as likely as
those with some experience of them to perceive them as a positive
influence on recruitment . However, employers ' awareness of the benefits
without actual experience of them tainted their view of the effectiveness
of these benefits in helping recruitment . This has implications perhaps
for the way in which ETU is publicised, since those with only a vague
knowledge of in-work benefits had a less positive attitude towards them
than those with no knowledge at all.
Once again, both the size of the establishment and its industry appeared
to have had some impact on employers' attitudes towards the effects of
in-work benefits on recruitment . Of those employers who reported some
experience of in-work benefits, the smallest (under five employees) were
the most likely to say that these benefits had helped recruitment (52 per
cent) while medium-sized establishments (between 25-49 employees)
were the least likely to think so (23 per cent) . Differences between
establishments by industry, however, were more pronounced . Turning
first to those with exposure to in-work benefits, a half of establishments
in agriculture/mining/construction held the view that in-work benefits
had aided their recruitment to low paid jobs, in contrast to three out of
ten establishments in the ` other services' sector . Yet again, establishments
who were aware of in-work benefits but had no actual exposure to them
reported less favourable views - just one out of ten in agriculture /mining/
construction, and two out of ten in ` other services' said that in-work
benefits had any effect on their recruitment.
Of the employers who said they had experience of in-work benefits,
those who thought in-work benefits had helped in their recruitment to
low-paid jobs actually had a higher proportion oflow-paid semi/unskilled
employment than employers who did not think benefits had affected
their recruitment. However, this was not the case for skilled/craft or
clerical/sales jobs . Of the employers with neither experience nor awareness
of in-work benefits, those who thought in-work benefits might help
with their recruitment to lower paid jobs had a greater proportion of
low-paid employment in both semi/unskilled and skilled/craft jobs than
employers who did not think these benefits might help with their
recruitment.
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Impact of in-work benefits on wage One of the concerns about ETU is that it may subsidise employers rather
costs than low paid workers, and help employers depress wage levels (see section
1 .5) . Therefore, employers were asked if they thought in-work benefits
had, or could, help to keep their wages down.
Once again there were marked differences in the attitudes of employers
with and without exposure to in-work benefits (Table 4 .10) . Only half
as many establishments with some experience of in-work benefits believed
that in-work benefits could help to hold down their wage costs compared
with employers with no exposure to these benefits (25 per cent compared
with 45 per cent) . But there was quite a lot of uncertainty : a quarter of
establishments with no knowledge of in-work benefits were not sure
what effect these benefits would have on their wage costs, and a fifth of
those who were aware of these benefits but had no actual experience of
them also did not know what effects they might have.
In-work benefits were said to have enabled a much greater proportion of
smaller establishments with experience of in-work benefits to depress
their wage offers than larger employers . For example, four out of ten
small employers (under five employees) felt that in-work benefits had
helped to keep their wages down compared with just one tenth of those
with over 200 employees . Similarly, large employers with neither
experience nor awareness of benefits were less likely than smaller ones to
think that the benefits could have any effect on their wage offers.
There was also a private/public sector divide on views of the (potential)
effect of in-work benefits on wages . Employers in the private sector
with experience of in-work benefits were twice as likely to report that
in-work benefits had sometimes helped to keep their wage costs down
(27 per cent) than equivalent employers in the public sector (14 per
cent) . There was a similar divide between employers with no knowledge
or experience of in-work benefits . Nearly half of these employers in the
private sector (46 per cent) said that in-work benefits would make it
easier to keep their wages down compared with just over a third (36 per
cent) in the public sector . However, there was little difference between
private and public sector establishments with knowledge though no
experience of in-work benefits, a fifth of whom said that in-work benefits
had sometimes helped to depress their wage offers . It was not clear quite
how such employers made this connection other than by expressing their
general view that the existence of in-work benefit may have exerted a
downward pressure on their wage bill.
For those employers with experience of in-work benefits, or who were
at least aware of them, their wage setting strategies and the extent to
which they had local autonomy in their wage policy did not seem to
influence their attitudes on the effects of in-work benefits on wages.
However, this was not the case for employers with neither experience
nor awareness of in-work benefits : a larger proportion of this group who
133
had greater local autonomy in wage-setting saw in-work benefits as having
the potential to keep their wages down compared with those with less
wage-setting autonomy.
Impact of in-work benefits on hours Because of the `16 hours' rule for eligibility to ETU and other in-work
of work benefits, it was important to discover whether employers thought that
some employees tried to increase the number of hours they worked (to at
least 16 hours a week) or if some employees reduced the number of
hours they worked, including overtime (and hence their earnings) so
that they would qualify for in-work benefits'''.
Over a quarter of establishments with experience of in-work benefits said
that as a result of them, some employees had wanted to increase their
hours of work, while over four out of ten reported that some of their
employees had wanted fewer hours and a similar proportion had been
unwilling to do overtime (Table 4 .10) . By comparison, employers with
knowledge of these benefits but no actual experience of them were more
likely to report a smaller impact on hours worked : a fifth believed that in-
work benefits had led to some employees asking for an increase in hours
(19 per cent), a decrease in hours (18 per cent) and made some employees
unwilling to do overtime (20 per cent) . Employers who were not aware
of in-work benefits would also have no knowledge of the hours rules for
eligibility and as expected, their attitudes on the potential effect of in-
work benefits on hours worked diverged from the actual effects reported
above . Around three in ten said they did not know what effect benefits
to lower paid workers would have on the hours of work and overtime in
their establishment.
As expected then, employers with less exposure to, or awareness of in-
work benefits had less knowledge of the potential impact of them on the
conditions of work . Of those employers who reported some experience
of in-work benefits, the most marked effects of in-work benefits they
reported concerned the wish of some employees to reduce the hours
they worked and the unwillingness of others to work overtime - four out
of ten employers reported this . Perhaps surprisingly, there were larger
differences in the attitudes of employers who were aware of in-work
benefits but had no experience of them and the actual effects as reported
by employers with experience of in-work benefits . The former were
more unsure about the overall effects of in-work benefits and reported a
smaller effect on recruitment and hours of work.
56 Any manipulation of hours resulting from in-work benefits would, of course, depend
on the flexibility of employers, while the impact on overtime may reflect the general
opportunities for this type of work in each establishment.
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Table 4,10 Attitudes towards in-work benefits
a . In your view, has/would the possibility of social security benefits to lower-paid workers possibly had/have
any of the following effects on your organisation?
Has/would it sometimes	 ?
(row percentages)
EXPERIENCE AWARE NEITHER
Yes No DK Yes No DK Yes No DK
Made/ make it easier to recruit
to lower-paid jobs 36 54 10 16 64 20 36 38 26
Helped/help to keep wages
down 25 67 8 21 61 18 45 32 23
Made/make employees want to
increase their hours 26 66 8 19 65 16 32 41 27
Made/make employees want to
decrease their hours 42 52 5 18 66 16 28 41 30
Made/make employees unwilling
to do overtime 45 50 6 20 64 16 42 32 26
Base (875) (1055) (470)
[Weight : establishment]
4.6 Summary The baseline survey of employers has provided data on the characteristics
of the employers surveyed ; wage offers and the extent of low pay;
recruitment and job turnover; and employers ' awareness and experience
of social security benefits in the twelve ETU evaluation areas before the
introduction of ETU.
Central to the analysis of employers was the potential effect of ETU on
wages levels . The greatest influence on employers ' wage-setting policies,
and one of considerable importance for ETU, was simply the pay
individuals were willing to work for . If ETU enables workers to come
forward for lower-paying jobs, this increase in labour supply may dampen
wage offers . On the other hand, the majority of branches of larger
organisations had to follow Head Office direction in wage-setting, which
may tend to blunt any local ETU wage effect.
Most employees within the establishments surveyed worked familiar 37-
38 hour weeks on average . However, one in ten worked less than the
ETU threshold of 16 hours per week . Hourly wage rates varied by job
type, size of establishment and type of industry . Half the semi/unskilled
employees were paid less than L4 per hour worked, as were three in ten
clerical/sales employees and one in seven skilled/craft workers . The
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proportion oflow-paid employees decreased as the size of the establishment
increased.
Turnover of employment was particularly high in the semi/unskilled
workforce . Job turnover increased as the proportion of low-paid
employees (less than L4 per hour) within an establishment rose.
In general, there was a high level of general awareness of particular social
security benefits among employers . Three-quarters of employers said
they were aware of in-work benefits and three out of ten reported some
previous experience of them. Those who reported experience of in-
work benefits said that their most marked effects were on the hours worked
by employees and employees ' willingness to work overtime. Significantly,
a quarter of employers with direct experience of in-work benefits said
that such benefits had helped to keep their wages down . Nearly half of
those with no previous experience of in-work benefits thought that they
could have such an effect on their wage offers.
4.6. 1 Future research Future strands of the survey of employers will principally be concerned
with the extent to which employers appreciate the existence of ETU,
and the extent to which, whether or not they are aware of it, ETU gives
rise to any change in their human resourcing policies and wage-setting.
Specific questions concern whether or not ETU results in:
® a moderation in the rate of increase in wages;
an increase in the supply of labour at any wage rate;
• a willingness in employers to accommodate (potential) employees who
qualify for the top-up (for instance, by adjusting hours of work).
The findings from the subsequent waves of the employers survey will be
compared to the baseline data presented above to determine whether any
change in wage levels or employment follow the introduction of ETU in
the eight pilot areas . The comparison will be made between the control
areas and the pilot areas, distinguishing between the two Schemes, A and
B. Any change in wage levels over the interval between surveys will be
used in future analysis to identify whether the operation of ETU, or the
employment of ETU recipients, has any apparent influence on wage
offers . Similarly, any change in hours of work ; recruitment and retention
patterns; and employment levels will be investigated to determine any
ETU effect . Awareness of ETU will also be compared between years, as
will employers ' own views on the likely, or actual, impact of ETU on
their employment practices.
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5 ETU AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
5 .1 Future economic activity The analyses so far in this report have told us how jobseekers and low
income workers expect a top-up to fit alongside other sources of in-
work income. They do not tell us how likely they expect such a situation
to be.
At the end of the interview, respondents were asked what they thought
was the most likely thing to happen to them in the next couple of years.
Taking the two samples together, three quarters saw themselves in work:
seven in ten working full-time, and another five per cent part-time.
Fourteen per cent expected to be unemployed and 11 per cent said they
would be doing `something else ' . Most common among anticipated
destinations for these last respondents was retirement . A tiny number
(16 respondents : 11 of whom were in couples), equivalent to just 0 .3 per
cent of the sample, anticipated they would not be working but looking
after a family in a couple of year's time. Obviously very few anticipated
leaving work to start a family but, given the very large number of young
women in the sample, experience suggests that rather more might be
caring for children in a couple of years time than actually plan to do so.
Respondents were asked at the same time whether they anticipated
claiming benefits in the near future . Just over a quarter (28 per cent)
thought they would be claiming benefit, two thirds thought they would
not (64 per cent), and one in twelve were unsure.
Encouragingly, the majority of each `customer' group in Table 5 .1 expects
to be working full-time in the next couple of years, with one exception:
older single women . This was particularly true among those sampled as
unemployed: fewer than four out of ten of them felt that they would be
working in two years time while a third thought they would still be
claimant unemployed.
It is important to note a substantial proportion of respondents anticipated
working while claiming benefit in the future . It could be argued that
these were current recipients of Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit
or Income Support who anticipated a continuation of their benefits on
entry to work. Indeed Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit claimants
were slightly more likely to anticipate working while claiming benefit
than those not (15 per cent versus 11 per cent) . But when all benefits
were included, the proportion of current claimants anticipating working
and claiming was similar (at 11 per cent) to the proportion of non-claimants
who anticipated this position (13 per cent) . Respondents were not asked
what benefit they anticipated claiming to supplement their earnings, but
as these questions followed directly on from those about a potential ETU,
there might appear to be an anticipatory effect for ETU .
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Table 5 .1A Expected employment/benefit outcomes:
Unemployed sample
Working Working Unem- Something
Unemployed
and claiming
Working,
claiming
Base FT PT ployed Retired else benefit benefit
Single male, under 25,
working 16+hrs 71 93 0 3 0
Row percentages
4
Cell percentages
3 7
Single male, 25 or over,
working I 6+hrs 47 78 0 13 0 9 13 13
Single female, under 25,
working I6+hrs 28 83 0 3 0 14 3 II
Single female, 25 or over,
working I 6+hrs 19 81 14 0 0 5 4 5
Single male, under 25,
not working 16+hrs 353 81 3 10 0 7 10 8
Single male, 25 or over,
not working 16+hrs 500 59 4 26 I 10 25 6
Single fern, under 25,
not working 16+hrs 148 73 6 13 0 9 5 12
Single fem, 25 or over,
not working 16+hrs 265 39 7 31 13 10 33 8
Dual earner couple,
under 45 years 23 86 0 0 0 14 0 4
Dual earner couple,
45 years or older 33 81 8 5 5 I 3 8
Man works 16+ hours,
woman not in work 51 55 8 27 2 8 0 6
Woman works 16+ hours,
man not in work 77 41 7 38 5 9 17 0
Couple, no earner working
16+hrs or more 364 42 4 34 5 15 29 6
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Table 5 .1 Expected employment/benefit outcomes:
Employed sample
Working Working Unem- Something
Unemployed
and claiming
Working,
claiming
Base FT PT ployed Retired else benefit benefit
Single male, under 25,
working 16+hrs 165 91 I 3 0
Row percentages
5
Cell percentages
4 II
Single male, 25 or over,
working 16+hrs 188 93 2 3 0 2 4 15
Single female, under 25,
working I 6+hrs 220 94 1 2 0 3 3 16
Single female, 25 or over,
working I 6+hrs 286 91 2 2 3 3 21
Single male, under 25,
not working 16+hrs 110 83 3 6 0 8 7 10
Single male, 25 or over,
not working 16+hrs 147 74 7 13 3 3 14 13
Single female, under 25,
not working 16+hrs 63 73 9 4 0 14 5 6
Single female 25 or over,
not working 16+hrs 115 48 10 19 16 7 5 20
Dual earner couple,
under 45 years 174 83 6 5 I 5 6 II
Dual earner couple,
45 years or older 320 80 8 4 5 3 5 13
Man works 16+ hours,
woman not in work 117 75 3 9 4 9 7 18
Woman works 16+ hours,
man not in work 219 75 9 6 7 2 7 9
Couple, no earner working
16+hrs or more 180 23 20 22 21 14 15 7
An analysis by area suggested that anticipation of working while claiming
benefit was more likely to be due to interview-conditioning than
knowledge from elsewhere of the impending introduction of a top-up.
There was no obvious pattern in the prevalence of anticipation of working
and claiming benefit . A quarter of respondents in North Wales (an ETU
Scheme A area) expected to claim while working, compared to just nine
per cent in Sunderland or Doncaster (ETU Scheme B areas) and 15 per
cent in Middlesborough (a control area).
Among workers and jobseekers asked whether they would claim an in-
work ETU, those who said `yes ' were five times more likely to expect to
be working and claiming benefit than were those workers and non-workers
who were not tempted by a top-up (16 per cent versus three per cent).
There was less difference between `yes ' and `no 's in terms of their
expectation of being in full-time work at all, at 27 per cent and 21 per
cent respectively . In total, 11 per cent of the sample said `yes ' to ETU
and expected to be in work in two years ' time, claiming benefit .
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5 .2 Who would claim an ETU?
Three quarters of unemployed claimants expected to enter work, as did
three quarters of those on government training Schemes . More than half
the unemployed non-claimants, those in full-time education, and those
temporarily sick also expected to enter work . Aside from the retired, the
most pessimistic were the long-term sick, just twelve per cent of whom
expected to enter work . One in five unemployed claimants of Income
Support or Unemployment Benefit expected to be working in two years'
time.
Those workers who were asked for a minimum acceptance wage were
asked a cautiously-worded question which introduced the concept of
wage supplementation (by drawing parallels with Family Credit and
Disability Working Allowance) . The question hypothesised the availability
of `a wage top-up ' to the respondent, and asked respondents whether
they would take less than their minimum wage expectation if they could
combine a lower wage with a top-up or whether they would hold out
for their preferred wage, disregarding a wage top-up.
Workers-in-work were also asked whether they would claim a top-up
(as reported in Section 2 .10), but the question did not directly link the
top-up to a reduction in their current wage . Workers were effectively
being presented with a `no loss ' scenario : an unconditional wage
supplement which - if they were entitled - would increase their financial
incentive to work. Some might have thought they would not be entitled,
but it was interesting that a full 23 per cent said ` no ' to a top-up from
which they could only gain.
More conditional scenarios were ventured later in the interview . Workers
in full-time work who said ` yes' to a top-up were asked whether they
would prefer to lower their hours to qualify for a top-up . Thirty seven
per cent said they would, which creates a potential concern over the
deadweight cost of introducing ETU. We cannot be sure how precisely
such ambitions may translate into action, either on an individual or an
aggregate level, but a substantial minority clearly were keen to trade work
for ` leisure' hours by claiming the new benefit, and so reduce the
proportion of wages in their in-work income in favour of benefits.
Workers in part-time work who said `yes ' to a top-up were asked whether
they would prefer to increase their hours to qualify for a top-up . Sixty
eight per cent said they would, which was more encouraging, as these
respondents would trade `leisure ' for work hours by claiming the new
benefit, and increase the amount of wages in their in-work income . This
hypothesised increase in labour supply would do little to offset the
hypothesised decrease among full-time workers, because part-time workers
represented fewer than one in ten workers-in-work.
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The responses of workers-in-work are of interest as a comparison group
alongside the out-of-work. It is useful to compare the anticipated in-
work characteristics of the out-of-work sample against the known in-
work characteristics of workers-in-work . But it was the responses of the
out of work which were most of interest, since these were the people at
whom ETU is aimed.
Among the potential jobseekers who gave a minimum acceptance wage,
just under two thirds (63 per cent) said they would accept a lower wage
plus top-up, leaving 37 per cent holding out for their minimum wage.
Multivariate analyses gave some further indications of the types of people
likely to have said they were interested in an in-work income top-up.
Financial necessity would certainly seem to have played a part . Those
out of work with debt repayment problems, and those in work who felt
they were managing poorly were more disposed to the top-up, as were
those more familiar with the world of in-work benefits . It was those out
of work who both knew that they could still claim Housing Benefit in
work, and who felt that they were likely to be eligible, who were more
disposed to claim . Likely eligibility would also seem to have influenced
disposition to claim ETU, as those out of work anticipating lower earnings
and workers on fewer hours were more inclined to say yes to a top-up.
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AREA COMPARMOM
6 .1 Introduction The study hypothesis is that over time those who live in areas where
ETU is available will report economically favourable outcomes compared
to those who do not . Four control areas where ETU is not available
have been included in the study to act as a comparison with the two pilot
versions of ETU (Scheme A and Scheme B)'' . It was important that -
before ETU was introduced - the sample interviewed in these control
areas closely resembled those in the ETU control areas, since if other
major differences existed, it might be these differences, and not the
existence of ETU, which accounted for different economic outcomes.
Such compositional differences could be controlled for in the analysis,
but had to be determined at the outset.
The same arguments applied to another attempt to discern differences in
outcomes between payment of ETU at the lower rate A and payment at
the higher rate B. Respondents in the pilot areas for rate A should thus
have similar initial characteristics to those in pilot areas for rate B.
This chapter concentrates on area comparisons . Three key issues will be
addressed : the local labour market profiles of the eight ETU pilot areas
and four control areas ; a comparison of the key characteristics of the
workers-in-work and unemployed samples between the pilot areas ; and
the differential applications for ETU by area.
The twelve evaluation areas which are the focus of this chapter were
classified into three sets of area groups and four area types, as listed in
Table 1 .2.
The emphasis in this section is on comparing and contrasting the socio-
economic and labour market profiles of the twelve local study areas . The
key points from the local labour market analyses are presented below.
These analyses drew on the 1991 Census of Population Local Base
Statistics, the Labour Force Survey, New Earnings Survey and Annual
Employment Survey, JUVOS unemployment claimant series and
Employment Service vacancy statistics.
s ' The twelve evaluation areas are either Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) or groupings
of TTWAs.
6.2 Local labour market
profiles
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6 .2 . 1 Socio-demographic structure • The age profiles of most local areas were similar to the national average.
• Seaside areas and rural areas tended to have higher proportions of their
population in the older age groups than the major urban areas and
large towns.
• The incidence of lone parenthood tended to be higher in the major
urban areas than in the other area types.
• In all twelve local areas the share of the population from ethnic minority
groups was significantly lower than the national average.
• There were marked local variations in the incidence of limiting long-
term illness, with the major urban areas, large towns and South Wales
exhibiting shares of working age residents suffering limiting long-term
illness well in excess of the national average.
• In terms of housing tenure there was a diversity of experience within
each area type, but in general the seaside areas were characterised by
lower than average proportions of households in the social rented sector
and more in owner-occupation than nationally or the other nine local
areas.
• An urban-rural distinction was apparent in patterns of car ownership,
with lower car ownership levels in urban than in rural areas.
• The seaside areas were characterised by lower proportions of
economically active residents in social classes IV and V than the other
area types.
• While the major urban areas and large towns had higher than average
proportions of households with no earners, the rural areas and seaside
areas displayed slightly lower proportions of households with no earners
than nationally.
6.2.2 Economic activity • The major urban areas and large towns were characterised by larger
than national average shares of economically active residents in
unemployment and on Government schemes.
• The incidence of self-employment tended to be highest in the seaside
areas and rural areas.
• With the exception of Southend and Southampton & the Isle of Wight,
economic activity rates were lower than the national average in the
local areas for both men and women.
• Sunderland and South Wales displayed the lowest economic activity
rates for men of working age.
• The large towns, major urban areas and South Wales were characterised
by much lower economic activity rates amongst men aged 50 years
and over than the national average.
• The seaside areas exhibited the smallest declines over the decade to
1991 in male economic activity rates.
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6.2.3 Employment • Over the period from 1981 to 1993 a small overall decline in employees
in employment disguised large losses of male full-time employees, a
smaller increase in female full-time employees, and job gains for female
and male part-time employees.
® The major urban areas and large towns suffered a net loss of employment
over the period, larger than average decreases in male full-time
employment, smaller than average percentage increases in female
employment and larger than average increases in male part-time
employees (from a low initial base).
• Seaside areas and rural areas exhibited a greater diversity of employment
change, but in general the experience of change was more favourable
than for the major urban areas and large towns.
• In North Wales, Bournemouth and Perth there were net gains in
employees in employment between 1981 and 1991, and in Southend
aggregate employment levels remained relatively stable.
• There were no simple patterns of variation within/across area groups.
• The service sector was dominant - in employment terms - in all twelve
local areas.
o Some industries (for example, chemicals, mining, etc .) were of particular
local importance in some areas but not in others.
• The large towns and Sunderland were characterised by significantly
larger than average shares of employment in the energy and water
sector (which included coal-mining).
• The rural areas were characterised by greater shares of employment in
agriculture and other services, and much lower shares in the financial
sector and transport & communications than nationally.
• The major urban areas and large towns tended to have smaller than
average shares of employees in workplaces with less than 25 employees
than nationally, while the seaside areas and rural areas had larger shares
of employment in small workplaces.
• Large workplaces were more important in the major urban areas than
other area types.
6 .2.4 Unemployment ° The major urban areas and large towns displayed consistently higher
than national average unemployment rates over the period from 1987
to 1996.
• The seaside areas exhibited slightly lower than average unemployment
rates until 1991, and thereafter unemployment rates slightly higher
than/similar to the national average.
• In the rural areas the incidence of unemployment was somewhat higher
than the national average up to 1990, and similar to the Great Britain
rate thereafter.
o Of the Scheme A areas Newcastle upon Tyne consistently recorded
the lowest unemployment rate, while of Scheme B areas Castleford,
Wakefield & Barnsley recorded the lowest rate .
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• Southend suffered the greatest relative increase in the unemployment
rate of any of the twelve local areas in the early 1990s.
• The major urban areas tended to display the largest concentrations of
long-term unemployed, although the large towns (with the exception
of Castleford, Wakefield & Barnsley) also were characterised by larger
than average proportions of long-term unemployed amongst the
unemployed.
• The seaside areas and the rural areas tended to have more unemployed
within the shorter duration categories - a reflection of the more seasonal
nature of employment opportunities in these areas.
• All three major urban areas were characterised by a greater than national
average likelihood of becoming unemployed and a lower than average
likelihood of ceasing to be unemployed.
• All three rural areas were characterised by a greater than average
likelihood of becoming unemployed and ceasing to be unemployed
(particularly in the summer period).
6.2.5 Earnings • The main secondary data sources on earnings - the New Earnings
Survey and the Labour Force Survey - have only a limited spatial
disaggregation.
• The basic pattern of regional earnings differentials in Britain was one
of a relatively steep wage gradient away from London, then the rest of
the South East, to the rest of the UK.
• The Southend and Southampton TTWAs (both located in the Rest of
the South East) displayed higher than average earnings than the other
local areas.
• Variations in earnings were evident between TTWAs comprising the
same local area.
• Large urban centres tended to display higher earnings levels than their
hinterlands.
• Rural areas were generally characterised by low average earnings.
6.2 .6 Overview of labour market • Of the area types the major urban areas and large towns were most
profiles similar in terms of socio-economic and labour market profiles - for
example, higher than average unemployment rates, relatively low
economic activity rates, low levels of car ownership, etc.
• There were some similarities between the seaside areas and rural areas
- for example, service sector domination of the employment structure,
older age profiles, greater than average likelihood of ceasing to be
unemployed, etc.
• The seaside areas emerged as the most distinctive of the four area types.
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The most distinctive/dissimilar local areas within each area type were:
major urban area :
	
Newcastle upon Tyne
(with a greater service orientation than the
two other areas):
large town :
	
Castleford, Wakefield and Barnsley
(with a lower incidence of unemployment
than the other areas):
seaside area :
	
Southend
(more akin to London ` subdominants ' than
seaside areas);
rural area :
	
South Wales
(displayed many similarities with large towns
[e .g . coalfields])
There were often no simple patterns of variation within/across control
areas.
6 .3 Is there any difference in There were few significant differences between Schemes found in the
the samples between pilot and workers-in-work sample . One important difference between the Control
control areas? and ETU pilot areas was the high proportion of respondents claiming
6.3 . 1 Workers-in-work disability related benefits . These were 12 per cent in the Control areas,
compared to just seven per cent in area Scheme B and six per cent in area
Scheme A. Area Scheme B, which included Bournemouth, was more
likely than the other areas to contain state pensioners.
Only small differences were apparent in terms of household composition
between Schemes (Table 6 .2) . There appeared little difference in tenure
categories, qualifications, the extent of job seeking or job satisfaction
between Schemes . More of the employed were actively seeking new
jobs in area Scheme B (24 per cent) than area Scheme A (19 per cent) or
C (20 per cent), but these differences were only marginally significant.
There was very little difference in the distribution of occupational groups
between Schemes, but there was a significant difference between industry
types . This seemed attributable to a high proportion employed in the
hotel and catering industry in Scheme B (which included Bournemouth)
and a very strong bias towards jobs in health in Control areas (21 per cent
compared to twelve per cent in the other two areas) . There was a
significant difference in trade union membership, which was 26 per cent
in Scheme B compared to 19 per cent in Scheme A . Trade union
membership in Control areas was intermediate at 24 per cent .
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Table 6 .2 Distribution of employment, marital status, sex, age
groups by area group: workers in work sample
Scheme A B Control
Column percentages
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hours 7 7 8
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 7 9 8
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hours 9 8 I
	
I
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 12 12 12
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours 5 6 4
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 8 7 6
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 4 2 3
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 5 7 3
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 7 8 7
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 13 14 12
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 5 5 5
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 9 8 I
	
I
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 8 8 10
Base 851 901 611
6.3 .2 Unemployed sample There were few significant differences between control areas found in
the unemployed sample . There were no significant differences in the
proportions of respondents claiming disability related benefits . Marginally
more in area Schemes B and C were claiming Income Support (66 and
65 per cent respectively, compared to 60 per cent in Scheme A . But
there were no other significant differences in benefit receipt.
Only small differences were apparent in terms of household composition
between the areas (Table 6 .3) . There appeared little difference in tenure
categories, except that renters were rather more abundant in Scheme B
(35 per cent) than Control areas (26 per cent) or Scheme A (29 per cent).
And renters who were liable to meet some or all of their housing costs
were more likely to be found in Schemes A and B (18 per cent in each)
than Control areas (13 per cent).
There was no significant difference in qualifications or the extent of job
seeking. However, among those currently seeking work in Scheme A,
14 per cent were seeking a part-time job of fewer than 16 hours each
week, compared to seven per cent in Scheme B and five per cent in
Control areas . Conversely 78 per cent of current seekers in Control
areas were looking for a job of 30 hours or more, compared to 63 per
cent in Scheme B and 58 per cent in Scheme A . Just 13 per cent in
Control areas said the hours of the job did not matter, compared to 19
per cent in Scheme A and 23 per cent in Scheme B . These differences in
hours preferences were very significant and future analysis must be careful
to monitor how far movement into work is influenced by such preferences
rather than the hours-related availability of ETU.
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There was very little difference in the distribution of known occupational
groups between area groups, nor between industry types. As among the
worker-in-work sample, Scheme B had a high proportion (formerly)
employed in the hotel and catering industry (14 per cent compared to
eight per cent and 11 per cent in Scheme A and C respectively) . But
there was no similar strong bias towards jobs in health in Control areas
(seven per cent in both A and C compared to 10 per cent in B) . There
was no significant difference in (former) trade union membership.
Thus, from the workers-in-work and unemployed samples, there were
few marked differences between the populations of the area groups . There
can be a reasonable level of confidence in the study to the extent that,
based on 1996 characteristics, any later differences in employment rates,
wages, final incomes and human capital, have arisen as a result of changes
in those areas since 1996, including the introduction of ETU . Such
differences as there are between areas will be simple to control for in the
analysis . However, some important differences were observed, in benefit
receipt, hours preferences and industry type . Subsequent changes in
these areas, such as changes in disability or pension entitlements or
restructuring of the health or hotel and catering industry will affect control
areas by varying amounts . Later comparisons between areas will need to
take these pre-existing differences into consideration.
Table 6 .3 Distribution of employment, marital status, sex, age
groups by area group: unemployed sample
Scheme A B Control
Column percentages
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hours 4 3 3
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hours I 2 3
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hours 3 I
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ hours
Single male, under 25, not working 16+ hours
I
18
I
16 21
Single male, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 23 27 28
Single female, under 25, not working 16+ hours 9 8 8
Single female, 25 or over, not working 16+ hours 15 16 12
Dual earner couple, under 45 years
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older
I
2
I
2 2
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 2 I
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 2 2 2
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours or more 20 20 18
Base 640 624 680

7 CCINCLUSIONS
This report has provided a baseline in 1996 from which to measure the
likely effects of the introduction of ETU in October that year and any
change that might follow. The ETU baseline study was designed to tell
us more about the conditions of people in the very lowest parts of the
income distribution - the very lowest-paid workers and the medium-to-
long-term unemployed most likely to become customers of ETU- and
to give a picture of the opportunities and difficulties that face them in
getting and keeping paid work in the 12 areas of the pilot . The evaluation
design was comprehensive, widening the frame of the baseline information
to include the views and practices of local employers, and enriching the
quantitative data reported here with a programme of qualitative, in-depth
research with those who will administer and those who might receive
the new benefit . All this information will be considered as the evaluation
progresses in the context of a detailed understanding of the local labour
markets that will be the sites of the control areas.
This report has shown that the baseline study achieved its main aims and
provided some surprises too:
The field surveys found good representative samples of the kinds of
people we needed to interview: medium-term unemployed people
looking for low-paid work and (the most difficult to sample) the lowest-
paid workers-in-work, many of whom would later find themselves in
scope of the new benefit.
•
Members of these samples had many of the characteristics you would
expect to find among the longer term unemployed and the lowest-
paid workers : they were poorly educated young single people, many
of them women, or older couples . Typically they had uncertain work
histories but were often well-reconciled to their low-paid jobs, if they
had one at all . Those seeking work seemed prepared to settle for
wage-rates below half those typical for their areas.
• Other findings were more surprising ; many of the unemployed were
unwell and persistent poor health was found to be a barrier to paid
work, just as it is among some lone parents . The members of the
unemployed sample were all medium-term unemployed (6-36 months)
and so stood apart in some of these health-related measures compared
with studies of shorter-term unemployed workers.
• Whereas we expected to find the great majority of likely customers of
ETU living as tenants, relatively few had rented households in the
same way as the lowest-income families with children have rented
households . The younger ones often lived with their parents and
many others had only small housing costs . This has important
implications for the likely working of ETU .
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• We were also able to demonstrate what may be some of the likely
effects of ETU on people 's work incentives, using the measures in the
field surveys . Large numbers appeared to be in scope of the new
benefit . For example, accounting for all other entitlements and sources
of incomes:
the majority of the medium-term unemployed in ETU-areas looked
for wages that would leave them in scope of ETU;
the great majority of the unemployed who had got jobs by the
time we interviewed them, had accepted wages well in scope of
ETU;
the majority of those selected as low earners had total household
incomes which would qualify them for ETU.
Most of the workers were already seeing a profit from work before the
introduction ofETU . Their in-work incomes were higher than would
be the total of their entitlements out of work . For this reason, no
more than seven per cent of the low-paid workers would find themselves
newly better off in work if they claimed, in the sense that they made a
loss in work at the time of their interview but would start to see a
profit if they got ETU.
• One of the most important conclusions from the baseline surveys was
that housing costs did not create a barrier to the new incentives to
work subsequently created by ETU . Even after housing costs were
taken into account, ETU would increase the incentive to work for
most low-paid households . The new incentive was not lost beneath
large entitlements to Housing Benefit carried into low-paid work . Most
of those who remained without an incentive were the relatively rare
mortgage-payers.
• Only tentative conclusions are possible at this stage but it seems fair to
suggest that workers seeking low-paid jobs would have additional scope
to lower their wage expectations in response to the availability ofETU.
• These findings can also be taken to suggest that the introduction of
ETU will attract deadweight costs : workers-in-work will be picking
up an additional allowance on top of wages that already leave them in
profit compared to their out-of-work incomes. Do they really need
this additional incentive to do the jobs they already do? Will job-
seekers need an additional incentive to reconsider reservation wages
that are already so low, to accept jobs they will take anyway?
• It is also possible to suggest that the baseline data obtained from
employers does not oppose the idea that the introduction of ETU will
influence both recruitment and wage-setting.
The next stage of the evaluation research programme will re-interview
in 1997 the workers-in-work, the unemployed people and the employers
seen at this first stage in 1996 . In this way, the effects of the introduction
of ETU in October 1996 will be assessed for the individuals most affected
by it . The 1997 surveys will include new employers starting meanwhile
and a large sample of people who claim the new benefit . This will provide
estimates, for example, of the number of new jobs ETU may help to
create and how many existing jobs may continue longer - longer at least
than they might otherwise have continued . Will we see faster flows from
unemployment to employment, and slower flows in the opposite direction
in the ETU areas compared with the control areas? It was significant that
in these baseline surveys large numbers of people we had identified as
low-paid workers had left work even before the interviewers found them,
most of them to unemployment . Anything that would help them remain
in work longer would be a major gain to maintaining higher rates of
labour market participation . This retention-rate is likely to be the more
significant aspect of ETU during the first year or so of the pilot ; the
creation of new jobs by employers as they become aware of an increased
supply of new-subsidised jobseekers, is likely to build up more slowly.
In addition to these measures of the impact of ETU at the individual level
of workers and employers, subsequent stages of the evaluation programme
will address wider issues. It will allow estimates of the extent to which
flows between employment and unemployment are modified by
displacement and substitution effects . Encouraging someone to get or to
remain in a low-paid job is not a gain if it excludes someone else from
getting the same job they would otherwise have, or removes them from
another one .
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PPEN®IX A THE ETU PILOT PROD ;r 1S1~ ~ RESEAECH'
The programme of research involves five strands:
® Field surveys of low-paid workers-in-work.
• Field surveys of the longer-term unemployed.
• Surveys of employers.
® Analysis of official administrative statistics.
• Studies of local labour market conditions.
• In-depth interviews with key participants.
A.1 Large scale quantitative The performance of the new benefit will be examined by a survey design
programme (Policy Studies which tracks forward from baseline samples drawn before the pilot . These
Institute) samples are re-interviewed periodically during the period of the pilot to
gain an understanding of the opportunities perceived and taken up by
individuals and employers during the pilot . Additionally, the researchers
will seek both current and retrospective information from those
interviewed at the end of the pilot period in 1999.
The extent to which these groups differ, over time and between each of
the ETU pilot schemes and control areas, in terms of their composition,
experience and behaviour in the labour market, will provide the main
measures of the effects of ETU on workers, the unemployed and
employers.
Surveys of low paid It is important to understand how the whole low income population
workers-in-work behaves in response to the introduction of this benefit . This includes
both low paid workers eligible for benefit as well as those earning wages
close to eligibility.
A sample of workers-in-work was interviewed before the introduction
of ETU and this sample will be re-interviewed a year after introduction.
Telephone and postal follow-up interviews will also be conducted with
this group during the remaining years of the pilot . In addition, a sample
of ETU applicants will be interviewed in 1997, and they too will be re-
contacted by phone and postal interview.
A new cross-section sample of workers-in-work, including ETU applicants
will be interviewed in 1999.
58 Adapted from `ETU pilot programme of research ' DSS in-house report no . 15, compiled
by A . Martin, May 1996 .
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These surveys will identify the probability of people with relatively low
skills continuing in paid work as a result of the introduction of ETU,
rather than becoming unemployed . These surveys will include both
those in receipt of ETU and those who do not apply for it and will
provide estimates of the benefit take-up rate.
Surveys of unemployed people A sample of medium-to-longer term unemployed people will be
interviewed in 1996, before the start of the pilot, and re-interviewed in
1997 . In addition, a second sample of the unemployed will be interviewed
in 1998 and re-interviewed in 1999.
These surveys will identify the extent to which ETU provides an incentive
for the unemployed to move into work and to stay there . They will
identify the incentive effects for those who apply for ETU, as well as why
some people do not apply and move into work.
Surveys of employers Successive surveys of employers will be conducted in each of the twelve
areas at three points:
just prior to the introduction of ETU in 1996;
a year after introduction in 1997;
during the last year of the pilot, 1999.
In each of these three years, 200 employers in each of the twelve pilot/
control areas will be interviewed : that is 2,400 per survey and 7,200 in
total during the pilot research. Some employers will be interviewed
several times to provide longitudinal data and establishments newly opened
since the introduction of ETU will be added to the sample.
Key issues addressed by the employers research are:
changes in wages and employment flows and how these changes are
affected by employer perspectives of the benefit system;
employer responses to labour supply changes, especially the hours of
work offered to low-paid employees.
The employers surveys will be the major source of information on local
labour market wages and wage dynamics.
Analysis of DSS administrative The information provided by applicants and recorded in the ETU database
data will be an important source of information . Analysis of the anonymised
caseload will provide detailed information about ETU recipient
population, their occupations, duration of claims, seasonality and wages.
Additional questions have been included in the ETU application form to
enhance this analysis.
Local labour market information This work will be conducted jointly with the Institute for Employment
Research (IER) at Warwick University who will lead on data collection
and analysis . Data will be fed from IER to inform Policy Studies Institute
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A.2 Local labour market analysis
(Institute for Employment
Research)
(PSI) work and vice versa . The key issues for this central strand of the
research are:
• the effects of the ETU upon wage setting;
• ETU as a cause of the substitution and displacement of labour (see
paragraphs below);
• the positive creation of new jobs at low wages.
The main purpose of the local labour market analysis is to compile, analyse
and synthesise local data from the range of secondary data sources for
each of the eight pilot areas and four control areas . This will provide an
overview of the operation of ETU within each local labour market and
will facilitate comparison with the control areas . Information will be
gathered on each area, before the pilot begins in October 1996, and then
updated during the period of the pilot.
These local labour market profiles will, therefore, serve two main functions
in the overall scheme of ETU evaluation:
• they will contribute to the creation of local baseline data for each area;
• they will generate evidence of the effects of the ETU on local labour
markets by providing a series of ` snapshots ' of the twelve areas from a
different perspective to that provided by survey data alone.
Separate profiles of each local area will be constructed using key indicators
designed to capture the main dimensions of labour market structure and
experience . Using these indicators, comparative analyses of the local areas
will be undertaken, highlighting the differences and similarities between
each of the four `types ' of labour market (ie . major urban area; large
town; seaside area ; rural area), as well as variations between local areas
within each scheme type. IER will also draw upon a large amount of
previous research on the economic, social and demographic structure
and change across Britain at the local labour market area level, in order to
place the experience of the pilot areas in the context of broader trends for
different types of local area.
Information will be drawn from the following sources:
• unemployment claimant statistics;
• labour force survey;
® 1991 Census of Population;
q job vacancies via jobcentres;
• Census of Employment/Annual Employer Survey;
• VAT registrations and deregistrations;
o New Earnings Survey;
q indices/classifications of economic conditions;
• information from local sources and surveys eg . from Training and
Enterprise Councils .
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In addition to these local labour market profiles, IER also propose to
investigate ` substitution ' and ` displacement' effects . Substitution could
occur if an employer recruited a potential ETU recipient in favour of a
non-ETU recipient . Displacement effects can occur where employers
take advantage of an increased supply of labour to reduce labour costs,
cut the price ofproducts and services, and increase their market penetration
at the expense of suppliers who face no excess supply of labour at similar
wage rates . Whether or not some employers use ETU as a wage subsidy
and maximise profits at the expense of the taxpayer and employers who
choose not to do so, is an important question for the research.
To measure these effects, IER will use all the previous data sources
mentioned above, plus data derived from the Policy Studies Institute
large-scale quantitative programme of surveys of both employers, workers-
in-work and applicants for ETU.
A.3 Qualitative programme of The Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) has been commissioned
research (Centre for Research to undertake a programme of depth interviews with a number of different
in Social Policy)
	
groups (detailed below) . The objectives of the qualitative strand are:
to offer a ` process ' evaluation of ETU to complement the ` impact '
analysis being commissioned from PSI, ie ` how and why' people react
to its introduction as well as `what' the effects are;
© to better understand how the scheme is perceived and understood by
actual and potential applicants and by those implementing it;
e to investigate the reasons for changes in the behaviour of the major
groups affected by ETU ie . jobseekers, workers-in-work and employers;
• to provide accounts of how ETU is implemented in each pilot area
including the interaction between local and central agencies and the
way in which these factors might affect the impact of ETU;
® to complement statistical analyses of the labour markets undertaken by
IER and PSI by providing narrative accounts of changes through the
three years of the pilot.
Interview groups Each set of interviews addresses different issues:
• eligible non-applicants - the reason for non-take-up of ETU;
• unsuccessful ETU applicants - why some people mistakenly apply for
ETU;
® routes onto ETU - the different ways in which people come on to the
benefit and the factors which influence their applying;
® routes off ETU - the employment destinations of ex-ETU recipients,
to identify whether it has a long or short term impact in terms of
labour market attachment;
® interviews with employers - employers ' awareness of ETU, their
attitudes towards it and their response to its introduction;
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© the self-employed - the experience and perspectives of self-employed
people and their reactions towards ETU;
© panels of Benefits Agency and Employment Service staff - this will
inform how ETU is being operated locally, what issues and problems
staff perceive to be important and whether there are any local variations
in implementing the benefit .
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APPENDIX B LAUNCHING THE ETU EVALUATION : PILOT WORK, SAMPLING
AND FIELDWORK
B.l
	
The Employers survey Considerations of cost and effectiveness, based on recent experiences,
B.1 .1 Pilot work decided in favour of a telephone survey, but one that used a `lead-in'
questionnaire . This was a self-completion 'jobs factsheet ' that was sent
in advance of the telephone call together with an explanatory letter . This
document asked employers to set down answers to some of the more
detailed questions about numbers of men and women employed in each
of the three job types of interest : semi/unskilled employees ; skilled/craft
employees ; and clerical/sales employees . It also asked for information on
rates of pay and recruitment and job turnover.
A questionnaire was drafted and pre-tested on 200 employers in non-
pilot areas using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI).
These areas - Fylde, Liverpool, Fife and Leeds - were among those short-
listed by the DSS for the main-stage ETU pilot, but were set aside in
favour of the three sets of four areas finally chosen as A, B and C areas.
The pilot was a success . In particular the `jobs factsheet ' speeded the
interview significantly for larger employers and provided information
that respondents had usually checked against records beforehand.
B
.1.2 Sampling The sample for the main-stage was drawn form the British Telecom
`Connections in Business ' database . A total of 6,000 establishments were
drawn to achieve a target of 200 interviews in each of the twelve pilot
areas - a total of 2,400 completed interviews in all . The survey of
employers was concentrated in traditionally low-paid sectors and was
structured to provide an adequate representation of large as well as small
establishments . Therefore, large employers (employing 200 or more
employees) were over-sampled, as were the following industrial sectors:
• distribution, hotels, restaurants and catering;
• other services (personal and social services, public and private);
• other manufacturing (including clothing and food).
B.1 .3 Response rate The selected establishments were released into the system randomly within
area . The target total of 200 interviews per area was achieved with a
high response rate of 78 per cent (upper bound) over all areas (Table
B.1) . Employers appeared to see the point of the enquiry and were
interested in the subject . A further incentive to employers was the offer
of a free copy of key findings from the survey .
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Table B .1 Analysis of response rate - employers survey
a.Non-completed contact
	
259
b.Refusals and quits
	
687
c. Invalid
	
1213
d. INTERVIEWED
	
2,400
= 78 per cent of contacted eligibles
= 72 per cent of (eligibles +not contacted)
Note: Invalid includes those establishments which had ceased trading since the time of sampling and those
addresses which failed the interview screener (le . not business addresses or sole trader enterprises)
B .2 The unemployed survey In general, an evaluation of a programme effect on unemployment is
B.2.1 Sampling best pursued with the aid of a flow sample . This is because a stock
sample, covering people ranging from very short to very long periods of
unemployment, tends to be heterogeneous . Those who have been
unemployed a long time not only have different characteristics from those
with shorter periods of unemployment, but may well be engaged in a
qualitatively different type of job search (for instance, one which faces a
high degree of employer discrimination) . In a stock sample of
unemployment, duration effects on outcomes are typically very large.
They are also hard to interpret since they proxy the effects ofboth observed
and unmeasured influences . These variations by duration may interact
with the effects of the programme, making it hard to identify the latter
except by use of a massively large sample . A flow sample, focusing upon
a relatively homogeneous job search process, increases the probability of
detecting programme effects for a given sample size.
What flow sample should be chosen? As ETU is intended to have an
impact particularly on long-term unemployment, it is reasonable to
exclude flows through relatively short claiming periods . Further, there is
a high exit rate from short periods, so if these were included there would
be relatively few left unemployed by the time of the first survey interview.
There are also practical arguments against sampling from the very long
term unemployed (VLTU) . The numbers available in any VLTU period
short enough to approximate a flow are small ; and the exit rate is extremely
low. It would therefore be difficult to obtain a large enough sample to
detect the impact of ETU in VLTU groups.
These considerations suggested that the most practical focus for the ETU
evaluation would be on middling periods of unemployment . Given this
general decision, the precise definition was arrived at on practical grounds,
namely:
i. What was the smallest band which would yield an adequate sample
size in all areas?, and
ii. Comparability with the unemployment statistics provided through the
National On-line Manpower Information System (NOMIS) .
On these grounds, the conclusion was to take the sample from those
with 26-65 weeks of unemployment at the point of sampling.
This duration-band constituted about 20-25 per cent of all claimant
unemployed in each of the twelve localities . However, because of the
different sizes and unemployment rates of the localities, different sampling
fractions had to be calculated for each, in order to equalise the sample
size across them.
An important difference from the employed sample (see next section)
has to be noted at this point . The employed sample was drawn by a
multi-stage procedure, which first of all selected within-locality spatial
clusters on a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) basis, and then selected
an equal number of individuals within each cluster . To simplify both
fieldwork, and comparability between the employed and unemployed
samples, the unemployed sample took the clusters defined for the employed
sample as given . It was therefore not a PPS sample . Accordingly, numbers
of individuals were drawn from each cluster in proportion to the numbers
unemployed there . The imposition of the employed clusters on the
unemployed sample creates some sample bias (likely to be small), which
can be corrected by weighting.
The usual sources for samples of (claimant) unemployed individuals are
either the National Unemployment Benefit System (NUBS), or the Joint
Unemployment and Vacancies Operating Statistics (JUVOS) . JUVOS
was not a possibility here, however, because it would not yield a sufficiently
large sample, and access to NUBS proved impossible in the time available.
The Department of Social Security decided to draw the sample from
their Departmental Central Index (DCI) . This uses a somewhat different
definition of claim duration from that used in NUBS/JUVOS, and
contains other types of claimants apart from the unemployed.
However, the difference in dates was not expected to be large, and it was
considered possible to draw the sample in such a way as to identify
unemployed claimants, including those on government training
programmes . PSI supplied the desired sampling numbers and structure,
and DSS proceeded with the sampling in May 1996.
B.2.2 Response rate The calculation of a response rate for the survey of the unemployed
sample is complicated by the fact that just over 10 per cent of the issued
sample could not be processed within the fieldwork period (it being
undesirable to extend that period beyond the introduction of ETU) . If
these were included in the response rate calculation, naturally that figure
would be considerably depressed . In the circumstances it seems reasonable
to set aside the unprocessed part of the sample in making the calculations.
We then arrive at the overall figures shown in Table B .2. The response
rate, calculated in the conventional way, was 64 per cent gross (including
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non-contacts in the denominator) and 81 per cent net (excluding non-
contacts) . The true underlying response rate will lie within this range;
non-contacts, if contacted, would have included many ineligible people
but may also have included an above-average proportion of refusals.
Table B.2 Analysis of response rate - Unemployed sample
a . Issued sample 7962
b. Processed sample 7109
c . Invalid address or moved/untraceable 1027
d . Unavailable (died, ill/hospitalised, away
throughout survey period) 142
e . Not contacted (minimum of 4 recalls) 646
f. Contacted (b-c-d-e) 5294
g . Ineligible for survey 2851
(54 per cent of contacts)
h . Contacted and eligible 2443
(46 per cent of contacts)
Refusals 452
(19 per cent of contacted eligibles)
INTERVIEWED 1991
= 81 per cent of contacted eligibles
= 64 per cent of (eligibles + not contacted)
B.3
	
The workers-in-work The aim was to sample the `within-range ' population, or the potential
survey customers of ETU . The sample was to comprise those who had jobs
B.3 .1 Sampling whose wages left them within range of a claim for ETU . That is, actually
within range or potentially so, typically if their normal hours were reduced,
bonus pay or overtime rates ceased, or a partner lost his or her job . The
task was simplified even further by forgoing the sophistication of sampling
in A and B areas according to the different ranges of incomes suggested
by the different qualifying rules for the A and B versions of the benefit.
The higher B benefit rules were used in all areas, which will provide a
sound basis for `grossing-up' in later analyses.
Thus, the target population was defined as single people earning less than
L140 a week and members of couples who themselves earned less than
L200 a week, while setting a similar ceiling on their partners ' earnings.
This potentially let into the sample some couples earning at least twice
their ETU threshold but, in practice, this was not a problem (see Chapter
Two).
The problem was that even in the pilot areas, chosen specifically as places
where ETU would do good business, the defined population of those
in-scope of the benefit was rare as a proportion of all households - certainly
fewer than five per cent . This is quite beyond the range of a cold-calling
doorstep sift by interviewers, at least in cost terms . Therefore, the feasible
choice lay between two methods:
B.3.2
	
Pilot work
Postal sift survey
The National Insurance Records
System (LAIRS) pilot
a postal sift of randomly selected addresses;
a sample frame that offered the chance to narrow the search on the
basis of known earnings.
Both methods were tested simultaneously, within the four non-pilot areas
Fylde, Liverpool, Fife and Leeds.
For this pilot, 10,000 households were selected from the postcode address
file, 2,500 in each area, and randomly divided into two . Half were sent
a postal questionnaire enquiring about household structure, work, income,
benefits and two attitudinal questions that might raise the interest profile
of the survey among respondents . The second half of the pilot postal
survey were sent the same questionnaire but their covering letter promised
them a payment of £10 should they be selected for interview as a result
of returning their form . The two postal surveys achieved final response
rates of just 40 and 44 per cent respectively 59 . Given the additional
attrition that follow-up surveys must accept, it was felt that a postal sift
method of sampling for the workers-in-work main stage survey could
not provide the accuracy needed.
The Contributions Agency computer contains over 60 million records,
each one unique to any British citizen or resident currently issued with a
National Insurance (NI) number. These include about eight million
who are dead but whose records still form the basis for insured benefits
paid to their spouses . Earnings are notified to each record. Those not
earning by reason of unemployment or childcare are awarded Credits
instead. On the basis of these records, entitlement to Unemployment
Benefit, Incapacity Benefit, and State Pensions are calculated.
The idea was that if these records could be interrogated and an estimate
of weekly earnings established, this could form the basis for a new sampling
frame of low paid workers.
Essentially, a computer specification was designed to find everyone with
a postcode among more than 500 designated as making up the twelve
ETU pilot areas, and sort them into postcode sectors that made up the
Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) . In each area, those who were under 18
and over 64, receiving Incapacity Benefit or, of course, dead, were
excluded. The remaining records were interrogated for their 1995 earnings
data and an estimate of weekly earnings made, allowing for Credits. Those
exceeding the earnings limits, as previously defined, were excluded . The
remaining total then formed a population that sampled PSUs proportionate
to their ` size ' , that is, the number of low earners : 22 PSUs were sampled
59 Postal surveys had proved highly successful as a method of sampling in the PSI ` Surveys
of Families with Children' (PRILIF), where response rates of more than 70 per cent
were achieved .
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in ETU pilot areas and 13 in control areas . The higher number in the
pilot areas compared with the control areas reflected the need to follow-
up enough who might actually go on to claim the benefit when it was
introduced . The aim was then to sample in each PSU sufficient numbers
to achieve 325 interviews in ETU pilot areas and 200 in control areas:
3,400 in total.
The sampling instructions that were devised to sample from the NIRS
files are reproduced in Appendix 3.
However, this system could not identify those with children, and a plan
to ` strain ' the sample through Child Benefit records - which at least
would eliminate the women with children - was abandoned under time
pressures . Nor could it identify those with high earning partners, nor
those working only part-time . Thus, interviewers would still have to
conduct a door-step sift, to remove those with children and high earning
partners from the main stage sample.
The whole method, from sampling NI records to screening on the
doorstep, was piloted by selecting 1,000 contributors in the four non-
pilot areas . Again, two methods were tried: half were approached directly
and half were sent a screening postcard to return asking about work and
children, to try to screen out parents . Disappointingly, fewer than half
these postcards were returned, which meant that NOP interviewers would
have to do the door step eliminations after all . On the other hand, those
approached directly yielded a sample of people who were predominately
still low paid workers . Eight out of ten earned less than £180 per week,
and only one in five had more than one earner . Also, surprisingly, few
had moved (about 13 per cent) . Against these encouragements, more
than a third had children and most of the second earners earned more
than the ceiling for eligibility . But the outcome remained a plausible
sample of low paid workers-in-work and a decision was made to use this
sampling framework for the main stage survey.
B.3.3 Response Rate The calculation of the response rate for the workers-in-work survey is
shown in Table B .3 . A total of 2,434 interviews were achieved,
representing a response rate of 79 per cent.
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Table I .3 Analysis of response rate - Workers-in-work
sample
Addresses issued 19,379 100%
Moved 13%
Dead *%
House empty I%
Useable addresses 16,553 86% = 100%
Away all day I%
Not available 4+ calls 4%
Not available <4 calls 3%
Refused 5%
Too ill *%
Others not screened 3%
Sample screened 13,871 80% = 100%
Not eligible (children, earnings too high etc .) 78%
Eligible 2,987 22% = 100%
Refused 14%
Not available 7%
INTERVIEWED 2,434 79%
B .4 The outcome of the field The aim was to interview 3,400 workers-in-work and 2,400 unemployed
surveys people. Subsequent loss to ineligibility was higher than hoped . In practice,
B.4
.1 Fieldwork it seems that it was not possible wholly to restrict the unemployed sample
to those who were claimant unemployed . This manifested itself partly at
the fieldwork stage, through a higher-than-expected proportion of the
issued sample being screened out because of the presence of one or more
dependent children. This suggests that the issued sample contained some
who were receiving Income Support as lone parents . In addition, the
achieved sample contained a sizeable proportion who described themselves
as being on one or another type of disability benefit . Some of these may
not have appeared in a NUBS sample, although others will be people
who have changed the basis of their benefit since being sampled . In
addition, larger than expected numbers of women with children or high
earning partners appeared among the sample of workers.
Eligible respondents were found at just 39 per cent of the unemployed
sample, or 46 per cent of the sample contacted and screened (60 per cent
was expected) and 18 per cent of the workers (25 per cent was expected).
In contrast, response rates among eligible people were high : 81 per cent
for the unemployed sample and 79 per cent for the workers-in-work
(see above).
These rates of loss reduced the overall numbers found and addresses held
in reserve were deployed to boost the achieved sample . Even so, the
unemployed sample fell short of its target of 2,400 to 2,000 and the
workers sample from 3,400 to 2,400 . Nor were these losses evenly
distributed throughout the twelve areas . Whereas the large towns and
conurbations all yielded samples close to the anticipated numbers of both
unemployed and workers-in-work, the rural areas and especially the
` seaside ' towns yielded sparse samples.
Figure B1 illustrates the number of achieved interviews in both the
workers-in-work survey and unemployed survey, by ETU pilot area.
There was an additional complication, but one that proved of considerable
interest. Ideally, all the unemployed people sampled would be interviewed
shortly before the introduction of the benefit and, on average, they would
be continuing their spell of unemployment . All of them would be actively
looking for work . Equally, all the workers sampled should be continuing
in their low-paid jobs right up to interview and through the introduction
of the benefit . They were of course nothing of the kind . The sample
was intended to be a flow sample and it was already flowing . Only 57
per cent of the unemployed sample were actively looking for work. The
rest were temporarily sick, long term sick or disabled, or, interestingly,
in work. Eighteen per cent had found jobs between being sampled in
April and being interviewed in July, August and September . Far from
being an inconvenient flaw in the sampling plan (though in a sense they
were, of course) they showed clearer than anything the current state of
entry-level jobs in these areas. They had accepted work and wages and
conditions considerably inferior even to the low paid workers-in-work
found in the other sample.
Figure B1 Survey fieldwork 1996 : respondents in unemployed
and workers-in-work samples
Survey fieldwork 1996 : respondents in
unemployed and workers in work samples
A
	
B
	
C
Unemployed sample q Workers in work sample
The second complication is the obverse of the first : only two thirds of
the workers-in-work sample were still in full time work (16 or more
hours a week) . Three quarters of them, though, were still in low paid
work. This is a considerable strength of the sample design . Whereas
many cross-section surveys of the working population will find many
low-paid workers who are only temporarily visiting the lower reaches of
the income distribution, selection on the basis of their 1994-95 earnings
record ensured that those found and interviewed in mid-1996 were those
persisting in low-paid work over a considerable period . They are really
typical of what should turn out to be the enduring customer base for
ETU.
The rest of the workers sample were working part time, retired, sick, in
education (though surprisingly few of them) but mostly unemployed
and looking for work . These, together with their corresponding movers
from the unemployed sample into work, provide a clear picture of the
churning that inevitably goes on in these lowest-paid sectors of the job
market. It is this process that we will observe more closely in the second
phase of interviewing when all those seen in this first phase will be
interviewed again.
A technical complication remains in that a satisfactory conclusion on
how to weight the workers sample has not yet been reached . Both the
employers sample (which over sampled some sectors and large firms) and
the unemployed sample have quite complex but conceptually
straightforward weighting systems . These take the estimates back to a
closer approximation of their parent populations of employers and
unemployed people that exist in the twelve ETU areas as a whole . Until
we have learned more of the way the NIRS system records income data
and how our sequential exclusions of, for example, Incapacity Benefit
recipients effect the definition of the original population, it is not possible
to devise a final scheme for weighting . A new paper of this topic will be
prepared. Meanwhile, the evidence presented in this report certainly
shows that we have found the kinds of people we were looking for, that
is, the population in scope of ETU - its potential customer base .
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T~ E NT9
SYSTEM (MRS) SIFT SAMPLE
i ll sL INSURANCE RECORDING
1.	Select all contributors with the advised postcodes.
2. Divide these into twelve separate files by the twelve consecutive
lists of postcodes called AREAS . Report numbers of contributors
in each file.
3. Note the total number of postcode ` sectors ' (ie the first part of the
postcode plus the first digit of the second part : eg 'NE7 7 ' , ' S73 8 ' ,
'SS7 1 ' and so on) assembled for each file . This is the ` number of
sectors' . Report numbers of contributors found in each postcode
sector.
4. Sort the records in each file by postcode order (SE1 8, SE1 9 and
so on . . .) and carry out the following operations separately on each
of the twelve files.
5.
	
Discard any known to be dead . Report numbers discarded.
6.
	
Discard all records younger than 18 and older than 63 years . Report
numbers discarded.
7.
	
Discard from those remaining all those currently registered for
Incapacity Benefit . Report numbers discarded.
8. Among the remainder and for each contribution record, subtract
from 52 the number of unemployed credits (or equivalent)
registered to their record during 1994/5 . Divide the result into
the total earnings recorded for the same period. (eg: £12,400/
(52-12) =£310 a week) This is the estimate of weekly earnings.
Report the frequency of estimated weekly earnings as `0', then in
£5 categories up to £180 a week, in £20 categories up to £360
a week, and in a single category for those earning more . Provide
categorical and cumulative frequencies, low to high.
9. Provide a table of the above earnings distribution separately for
men and women, for those aged 18-24, 25-45, and 46 and older,
for employed and self-employed, for those with unemployed credits
in 1994 and those with none, and for sex-within-age.
10. Discard from the file all those whose estimate of weekly earnings is
below £30 a week and above £180 a week . Report numbers
discarded .
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11. Sum the remaining cases and select a random number between 1
and this total . This is the `starting point'.
12. Divide the number of sectors by three . Divide the result (truncated
to nearest whole number below) into the number of records . This
is the ` sampling interval ' .
13. From the starting point (and including the starting point itself as a
selection) select the record that occurs at the sampling interval
successively through the file and back to the starting point . Note
the postcode sector of each selected record.
14. Within each postcode sector noted at (13) and only in those
postcode sectors, divide the total number of records by (n = the
constant number of contributors we want to approach in each
postcode sector, to follow) . Use the result as a sampling interval to
select n records.
15. Send all selected names and addresses in a suitable format to ASD(5).
16.
	
For each record selected, create a rectangular data matrix (cases by
variables) including the following:
NINO
Postcode
Age
Sex
Estimate of weekly number of unemployment credits recorded for
1994
Whether self-employed
Send these data to ASD(5) on a diskette.
Reminder : operations five through 16 are carried out separately
on each of the twelve areas defined on the list of postcodes.
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NEi PLC fl1EllT A AL!lES : SELECTED STATllTlCCAL RESULTS
The following statistical tables provide further detailed information relating
to the findings summarised in the text . Only final results are shown, all
intermediate output being omitted . For example, in sample selection
models, the model of the selector variable is suppressed, as are the OLS
starting values.
ETU
Unemployment analyses
Reference list of variables used in analyses
Note: Means of variables are shown in the analysis tables.
Label
ACTIV
AGER
AGESQ
ALEV
ANYVOC
CARER
CSELEV
DEBT
DEGREE
DISBEN
DRIVER
ETU
ETUA
ETUB
FCEXP
FEM
HISAV
HRSEXP
HWAGEXP
ILL
INACTIV
INTMO
INTMO2
Meaning
Seeking work now / in past 4 weeks
Age (continuous variable)
Age squared
Highest qualification is A-level
Has some vocational qualification
Has a caring responsibility
Highest qualification is CSE-level
Has problems over debt
Highest qualification is degree-level
Claiming some disability benefit
Holds current driving licence
Resident in an ` ETU' area
Resident in ETU `A' area
Resident in ETU `B' area
Has claimed or claims Family Credit
Female
Has savings of more than 5000
Hours of work sought (continuous)
Minimum hourly wage sought (continuous)
Has persistent illness or disability
Not seeking work now or in past 4 weeks
Month of interview (continuous)
Interviewed in August 1996
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Label
INTMO3
INVESTS
JOBAFTUE
LIVPAR
LNHWEXP
LNWWPAY
MARRIED
MODSAV
NACTS
NEMP
NJOBAPPS
OLEV
OTHINC
OUTLIER
PROF
PT
Q129
Q251B
RMORTS
ROOWNS
RPRENTS
RSRENTS
RURAL
RURAREA
SCHREC
SEASIDE
SEPDIV
SMTOWN
SPEARN
SPWK
SPNOTWK
TNCUEPC
TOTJOBPC
TOTSAV
TOTSICPC
Meaning
Interviewed after August 1996
Has some investments
In a job at the time of the interview
Lives in parents' home
Log of minimum hourly wage sought (continuous)
Log of current weekly pay (continuous)
Marital status is married
Has savings >500 and <5001
Number of events in work history
Number of others employed in household
No . of job applications: 0 = none, 1 = 1-5, 2= 6
or more.
Highest qualification is 0-level
Amount of `other' income (continuous)
Outlying values on this case (used for screening
the data)
Has a nursing or other professional qual.
Works 16-plus hours per week
How well managing financially (contin ., high value
indicates managing badly)
How frequently meets friends (contin ., high value
means infrequent contacts)
Owns housing on mortgage
Owns housing outright
Rents housing privately
Rents housing in social sector
Area classified as rural in ETU scheme
Location rural acc . to interviewer
Has taken part in government scheme for unemployed
people
Area classifed as seaside in ETU scheme
Marital status separated, divorced or widowed
Location small town acc . to interviewer
Spouse ' s weekly earnings (continuous)
Married, spouse in work
Married, spouse not in work
non-claimant unemployed in work history
% employed in work history
Total savings amount (continuous)
% long-term sick in work history
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Label
TOTUEPC
URBLGE
URBSML
WORRY
WWAGEXP
Meaning
claimant unemployed in work history
Location large town acc . to interviewer
Location small town acc . to interviewer
Is worried about finances
Minimum weekly wage sought (continuous)
industry and occupation dummies:
MNFG
CONSTR
DISTRIB
HOTCAT
TRACOM
BUSSERV
PUBADM
EDUCN
HEALTH
NOSIC
CLER
CRAFT
PERSPROT
SALES
MCOPS
OTHLOW
Manufacturing
Construction
Distribution
Hotels, catering
Transport and communications
Financial and business services
Public administration
Education
Health and welfare services
No SIC stated
Clerical
Craft
Personal and protective services
Sales assistants
Machine operatives
Other (low-skilled)
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ETU
Unemployment Analyses
1 Weekly earnings : pooled unemployed and employed samples.
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the log of weekly pay. (ii) The
method is two-stage sample selection, with selection on whether in work
at the time of interview . (iii) Employed given weight of 2 to 1 relative
to unemployed.
(a) Overleaf: results for WOMEN excluding variable PT
Sample Selection Model
Two stage least squares regression Weighting variable = QAII
Dependent variable is LNWPAY Mean = 4 .48366, S .D . = 0 .4236
Model size :Observations = 1010, Parameters = 41, Deg .Fr . = 969
Residuals : Sum of squares = 143 .168
	
Std .Dev. = 0 .38438
Fit :
	
R-squared = 0 .17584,
	
Adjusted R-squared = 0 .14182
Note: Not using OLS . R-squared is not bounded in [0,1]
Model test : F[ 40, 969] = 5 .17, Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic : Log-L = -446 .5146, Restricted(13=0) Log-L = -565 .1048
	
Amemiya Pr. Crt .= 0 .154,
	
Akaike Info . Crt .= 0.965
Standard error corrected for selection	 0 .38631
Correlation of disturbance in regression
and Selection Criterion (Rho)	 -0 .15200
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 4 .2488 0 .19579 21 .701 0 .00000
AGER 0 .62884E-02 0 .84772E-02 0 .742 0 .45821 0 .6846E+05
AGESQ -0 .14819E-03 0 .10144E-03 -1 .461 0 .14405 0 .3094E+07
NEMP -0 .14993E-01 0
.20063E-0I -0 .747 0 .45488 1303.
ILL 0 .30240E-01 0 .37093E-0I 0 .815 0 .41493 490 .2
CARER -0 .69840E-01 0
.39272E-01 -1 .778 0 .07534 145 .1
NACTS -0 .12768E-01 0 .11893E-01 -1 .074 0 .28301 199 .4
JOBDURI -0 .10283E-03 0.16799E-03 -0 .612 0 .54044 4580.
TOTJOBPC 0.18784E-02 0.66466E-03 2 .826 0 .00471 589 .9
JOBAFTUE -0 .28765 0.60053E-0 I -4 .790 0 .00000 815 .0
ANYVOC -0 .17465E-02 0.29783E-0 I -0 .059 0 .95324 70 .30
DRIVER 0.17423E-01 0.25759E-01 0 .676 0 .49881 228 .5
SPWK 0.51199E-01 0.55170E-01 0 .928 0 .35340 52.17
SPNOTWK 0.60605E-0I 0 .52351E-01 1 .158 0 .24700 0 .2921E+05
SEPDIV -0.40795E-0 I 0 .54725E-0 I -0 .745 0 .45600 0 .1323E+05
RRENTS -0.14429E-01 0 .37130E-01 -0 .389 0 .69757 455 .2
LIVPAR 0.49194E-0 I 0 .45090E-01 1 .09 I 0 .27526 370 .3
RURAL -0.16106E-02 0 .31355E-01 -0 .051 0 .95903 372.3
SMTOWN -0.33 124E-0I 0 .29784E-0 I -1 .1
	
12 0.26608 373 .3
MNFG 0.12655 0 .68011E-01 1 .861 0.06279 1
	
18.2
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bIs.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
CONSTR 0.18660 0 .13310 1 .402 0.16092 558 .0
DISTRIB 0.11046 0 .67004E-0 I 1 .649 0.09925 424 .2
HOTCAT 0.45461 E-0I 0 .64845E-01 0 .701 0.48326 556 .1
TRACOM 0.11321 0 .9561 I E-0I I .184 0.23638 179 .0
BUSSERV 0.14001 0 .74854E-01 1 .870 0.06143 617 .1
PUBADM 0.14355 0 .80383E-01 1 .786 0.07412 618 .0
EDUCN 0.12730 0 .68928E-01 1 .847 0.06477 0 .1257E+05
HEALTH 0.18427 0 .59710E-01 3 .086 0.00203 0.2115
NOSIC 0.98695E-01 0 .96799E-01 1 .020 0.30792 0 .2333E-01
CLER 0.35829E-01 0 .52238E-0 I 0 .686 0.49278 0.2053
CRAFT 0.14609 0 .77571 E-01 1 .883 0.05967 0,4303E-0 I
PERSPROT
-0.34185E-01 0 .51181E-01 -0 .668 0.50419 0.2317
SALES -0.14838 0 .60746E-0 I -2 .443 0.01458 0 .1591
MCOPS 0.11617 0 .65149E-0I 1 .783 0.07456 0 .1011
OTHLOW -0.18526 0 .53036E-0 I -3 .493 0.00048 0 .1649
NOSOC 0 .13804 0 .11924 1 .158 0.24700 0.1244E-01
FCEXP 0.85490E-01 0 .42286E-01 2 .022 0.04320 0 .1115
ETUA 0 .13355E-01 0 .31468E-01 0 .424 0.67128 0 .3603
ETUB -0.28646E-01 0 .32774E-0I -0 .874 0.38209 0 .3541
INTMO 0.74695E-02 0 .14462E-01 0 .516 0.60552 7 .027
LAMBDA -0.58719E-01 0 .93261 E-0I -0 .630 0.52894 0 .4292
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ETU
Unemployment Analyses
1 Weekly earnings : pooled unemployed and employed samples.
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is the log of weekly pay . (ii) The
method is two-stage sample selection, with selection on whether in work
at the time of interview . (iii) Employed given weight of 2 to 1 relative
to unemployed.
(b) Overleaf: results for WOMEN including variable PT
Sample Selection Model
Two stage least squares regression Weighting variable = QAII
Dependent variable is LNWPAY Mean = 4 .48366, S .D . = 0 .4236
Model size :Observations = 1010, Parameters = 42, Deg.Fr. = 968
Residuals : Sum of squares = 111 .286
	
Std .Dev. = 0.33906
Fit:
	
R-squared = 0.35871,
	
Adjusted R-squared = 0 .33155
Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,11
Model test: F[ 41, 968] = 13.21, Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic : Log-L = -319 .2968, Restricted(B=0) Log-L = -565 .1048
	
Amemiya Pr . Crt .= 0.120,
	
Akaike Info . Crt .= 0.715
Standard error corrected for selection	 0 .33921
Correlation of disturbance in regression
and Selection Criterion (Rho)	 0 .44537E-01
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 4 .4870 0 .17290 25 .951 0 .00000
PT -0 .65605 0 .38656E-0 I - 16 .972 0 .00000 0 .6842E+05
AGER 0 .48950E-02 0 .74612E-02 0 .656 0 .51179 0 .3092E+07
AGESQ -0 .1 1107E-03 0 .89305E-04 -1 .244 0 .21361 3105.
NEMP -0 .75691 E-02 0 .17665E-0I -0 .428 0 .66830 490 .9
ILL -0 .86247E-02 032726E-0I -0 .264 0 .79213 145 .2
CARER -0 .35702E-0 I 0 .34605E-0 I -1 .032 0 .30221 197 .1
NACTS -0 .92979E-02 0 .10480E-0I -0.887 0 .37498 4582.
JOBDURI -0 .60238E-04 0 .14823E-03 -0.406 0 .68447 503 .0
TOTJOBPC 0 .11304E-02 0 .58823E-03 1 .922 0 .05464 901 .9
JOBAFTUE -0 .14659 0 .53664E-0 I -2.732 0 .00630 70.05
ANYVOC 0 .11386E-01 0 .26217E-01 0.434 0 .66408 228 .3
DRIVER 0.20803E-01 0 .22665E-0 I 0.918 0 .35870 52.51
SPWK 0.33349E-01 0 .48584E-01 0.686 0 .49245 0 .2921 E+05
SPNOTWK 0.26525E-01 0 .46129E-01 0.575 0 .56528 0 .1323E+05
SEPDIV -0 .46942E-01 0 .48178E-0I -0.974 0 .32989 455 .2
RRENTS -0 .24903E-01 0 .32683E-0I -0.762 0 .44607 370.2
LIVPAR 0.85565E-02 0 .39751 E-0I 0.215 0 .82957 372.3
RURAL 0.40696E-02 0 .27587E-01 0.148 0 .88272 373 .3
SMTOWN
-0 .22486E-01 0 .26213E-0I -0.858 0 .39098 118 .3
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
MNFG 0.35678E-01 0 .60229E-01 0 .592 0.55360 558 .2
CONSTR 0.10175 0 .11754 0 .866 0.38666 424.0
DISTRIB 0.35435E-01 0 .59264E-0I 0 .598 0.54989 556.2
HOTCAT 0.14386E-01 0 .57228E-0 I 0 .251 0.80152 179 .1
TRACOM 0.89664E-01 0 .84333E-01 .063 0.28768 617.0
BUSSERV 0.97474E-01 0 .66075E-0I .475 0.14016 618 .1
PUBADM 0.47983E-01 0 .71132E-01 0 .675 0.49996 0.1257E+05
EDUCN 0.11800 0 .60796E-01 .941 0.05227 0 .7932E-01
HEALTH 0.12462 0 .52783E-01 2 .361 0.01823 0 .2115
NOSIC 0.15547E-01 0 .85507E-01 0 .182 0 .85572 0 .2333E-01
CLER -0.51194E-01 0 .46361E-0I -1 .104 0 .26948 0 .2053
CRAFT 0.76402E-0I 0 .68541 E-O I I .115 0 .26498 0 .4303E-0I
PERSPROT -0.98363E-01 0 .45304E-0I -2 .171 0 .02992 0 .2317
SALES
-0.16283 0 .53585E-01 -3 .039 0 .00238 0 .1591
MCOPS 0 .46680E-01 0 .57604E-01 0 .810 0,41773 0 .1011
OTH LOW
-0.16609 0 .46794E-0I -3 .549 0 .00039 0 .1649
NOSOC 0 .15531 0 .10516 1 .477 0 .13972 0 .1244E-01
FCEXP 0
.63166E-01 0 .37227E-01 1 .697 0 .08974 0 .1115
ETUA 0 .72712E-02 0 .27687E-01 0 .263 0 .79284 0 .3603
STUB
-0.35571E-01 0 .28839E-01 -1 .233 0 .21743 0 .3541
INTMO 0 .12425E-02 0 .12735E-01 0 .098 0 .92228 7 .027
LAMBDA 0 .15107E-01 0 .82340E-01 0 .183 0 .85442 0 .4292
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ETU
Unemployment Analyses
1 Weekly earnings : pooled unemployed and employed samples.
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is the log of weekly pay. (ii) The
method is two-stage sample selection, with selection on whether in work
at the time of interview . (iii) Employed given weight of 2 to 1 relative
to unemployed.
(c) Overleaf results for MEN excluding variable PT
Sample Selection Model
Two stage least squares regression Weighting variable = QAII
Dependent variable is LNWPAY Mean = 4 .65100, S .D . = 0 .3969
Model size :Observations = 604, Parameters = 41, Deg.Fr. = 566
Residuals : Sum of squares = 75 .2742
	
Std .Dev. = 0.36468
Fit :
	
R-squared = 0.15415,
	
Adjusted R-squared = 0 .09438
Note: Not using OLS . R-squared is not bounded in [0,1]
Model test: F[ 40, 566] = 2.58, Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic : Log-L = -227.7724, Restricted(B=0) Log-L = -299 .8084
Amemiya Pr. Crt .= 0 .142,
	
Akaike Info . Crt .= 0 .886
Standard error corrected for selection	 0 .36494
Correlation of disturbance in regression
and Selection Criterion (Rho)
	 -0.47455E-01
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e. P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 4 .0374 0.25943 15 .562 0.00000
AGER 0 .31549E-01 0.10820E-01 2 .916 0.00355 0.7562E+05
AGESQ -0 .40577E-03 0.13723E-03
-2 .957 0.00311 0.3182E+07
NEMP 0 .13969E-01 0.22520E-01 0 .620 0 .53506 1466.
ILL -0 .23003E-0 I 0.39250E-0 I
-0 .586 0 .55784 620 .2
CARER 0 .19444E-01 0 .72744E-0 I 0 .267 0 .78924 204 .1
NACTS -0 .11785E-01 0 .91985E-02
-1,281 0 .20012 156 .2
JOBDURI 0 .61424E-03 0 .23390E-03 2.626 0 .00864 7040.
TOTJOBPC
-0 .21410E-03 0 .64725E-03 -0.331 0
.74080 829 .2
JOBAFTUE -0 .10875 0
.53495E-01 -2.033 0 .04205 1250.
ANYVOC 0 .83473E-01 0 .32930E-01 2.535 0 .01125 63 .38
DRIVER 0 .61159E-02 0
.40933E-01 0.149 0 .88123 218 .7
SPWK 0
.73168E-01 0 .69778E-01 1 .049 0.29437 56.19
SPNOTWK -0 .39423E-01 0 .64317E-01
-0.613 0.53991 0 .1655E+05
SEPDIV
-0 .14700 0 .85646E-01 -1 .716 0.08609 0.1763E+05
RRENTS 0.44073E-01 0.50069E-01 0 .880 0.37873 460.2
LIVPAR -0.73135E-02 0.53912E-01 -0 .136 0.89209 231 .5
RURAL -0.79251E-01 0.40564E-01 -1 .954 0.05073 293 .3
SMTOWN -0.25395E-01 0
.37520E-01 -0 .677 0.49850 338 .3
MNFG 0.21110 0.76493E-01 2 .760 0.00579 162.2
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
CONSTR 0.16605 0 .96097E-0 I 1 .728 0.08400 1003.
DISTRIB 0.14235 0 .76541 E-0I I .860 0.06292 483 .2
HOTCAT 0.33021 E-0I 0 .83499E-01 0 .395 0.69250 684.1
TRACOM 0.24162 0 .87191E-01 2 .771 0.00559 167.1
BUSSERV 0.36777E-0 I 0 .84781 E-0I 0 .434 0.66444 679 .1
PUBADM 0
.18034 0 .10120 1 .782 0.07475 727.0
EDUCN -0.13266E-01 0 .15112 -0 .088 0.93004 0.1592E+05
HEALTH -0.16675E-02 0 .94518E-01
-0 .018 0.98592 0.5448E-0 I
NOSIC 0 .18179 0 .15985 1 .137 0.25542 0.1108E-01
CLER -0.54812E-01 0 .70157E-0I
-0 .781 0.43464 0 .1717
CRAFT 0 .35542E-01 0 .73115E-01 0 .486 0 .62689 0 .1496
PERSPROT -0.88088E-04 0 .73377E-0 I -0 .001 0 .99904 0 .1404
SALES -0
.22401 0 .79280E-0 I -2 .826 0 .00472 0.9418E-01
MCOPS -0 .42462E-01 0 .70954E-0 I -0 .598 0 .54954 0 .1958
OTH LOW -0 .51951 E-0I 0,72828E-01 -0 .713 0 .47563 0 .1634
NOSOC 0 .90132E-01 0 .14021 0 .643 0 .52033 0 .1477E-0I
FCEXP -0 .16799E-01 0 .56884E-0 I -0 .295 0 .76775 0 .1090
ETUA 0 .11788E-01 0 .42205E-01 0 .279 0 .78002 0 .3361
ETUB 0
.41256E-02 0 .40559E-01 0 .102 0 .91898 0 .4007
INTMO 0 .67610E-02 0 .16869E-01 0 .401 0 .68857 7 .228
LAMBDA -0 .17318E-01 0
.92372E-01 -0 .187 0 .85128 0 .8292
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ETU
Unemployment Analyses
1 Weekly earnings : pooled unemployed and employed samples.
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is the log of weekly pay . (ii) The
method is two-stage sample selection, with selection on whether in work
at the time of interview . (iii) Employed given weight of 2 to 1 relative
to unemployed.
(d) Overleaf: results for MEN including variable PT
Sample Selection Model
Two stage least squares regression Weighting variable = QAII
Dependent variable is LNWPAY Mean = 4 .65100, S .D . = 0 .3969
Model size :Observations = 607, Parameters = 41, Deg.Fr. = 565
Residuals : Sum of squares = 45 .7968
	
Std.Dev. = 0.29388
Fit :
	
R-squared = 0.45071,
	
Adjusted R-squared = 0 .41085
Note : Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in 10,1]
Model test : F] 41, 565] = 11 .31, Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic : Log-L = -96 .2135, Restricted(B=0) Log-L = -299 .8084
	
Amemiya Pr. Crt .= 0.142,
	
Akaike Info . Crt .= 0.455
Standard error corrected for selection	 0 .29509
Correlation of disturbance in regression
and Selection Criterion (Rho)	 0 .11509
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 4
.2205 0 .20952 20 .144 0.00000
PT -1 .0647 0 .58800E-01 - 18 .108 0.00000 0 .7559E+05
AGER 0.25508E-01 0 .87352E-02 2 .920 0.00350 0 .3180E+07
AGESQ -0.33815E-03 0 .11077E-03 -3 .053 0.00227 2813.
NEMP 0.28574E-01 0 .18193E-01 1 .571 0.11627 621 .0
ILL -0.60600E-01 0 .31741E-0I -1 .909 0.05624 204 .2
CARER 0.21 170E-0 I 0 .58680E-01 0 .361 0.71827 153 .1
NACTS
-0.87584E-02 0 .74224E-02 -1 .180 0.23800 7044.
JOBDURI 0.47295E-03 0 .18857E-03 2 .508 0.01214 752 .7
TOTJOBPC 0.24604E-03 0 .52218E-03 0 .471 0.63751 1325.
JOBAFTUE 0.16306E-01 0 .43643E-01 0 .374 0.70868 63 .12
ANYVOC 0.70171 E-0I 0 .26584E-01 2 .640 0
.00830 218 .4
DRIVER -0.50900E-02 0 .33029E-0I -0 .154 0 .87753 56 .69
SPWK 0.79293E-01 0 .56280E-01 1 .409 0 .15887 0 .1655E+05
SPNOTWK -0.27899E-01 0 .51891 E-0I -0 .538 0 .59082 0 .1763E+05
SEPDIV -0.11043 0 .69108E-01 -1 .598 0 .11005 460 .1
RRENTS -0.47445E-02 0 .40498E-0 I -0 .117 0 .90674 231 .2
LIVPAR -0.33060E-0 I 0 .43521 E-0I -0 .760 0 .44747 293,5
RURAL -0.58566E-01 0 .32755E-01 -1 .788 0 .07377 338.3
SMTOWN -0.20253E-01 0 .30279E-0 I -0 .669 0 .50358 162 .3
182,
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s.e. P[ Z z] Mean of X
MNFG 0.96760E-01 0 .61957E-01 1 .562 0 .11835 1003.
CONSTR 0.64746E-01 0 .77640E-01 0 .834 0 .40433 483 .1
DISTRIB 0.81994E-01 0 .61764E-01 1 .328 0 .18433 684.2
HOTCAT -0 .22973E-0 I 0 .67352E-0 I -0 .341 0 .73303 167.1
TRACOM 0.14163 0 .70475E-01 2 .010 0 .04446 679.1
BUSSERV 0.71794E-01 0 .68342E-0 I 1 .05 I 0 .29348 727 .1
PUBADM 0.10424 0 .81659E-01 1 .277 0 .20176 0.1592E+05
EDUCN 0
.43278E-01 0.12179 0 .355 0 .72232 0.1293E-01
HEALTH 0.13783E-01 0.76161E-01 0 .181 0 .85639 0.5448E-0I
NOSIC 0.37193E-01 0.12905 0 .288 0 .77319 0.1108E-01
CLER -0 .11505E-01 0.56588E-0I -0.203 0 .83890 0 .1717
CRAFT 0.67392E-01 0.58946E-01 1 .143 0 .25292 0 .1496
PERSPROT 0.45444E-01 0.59184E-01 0 .768 0 .44257 0 .1404
SALES -0 .47584E-0 I 0.64623E-01 -0.736 0 .46153 0.9418E-01
MCOPS 0.39343E-02 0.57236E-01 0 .069 0 .94520 0.1958
OTH LOW -0 .10020E-01 0.58732E-01 -0 .171 0 .86453 0.1634
NOSOC 0 .84128E-01 0.11298 0 .745 0 .45650 0.1477E-01
FCEXP -0 .42628E-01 0.45932E-0 I -0.928 0 .35336 0.1090
ETUA 0 .27822E-01 0.34064E-01 0 .817 0 .41407 0.3361
ETUB 0 .16196E-01 0.32735E-01 0 .495 0 .62076 0.4007
INTMO -0 .6751 I E-02 0.13633E-01 -0 .495 0 .62046 7 .228
LAMBDA 0 .33961 E-01 0.74562E-01 0 .455 0 .64877 0.8292
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2 Analyses of Economic Activity
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is employed,
or seeking work at the time of the interview or in the previous 4 weeks.
(ii) The method is probit analysis.
(a) Overleaf: Analysis for male and female combined
Binomial Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable ACTIV
Number of observations 1942
Iterations completed 5
Log likelihood function
-789.5835
Restricted log likelihood
-1127 .340
Chi-squared 675 .5132
Degrees of freedom 28
Significance level 0 .0000000
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 1 .2899 0.20257 6 .368 0 .00000
FEM -0 .34531 0.81262E-01 -4 .249 0
.00002 0 .2992
AGER
-0 .10246E-0 I 0.37737E-02 -2 .715 0 .00662 37 .35
NEMP -0 .25105E-01 0.51351E-01 -0 .489 0 .62491 0 .5772
Q251 B -0.41688E-01 0.15917E-01 -2 .619 0 .00882 2 .641
ILL -0.81528 0.77840E-0 I - 10 .474 0 .00000 0.3527
CARER -0.15036 0 .11969 -1 .256 0 .20900 0 .8445E-0 I
NACTS 0.89266E-01 0 .21586E-01 4 .135 0 .00004 3
.230
TOTUEPC 0.79635E-03 0 .11407E-02 0 .698 0 .48509 34 .85
TNCUEPC 0.18693E-02 0 .22304E-02 0.838 0 .40198 4.519
TOTSICPC -0.21392E-01 0 .23548E-02
-9 .084 0 .00000 7.923
DEGREE 0.31617 0 .18650 1 .695 0 .09002 0.5407E-0 I
ALEV -0.16729 0 .15326
-1 .092 0 .27505 0.6282E-0 I
OLEV 0.16522 0 .11092 1 .490 0 .13635 0.1771
CSELEV 0.86114E-01 0 .12240 0 .704 0.48170 0.1498
PROF -0
.27340 0 .15759 -1 .735 0.08276 0.5767E-0 I
ANYVOC 0 .12020 0 .81347E-01 1 .478 0
.13953 0 .3383
DRIVER 0 .1731
	
1 0 .81674E-01 2 .120 0.03404 0 .5180
SPWK 0 .38984 0.21616 1 .803 0.07131 0
.4325E-01
SPNOTWK 0 .40459E-0 I 0.10485 0 .386 0 .69958 0 .2322
TOTSAV 0 .24792E-04 0.19635E-04 1 .263 0 .20672 443 .3
OTHINC -0 .24971 E-02 0.10248E-02 -2 .437 0 .01483 5 .445
ROOWNS -0 .19229E-01 0.15254 -0 .126 0 .89968 0 .1004
RM ORTS 0 .16311 0 .13696 1 .191 0 .23367 0 .1437
RSRENTS 0 .15193 0 .11748 1 .293 0 .19594 0 .2085
RPRENTS 0 .10404 0 .13784 0 .755 0 .45037 0 .9526E-0 I
ETU 0
.56038E-02 0 .76475E-0I 0 .073 0 .94159 0 .6473
INTMO2 -0 .49398E-01 0 .87044E-01 -0 .568 0 .57037 0 .5026
INTMO3
-0 .85185E-01 0 .10308 -0 .826 0 .40858 0 .2266
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2 Analyses of Economic Activity
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is
employed, or seeking work at the time of the interview or in
the previous 4 weeks . (ii) The method is probit analysis .
(b) Overleaf: Analysis for female only.
Binomial Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable ACTIV
Number of observations 581
Iterations completed 6
Log likelihood function -265 .2072
Restricted log likelihood -381 .2399
Chi-squared 232 .0654
Degrees of freedom 27
Significance level 0 .0000000
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 1 .1971 0 .36717 3 .260 0 .00111
AGER -0.12572E-0I 0 .62504E-02 -2 .011 0 .04428 38 .28
NEMP -0.74220E-02 0 .95988E-01 -0.077 0 .93837 0,5284
Q25 I B -0.2153 I E-0 I 0 .27452E-0I -0 .784 0 .43284 2.935
ILL -0.74287 0 .13809 -5 .380 0 .00000 0.4062
CARER
-0.19225 0 .20070 -0 .958 0 .3381 1 0.9811E-01
NACTS 0.63286E-01 0 .38534E-01 1 .642 0 .10051 3 .007
TOTUEPC
-0 .14638E-02 0 .20415E-02 -0 .717 0 .47338 27.22
TNCUEPC 0 .64529E-03 0 .40580E-02 0 .159 0 .87365 3 .999
TOTSICPC -0 .24051 E-01 0 .50853E-02 -4 .729 0 .00000 9 .149
DEGREE 0 .25622E-01 0 .29256 0 .088 0 .93021 0 .6885E-01
ALEV -0 .13392 0 .26553 -0 .504 0 .61401 0 .7745E-0I
OLEV -0 .13879E-01 0 .19518 -0 .071 0 .94331 0.2014
CSELEV 0 .84913E-01 0 .23092 0 .368 0 .71309 0 .1343
PROF
-0 .18742 0 .26433 -0 .709 0 .47830 0 .6368E-01
ANYVOC 0 .18753 0 .15310 1 .225 0 .22062 0 .2995
DRIVER 0 .23946 0 .14784 1 .620 0 .10530 0 .4045
SPWK 0 .66185 0 .40996 1 .614 0 .10643 0 .3442E-0 I
SPNOTWK 0 .24005 0 .18202 1 .319 0 .18722 0 .1893
TOTSAV 0 .12206E-03 0 .82982E-04 1 .471 0 .14131 314,9
OTHINC
-0 .67659E-02 0 .30698E-02 -2 .204 0 .02753 4 .229
ROOWNS -0 .14399 0 .27315 -0 .527 0 .59810 0 .9639E-01
RMORTS -0 .20052 0 .24237 -0 .827 0 .40806 0 .1652
RSRENTS -0 .25993 0 .20132 -1 .291 0 .19666 0 .2651
RPRENTS -0 .84599E-0 I 0.22500 -0 .376 0 .70692 0 .1205
ETU -0 .73394E-01 0.14096 -0 .521 0 .60259 0 .6867
INTMO2 0 .12979 0.15221 0 .853 0 .39382 0 .5318
INTMO3 -0 .57349E-02 0.18789 -0 .031 0 .97565 0 .2014
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2 Analyses of Economic Activity
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is employed,
or seeking work at the time of the interview or in the previous 4 weeks.
(ii) The method is probit analysis.
(c) Overleaf: Analysis for only.
Binomial Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable ACTIV
Number of observations 1361
Iterations completed 5
Log likelihood function
-510.3569
Restricted log likelihood
-726 .5932
Chi-squared 432 .4727
Degrees of freedom 27
Significance level 0 .0000000
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 1
.1536 0.24638 4.682 0.00000
AGER -0.82778E-02 0.50149E-02 -1
.651 0.09881 36 .95
NEMP
-0.29428E-01 0.62017E-01 -0.475 0.63514 0.5981
Q25 I B -0.50392E-01 0.20031E-01 -2 .516 0.01188 2.515
ILL -0.87886 0 .97685E-01 -8 .997 0.00000 0.3299
CARER -0.13167 0 .15326 -0 .859 0 .39026 0 .7862E-01
NACTS 0.10306 0 .26770E-01 3 .850 0 .00012 3 .325
TOTUEPC 0.18508E-02 0 .14207E-02 1 .303 0 .19268 38.10
TNCUEPC 0.30316E-02 0 .27369E-02 1 .108 0 .26799 4.741
TOTSICPC -0.19949E-01 0 .27290E-02 -7 .310 0 .00000 7.400
DEGREE 0 .45342 0 .25862 1 .753 0 .07956 0 .4776E-01
ALEV -0.26378 0 .19379 -1 .361 0 .17346 0 .5658E-01
OLEV 0 .21295 0 .14048 1
.516 0 .12955 0.1668
CSELEV 0 .57193E-01 0 .14688 0 .389 0 .69698 0 .1565
PROF -0 .38498 0 .20134 -1
.912 0 .05586 0 .5511E-01
ANYVOC 0 .12862 0 .99107E-01 1 .298 0 .19437 0 .3549
DRIVER 0 .14947 0 .10152 1 .472 0 .14094 0 .5665
SPWK 0 .12381 0.26382 0.469 0 .63887 0.4702E-0 I
SPNOTWK -0 .15095 0.13909 -1 .085 0.27782 0 .2506
TOTSAV 0 .84644E-05 0
.20823E-04 0 .406 0.68439 498 .1
OTHINC
-0 .10571 E-02 0.12216E-02 -0 .865 0.38687 5 .965
ROOWNS 0 .98146E-01 0.19024 0 .516 0.60591 0 .1021
RMORTS 0 .37552 0.17375 2 .161 0.03068 0.1345
RSRENTS 0 .41871 0 .15414 2 .716 0 .00660 0.1844
RPRENTS 0 .21378 0 .18154 1 .178 0 .23898 0 .8450E-01
ETU 0 .45582E-01 0 .93178E-01 0 .489 0 .62471 0.6304
INTMO2 -0 .96617E-01 0 .10926 -0 .884 0 .37652 0.4901
INTMO3 -0 .11797 0 .12600 -0 .936 0 .34914 0.2373
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3 Analysis of Entry to Job after Unemployment
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is employed
(including less than 16 hours or self-employment) at the time of the
interview. (ii) The analysis is a bivariate probit sample selection model,
with selection on economic activity (see also analysis 2) . The method is
full-information maximum likelihood . (iii) Only the results relating to
job entry are shown in detail.
(a) Overleaf: results for men and women combined.
PIML Estimates of Bivariate Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable JOB/ACT
Number of observations 1942
Iterations completed 35
Log likelihood function -1421 .761
Selection model based on ACTIV
Means for vars . 1- 33 are after selection .
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant -1 .7139 0 .23925 -7.164 0 .00000
FEM 0 .30647 0 .96118E-01 3 .188 0 .00143 0 .2593
AGER -0 .15727E-0I 0 .51951 E-02 -3 .027 0 .00247 35 .02
Q25IB -0.40735E-0I 0 .20543E-0I -1 .983 0 .04737 2 .386
NEMP 0 .15135 0 .48563E-01 3 .117 0 .00183 0 .6430
ILL -0.19027 0 .11371 -1 .673 0 .09426 0 .2256
CARER 0.19229 0 .16066 1 .197 0.23135 0.6887E-0 I
NACTS 0.94227E-0 I 0 .20813E-0 I 4 .527 0.00001 3 .518
TOT)OBPC 0.12831 E-0I 0 .12272E-02 10 .455 0.00000 36 .31
DEGREE 0.13978 0 .18902 0 .739 0.45961 0.6395E-01
ALEV 0 .36275 0 .16423 2 .209 0.02719 0.6535E-01
OLEV -0 .15307E-01 0 .11498 -0 .133 0.89410 0 .2003
CSELEV 0 .15057 0 .11786 1 .278 0.20141 0.1722
PROF -0 .51271 0 .19164 -2 .675 0.00746 0.5762E-0I
ANYVOC -0 .27654E-0 I 0 .86438E-0 I -0 .320 0.74902 0.3732
DRIVER 0 .24329 0 .91431E-01 2 .661 0.00779 0.5418
SCHREC -0 .28684 0.10186 -2 .816 0 .00486 0.2614
MARRIED 0 .17198 0.13955 1 .232 0 .21779 0.2579
SEPDIV -0 .12312 0.15413 -0 .799 0 .42438 0.1398
HISAV 0 .42661 0.27285 1 .564 0 .11792 0 .2389E-01
MODSAV 0 .94040E-01 0.14267 0 .659 0 .50981 0 .7660E-01
OTHINC -0 .36175E-02 0.24788E-02 -1 .459 0 .14446 4.416
ROOWNS 0 .12704 0 .18496 0.687 0 .49220 0 .9276E-0 I
RMORTS 0 .50064E-0I 0 .15190 0.330 0 .74172 0 .1405
RSRENTS 0 .16343 0 .13832 1 .181 0 .23741 0 .1651
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
RPRENTS
-0 .40953 0.18346 -2 .232 0 .02560 0.9979E-0I
URBSML 0 .20222 0 .99558E-01 2 .031 0 .04224 0 .2944
RURAREA 0.12806 0 .11624 1 .102 0
.27060 0 .1841
SEASIDE -0 .10050 0 .11332
-0.887 0 .37514 0 .2340
ETUA 0.16652 0 .96777E-01 1 .721 0 .08531 0.3268
STUB 0.14285 0 .99485E-01 1
.436 0.15103 0.3162
INTMO2 0
.88198E-01 099421E-01 0 .887 0.37502 0.4996
INTM03 0 .28154 0 .11374 2 .475 0
.01332 0.2277
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3 Analysis of Entry to Job after Unemployment
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is employed
(including less than 16 hours or self-employment) at the time of the
interviews . (ii) The analysis is a bivariate probit sample selection model,
with selection on economic activity (see also analysis 2) . The method is
full-information maximum likelihood . (iii) Only the results relating to
job entry are shown in detail.
(b) Overleaf: Analysis for male only, with ETU areas coded as a single
dummy variable.
FIML Estimates of Bivariate Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable JOB/ACT
Number of observations 1361
Iterations completed 34
Log likelihood function
-942.5940
Selection model based on ACTIV
Means for vars . 1- 31 are after selection .
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e. P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant -1 .7074 0 .29973 -5 .697 0.00000
AG ER -0.12652E-01 0 .67401 E-02 -1 .877 0.06050 35 .18
Q25 I B -0.38856E-01 0 .27551 E-0I -1 .410 0.15844 2 .288
NEMP 0.88346E-01 0 .58893E-01 1 .500 0.13359 0 .6433
ILL -0.10390 0 .17901 -0 .580 0.56164 0 .2211
CARER 0.44693E-0I 0 .23060 0 .194 0.84632 0.6452E-01
NACTS 0.10424 0 .26418E-0I 3 .946 0.00008 3 .577
TOTJOBPC 0.12304E-0I 0 .15852E-02 7 .762 0.00000 34 .19
DEGREE 0.41614E-01 0 .24883 0 .167 0.86718 0 .5503E-01
ALEV 0 .50416 0 .21444 2 .351 0.01872 0 .5693E-01
OLEV -0.72677E-0 I 0 .14641 -0 .496 0.61962 0 .1860
CSELEV 0 .18089 0 .14558 1 .243 0.21402 0 .1736
PROF -0.35900 0 .24803 -1 .447 0 .14779 0 .5598E-0 I
ANYVOC -0 .40606E-0 I 0 .10678 -0 .380 0 .70375 0 .3786
DRIVER 0 .26286 0 .11938 2 .202 0 .02767 0 .5740
SCHREC -0 .41147 0 .13996 -2 .940 0 .00328 0 .2751
MARRIED 0 .46976E-02 0 .19001 0 .025 0 .98028 0 .2619
SEPDIV -0 .51062 0 .21753 -2 .347 0 .01891 0 .1214
HISAV 0
.57073 0 .36232 1 .575 0 .11521 0 .2467E-0I
MODSAV -0 .12153 0 .18880 -0 .644 0 .51975 0 .7685E-01
OTHINC -0 .34957E-02 0 .28726E-02 -1 .217 0 .22364 5 .332
ROOWNS 0 .48246E-0 I 0 .25579 0 .189 0 .85040 0 .9108E-01
RMORTS 0 .18996 0 .20328 0.934 0 .35007 0 .1338
RSRENTS 0 .88837E-01 0 .17793 0.499 0 .61758 0 .1613
RPRENTS -0
.54848 0 .28934 -1 .896 0 .05801 0 .8824E-0 I
URBSML 0 .18211 0 .12631 1 .442 0 .14936 0 .3055
RURAREA 0 .20154 0 .15334 1 .314 0 .18873 0 .1727
SEASIDE -0 .24886 0 .15202 -1 .637 0 .10161 0 .2353
ETU 0 .22310 0 .10834 2 .059 0 .03946 0 .6300
INTMO2 0 .11582 0
.12515 0 .925 0 .35475 0 .4877
INTM03 0 .38859 0 .14513 2 .678 0 .00742 0 .2372
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3 Analysis of Entry to Job after Unemployment
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent is employed
(including less than 16 hours or self-employment) at the time of the
interviews. (ii) The analysis is a bivariate probit sample selection model,
with selection on economic activity (see also analysis 2) . The method is
full-information maximum likelihood . (iii) Only the results relating to
job entry are shown in detail.
(c) Overleaf: results for men only, with ETU `A' and `B' areas coded as
separate dummies
FIML Estimates of Bivariate Probit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable JOBACT
Number of observations 1361
Iterations completed 34
Log likelihood function
-941 .6608
Selection model based on ACTIV
Means for vars . 1- 32 are after selection .
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant -1 .6988 0 .30014 -5 .660 0 .00000
AGER -0 .13068E-0I 0 .67668E-02 -1 .931 0 .05347 35 .18
Q25 I B
-0 .3945 I E-0 I 0 .27454E-0 I -1 .437 0 .15073 2.288
NEMP 0 .91044E-01 0 .58988E-01 1
.543 0 .12273 0.6433
ILL
-0 .93057E-01 0 .17946 -0 .519 0 .60409 0.2211
CARER 0 .45690E-01 0 .23055 0 .198 0 .84291 0 .6452E-0I
NACTS 0 .10466 0
.26412E-01 3 .963 0 .00007 3 .577
TOTJOBPC 0 .12229E-0I 0 .15891 E-02 7 .695 0 .00000 34 .19
DEGREE 0 .37622E-0I 0 .25032 0 .150 0 .88053 0.5503E-01
ALEV 0 .49700 0 .21507 2.311 0.02084 0.5693E-0 I
OLEV -0 .70874E-01 0 .14618
-0.485 0.62779 0 .1860
CSELEV 0 .17733 0.14646 1 .211 0.22599 0 .1736
PROF -0 .35952 0.24851
-1 .447 0.14798 0.5598E-01
ANYVOC -0 .34386E-0I 0.10893 -0.316 0.75224 0 .3786
DRIVER 0.26038 0.11980 2 .173 0.02974 0 .5740
SCHREC -0 .41040 0.14004 -2 .931 0 .00338 0 .2751
MARRIED 0.87775E-02 0.19017 0 .046 0 .96319 0 .2619
SEPDIV -0 .50404 0.21890
-2 .303 0 .02130 0.1214
HISAV 0.58326 0.36477 1 .599 0 .10983 0
.2467E-01
MODSAV -0.12592 0 .18863
-0 .668 0 .50439 0 .7685E-01
OTH INC -0.34554E-02 0 .28720E-02 -1 .203 0 .22892 5 .332
ROOWNS 0.54186E-01 0 .25693 0 .211 0 .83297 0 .9108E-01
RMORTS 0.20038 0 .20428 0 .981 0 .32665 0.1338
RSRENTS 0.93570E-01 0 .17712 0 .528 0 .59730 0.1613
RPRENTS
-0.5503 I 0 .28735 -1 .915 0 .05548 0 .8824E-0I
URBSML 0.17749 0 .12689 1 .399 0 .16189 0 .3055
RURAREA 0.21880 0 .15464 1 .415 0 .15710 0 .1727
SEASIDE -0.25226 0 .15189 -1 .661 0 .09676 0 .2353
ETUA 0 .16456 0 .12696 1 .296 0.19494 0 .3131
ETUB 0 .28000 0 .12661 2.21
	
1 0.02701 0 .3169
INTM02 0 .11424 0 .12499 0.914 0.36072 0 .4877
INTMO3 0 .39244 0 .14529 2.701 0.00691 0 .2372
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4 Analysis of Search Intensity - male and female combined, current job-
seekers only
Notes : (i) The dependent variable is the frequency of job applications in
the past 4 weeks, grouped as 0 = none, 1 = 1-5, 2=6 or more . (iii) The
method is multinomial logit . (iii) The first block of results in the table
shows the effects on moderate intensity v . no applications, and the second
block shows the effects on high intensity v . no applications .
Multinomial Logit Model
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent variable NJOBAPPS
Number of observations 873
Iterations completed 5
Log likelihood function -878.0547
Restricted log likelihood -950.9126
Chi-squared 145 .7158
Degrees of freedom 64
Significance level 0 .0000000
Variable
	
Coefficient Standard Error z=bls.e .
	
P[ Z z] Mean of X
(I) Effects on odds= I v. odds=0
Constant 1 .2901 0.95464 1 .351 0 .17656
FEM -0 .37281 0.21894 -1 .703 0 .08860 0 .2279
AGER -0 .30803E-01 0.10593E-0 I -2 .908 0 .00364 35 .21
NEMP 0 .24640E-01 0.1 1892 0 .207 0 .83585 0 .5979
ILL
-0 .37223 0.21340 -1 .744 0 .08 I
	
I
	
I 0.2188
CARER 0 .18376 0.35594 0 .516 0 .60567 0.5956E-0 I
NACTS 0 .57166E-01 0.47111E-01 1 .213 0 .22497 3 .428
TOTJOBPC 0 .49852E-02 0.31469E-02 1 .584 0 .11316 30.22
SCHREC 0
.77819E-01 0 .19994 0 .389 0 .69712 0.2910
FCEXP -0 .36258 0 .34942 -1 .038 0 .29942 0.7102E-0I
DEGREE -0
.11818 0 .40161 -0.294 0 .76856 0.6300E-0I
ALEV 0 .87726 0 .49583 1 .769 0 .07685 0.5613E-01
OLEV 0 .27827 0 .26614 1 .046 0 .29576 0.1982
CSELEV 0 .94557E-01 0 .28200 0.335 0 .73739 0.1672
PROF -0.25928 0 .38928 -0.666 0 .50538 0.6529E-01
ANYVOC 0 .12250 0 .19212 0 .638 0 .52371 0.3826
DRIVER 0 .11368 0 .20283 0 .560 0 .57514 0.5097
MARRIED
-0.93985E-01 0 .31027 -0.303 0 .76195 0.2520
SEPDIV 0 .59561 E-0 I 0 .30208 0.197 0 .84370 0.1501
HISAV 0 .43689 0 .64441 0.678 0 .49779 0.2176E-01
MODSAV -0.37961 0 .34656 -1 .095 0 .27335 0.8133E-01
OTHINC -0.11090E-01 0 .51589E-02 -2.150 0 .03158 4.632
ROOWNS 0.51942 0 .38720 I .34 I 0 .17977 0.9278E-01
RMORTS 0.53913 0 .36318 1 .484 0 .13769 0.1260
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
RSRENTS 0 .31180 0 .29546 1 .055 0 .29130 0 .1649
RPRENTS 0 .40010 0 .32951 1 .214 0 .22467 0 .1134
DEBT -0 .28945E-0 I 0 .22687 -0.128 0 .89848 0 .1970
RURAL -0 .63529E-01 0 .23187
-0.274 0 .78409 0.2222
SMTOWN 0 .23686 0 .20589 1 .150 0.24996 0.3517
WWAGEXP -0 .43711E-02 0 .20207E-02 -2.163 0.03053 120 .8
ETUA
-0 .14676 0 .21681 -0 .677 0.49846 0.3150
ETUB 0 .34588 0 .21763 1 .589 0.11200 0.3150
INTMO 0 .84760E-02 0 .99335E-0I 0 .085 0 .93200 7 .959
(ii) Effects on odds=2 v. odds=0
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=b/s.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 1 .2782 1 .0134 1 .26 I 0 .20723
FEM -0 .40588 0.23545 -1 .724 0 .08474 0 .2279
AGER
-0.29798E-01 0.11566E-0I -2 .576 0 .00998 35 .21
NEMP 0.48537E-02 0.12384 0 .039 0 .96874 0 .5979
ILL
-0.40294 0.23284 -1 .731 0 .08354 0 .2188
CARER -0.17953 0.41236 -0 .435 0 .66329 0 .5956E-01
NACTS 0.51198E-01 0.49706E-0 I 1 .030 0 .30301 3 .428
TOT)OBPC 0 .10574E-01 0 .33567E-02 3 .150 0 .00163 30 .22
SCHREC 0 .52861 0 .20672 2.557 0 .01055 0 .2910
FCEXP 0 .78125E-01 0 .35966 0.217 0 .82804 0 .7102E-01
DEGREE 0 .76215 0 .38488 1 .980 0 .04768 0 .6300E-0 I
ALEV 1 .3581 0 .51368 2.644 0.00820 0 .5613E-01
OLEV 0 .89214 0 .27490 3 .245 0.00117 0.1982
CSELEV 0
.51667 0 .29342 1 .761 0.07826 0.1672
PROF -0 .24244 0 .39479 -0.614 0.53915 0 .6529E-0I
ANYVOC 0 .10400 0 .20166 0 .516 0.60606 0.3826
DRIVER 0 .12406 0 .21629 0 .574 0.56624 0.5097
MARRIED 0 .95808E-02 0 .33101 0 .029 0.97691 0 .2520
SEPDIV -0 .36708 0 .34037 -1 .078 0.28082 0 .1501
HISAV -0 .80996E-0 I 0 .73962
-0 .110 0.91280 0.2176E-01
MODSAV -0 .49575E-01 0 .34401 -0 .144 0.88541 0.8133E-01
OTHINC -0 .68360E-02 0 .44313E-02 -1 .543 0.12291 4 .632
ROOWNS 0 .84559E-0 I 0 .43052 0 .196 0.84429 0.9278E-0 I
RMORTS 0 .18837 0 .38679 0 .487 0 .62624 0 .1260
RSRENTS 0 .44555E-01 0 .32520 0 .137 0 .89102 0 .1649
RPRENTS 0,26517 0 .34990 0 .758 0 .44854 0 .1134
DEBT -0 .73010E-01 0 .24592 -0 .297 0 .76656 0 .1970
RURAL -0 .26170 0 .24462 -1 .070 0 .28471 0 .2222
SMTOWN -0 .24158 0.22117
-1 .092 0 .27471 0 .3517
WWAGEXP -0 .89413E-03 0.19546E-02 -0 .457 0 .64736 120 .8
ETUA 0 .18988 0.22376 0 .849 0 .39611 0 .3150
ETUB
-0 .53973E-01 0.23966 -0 .225 0 .82182 0 .3150
INTMO -0 .10029 0.10651 -0 .942 0 .34640 7 .959
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ETU
Unemployment Analyses
5 Analysis of Wage Expectations, male and female jobseekers
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the log of the minimum weekly
wage sought. (ii) The method is OLS . (iii) The analysis includes both
current jobseekers and those expecting to search again in the future,
provided that they gave both minimum weekly wage and the hours to
which this wage applied.
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = ONE
Dependent variable is LNWWEXP Mean = 4 .71151, S .D. = 0 .4646
Model size :Observations = 1024, Parameters = 35, Deg .Fr. = 989
Residuals : Sum of squares = 134 .940
	
Std.Dev. = 0.36938
Fit :
	
R-squared = 0.38886, Adjusted R-squared = 0 .36785
Model test : F[ 35,
	
989] = 18 .51,
	
Prob value = 0 .00000
Diagnostic : Log-L = -415 .3524, Restricted([ =0) Log-L = -667.4747
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls .e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
Constant 3 .3208 0.17753 18.705 0 .00000
FEM
-0 .95621 E-0I 0.28900E-0 I -3,309 0 .00094 0.2510
INACTIV 0 .94470E-01 0.40841 E-0I 2.313 0 .02072 0 .9863E-01
HRSEXP 0 .29749E-01 0.16939E-02 17,563 0 .00000 36.84
AG ER 0 .14515E-01 0.70452E-02 2.060 0 .03937 35 .1 6
AGESQ -0 .15080E-03 0.88700E-04 -1 .700 0 .08911 1436.
NEMP -0 .31016E-01 0.15806E-01 -1 .962 0 .04972 0.5967
ILL 0 .10127E-01 0.28789E-01 0.352 0 .72502 0.2490
CARER 0 .70864E-0 I 0.48850E-01 1 .45 I 0 .14687 0 .6445E-0 I
NACTS -0 .53024E-02 0.62087E-02 -0.854 0 .39309 3 .401
TOTJOBPC 0 .20428E-03 0.41328E-03 0.494 0 .62111 30.19
DEGREE 0 .17079 0.52015E-01 3 .283 0 .00103 0 .6152E-01
ALEV 0 .52340E-01 0.51324E-01 1 .020 0 .30783 0 .6543E-0 I
OLEV 0 .42921 E-0I 0.33979E-01 1 .263 0 .20653 0.1963
CSELEV 0 .38524E-01 0.36603E-01 1 .052 0 .29258 0.1592
PROF 0 .13581 0.50352E-01 2 .697 0 .00699 0 .6445E-0I
ANYVOC 0
.90526E-02 0.25070E-01 0 .361 0 .71803 0.3740
DRIVER 0 .55122E-01 0.26392E-0 I 2 .089 0 .03675 0.4971
MARRIED 0 .80719E-01 0.42257E-01 1 .910 0 .0561 I 0.2412
SEPDIV 0 .36789E-02 0.41869E-01 0 .088 0 .92998 0.1523
HISAV -0 .26120E-01 0.85082E-0I -0 .307 0 .75884 0 .2246E-0I
MODSAV 0 .41329E-01 0.48349E-01 0 .855 0 .39266 0,7031E-01
OTHINC 0 .87818E-03 0.46364E-03 1 .894 0 .05821 4.763
LIVPAR -0 .49291 E-02 0.38208E-0 I -0 .129 0 .89735 0.4287
RMORTS 0 .10344 0.43258E-01 2 .391 0 .01680 0.1318
RSRENTS 0 .97817E-01 0.38937E-01 2 .512 0 .01200 0.1709
RPRENTS 0 .87032E-0 I 0.46277E-0 I 1 .88 I 0 .06001 0.1
	
1
	
13
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z=bls
.e . P[ Z z] Mean of X
WORRY 0 .21527E-02 0 .28262E-01 0 .076 0.93928 0 .5654
Q I29 -0,16896E-01 0 .12152E-01 -1 .390 0 .16441 3 .273
DEBT 0 .72945E-01 0 .32693E-01 2,23 I 0 .02567 0.1973
RURAL 0 .22296E-01 0 .31071E-01 0 .718 0 .47300 0.2197
SMTOWN 0 .21283E-0I 0.27379E-01 0 .777 0 .43695 0.3545
ETUA 0 .66641 E-01 0.28701 E-0I 2 .322 0 .02024 0,3184
ETUB 0 .11798E-01 0.29420E-01 0.401 0 .68841 0.3125
INTMO
-0 .11472E-01 0.13029E-0I -0.880 0 .37859 7 .954
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APPENDIX E UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE BASES FOR KEY SURVEY
`TARGET GROUPS'
Table E
.1 provides the unweighted base numbers for the key target groups
used in many of the tables in this report
. These are provided separately
for the Workers-in-work and the Unemployed sample . The numbers in
bold indicate the key cells for workers-in-work who had remained in
work at the point of interview and the members of the unemployed
sample who were still out of work.
Table E.1 Unweighted sample bases for key survey
`target groups'
Employed
Sample
Unemployed
Sample
A B
	
C A B C
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hours 57 60 48 29 19 23
Single male, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 63 79 47 I
	
I 13 22
Single female, under 25, working 16+ hours 77 70 66 21 5 10
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ hours 103 108 72 7 10 4
Single male, under 25, not working 46 55 23 108 94 138
Single male, over 25, not working 64 62 39 140 159 183
Single female, under 25, not working 30 19 18 5 I 44 49
Single female, over 25, not working 46 61 16 87 94 78
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 56 74 44 9 9 6
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 1
	
12 126 76 12 16 I
	
I
Man works 16+ hours, woman not in work 45 42 33 22 15 13
Woman works 16+ hours, man not in work 80 72 67 24 23 28
Couple, not working 66 71 59 118 118 114
Status not determined 6 2 3 I 5 I
TOTAL 851 901 611 640 624 680
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0
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0
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13 . Researching the Disability Working
	
0
Allowance Self Assessment Form
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14 . Child Support Unit National Client
	
0
Survey 1992
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16 . Contributions Agency Customer
	
0
Satisfaction Survey 1992
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0
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20 . Invalidity Benefit: A longitudinal
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0 11 762471 3 £30.00
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0 11 762533 7 £30.00
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67 . Maternity Rights and Benefits in
Britain
0 11 762536 1 £35 .00
68 . Claimants' Perceptions of the Claim
Process
0 11 762541 8 £23.00
69 . Delivering Benefits to Unemployed
People
0 11 762553 1 £27.00
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0 11 762557 4 £20.00
71 . Stepping-Stones to Employment 0 11 762568 X £27.00
72 . Dynamics of Retirement 0 11 762571 X £36.00
73 . Unemployment and Jobseeking before
Jobseeker ' s Allowance
0 11 762576 0 £34.00
74 . Customer views on Service Delivery
in the Child Support Agency
0 11 762583 3 £27.00
75 . Experiences of Occupational Pension
Scheme Wind-Up
0 11 762584 1 £27 .00
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People
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77 . What Happens to Lone Parents 0 11 762598 3 £31 .00
78 . Lone Parents Lives 0 11 762598 1 £34 .00
79 . Moving into Work : Bridging Housing
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82 . Pension Scheme Investment Policies 1 84123 002 2 £28.00
83 . Pensions and Retirement Planning 1 84123 003 0 £28.00
84 . Self-Employed People and National
Insurance Contributions
1 84123 004 9 £28.00
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86 . Leaving Incapacity Benefit 1 84123 087 1 £34.00
87 . Unemployment and Jobseeking:
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88 . Attitudes to the Welfare State and
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89 . New Deal for Lone Parents:
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